in the present crisis. Whether or not VII Corps would eventually be deployed to southwest Asia was a national policy decision, but VII Corps was available, it was relatively close (Germany is about the same distance from Saudi Arabia as New York from California), for the time being it was not really needed for the defense of Europe, and it was a heavy, armored corps, much of which had recently trained for offensive, force-oriented missions — the kind of missions that would surely be necessary if the decision were made to forcibly uproot the Iraqis from Kuwait. So it was certainly possible that all or part of the corps would go to Saudi. More to the point, Franks knew that fellow soldiers were in a tough spot, the United States was deeply committed, and it was up to him to anticipate and look to the future where VII Corps was concerned. For Franks, the strategic situation resembled the days in 1945 when the European war ended, permitting forces to be shifted from that theater to the Pacific. The commanders had to find out first what was going on in that other theater of operations.
In consequence, he had the corps staff read themselves into the crisis — just in case. Corps G-2, Colonel Gene Klaus, and Corps G-3, Colonel Stan Cherrie, under the direction of the chief of staff, Brigadier General John Landry, set up a situation room at Kelly Barracks (an old Wehrmacht complex near Stuttgart that was the headquarters for VII Corps) in a vaulted-door, secure conference room facility in a basement. They set up maps, monitored the intelligence communications traffic they had obtained through their own parent headquarters in Heidelberg, posted the disposition of Iraqi forces, and of U.S. and other Coalition forces; they read up on the Iraqi army, and in general did their homework about the operation that by then was called Desert Shield. They were marching to the sound of the guns.
At the same time, Franks had planners looking into moving the corps from Germany to the Persian Gulf. Since he knew this would be a truly enormous undertaking, if they were called to do it, he wanted to know in advance what would be involved. As it happened, the most obvious route for the corps — to go through Italian ports — was not the best one. Heavy combat equipment could not pass through the tunnels in the Alps. Thus the fastest route, counterintuitively, looked to be through the northern ports of Germany.
He also had his planners look at an indirect approach to forcing the Iraqis out of Kuwait. 'What if we moved VII Corps to eastern Turkey,' he asked, 'and then attacked toward Baghdad? Is that a workable alternative? Could we move our corps through the terrain and could we logistically support the operation?' After some corps planning work, it began to look like a workable option. As far as they could see, no Iraqi force was available to stop them. If Saddam saw an armored corps on the move to Baghdad, he might quickly decide his capital was worth more than Kuwait.
Franks informally discussed the Turkey option to his own higher commanders, General Crosbie ('Butch') Saint, the U.S. Army Europe commander, and General Jim McCarthy, USAF, deputy commander of U.S. forces in Europe, both bold thinkers, and they both liked the idea. But when they tried the concept out on still higher echelons, Franks's idea was squelched.
The American buildup in the Gulf was directed by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief (CINC) of CENTCOM (Central Command), headquartered in Tampa, Florida. CENTCOM is one of six United States multiservice — joint — commands, its area of military responsibility covering most of southwest Asia and the Middle East, with the exception of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, which are under EUCOM (European Command). Before the crisis in the Gulf, CENTCOM existed only as a planning body, which is to say that there were no actual troops under CENTCOM control. In case of need, troops from all the services would be given to CENTCOM (in Army terminology, they would be 'chopped' to CENTCOM) from other geographical commands. CENTCOM would be the 'supported' command, and other joint commands, such as EUCOM and FORSCOM, would be 'supporting.' CENTCOM trained with the various contingency units, who would normally be 'chopped' to their command if need arose.
In August 1990, XVIII Airborne Corps from FORSCOM was chopped to CENTCOM and immediately began deploying to Saudi Arabia, along with air and naval forces. The XVIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Gary Luck, was what the Army calls a contingency corps. It was specifically configured to deploy worldwide to meet a variety of circumstances, and to do so rapidly. It was made up of the 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by Major General James Johnson; the 101st Airborne Division, commanded by Major General J. H. Binford Peay; the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), commanded by Major General Barry McCaffrey (a heavy division); the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Brigadier General John Tilelli; and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Doug Starr. Units of XVIII Corps began closing in theater in early August. The last to arrive, the 1st Cavalry Division, closed on 22 October.
Fred Franks was sure that if VII Corps or VII Corps units were to join XVIII Corps in the Gulf, they would know what to do. He was not certain who would be called, but knew his job was to have them ready if they were needed. If a whole corps was needed, they were the right team, he knew, to give the growing U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia real offensive punch on the ground. That decision would come in time, but there were false starts, false alarms, and zigzags along the way.
In August, after aviation elements from neighboring V Corps were alerted and then deployed, Franks asked and received General Saint's OK to alert his own aviation brigade for possible deployment of an attack aviation battalion. Though they worked hard to put the move together, the battalion did not deploy. Even so, Colonel Johnnie Hitt, the 11th Aviation Brigade commander, and his troops taught the rest of the corps a great deal about preparing for the move. As it turned out, this was an important planning drill for Franks and the corps staff. At about the same time, the first VII Corps troops to actually go to the Gulf were alerted and deployed — two NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) reconnaissance platoons, equipped with German-built FUCHS (FOX) vehicles.
Later in September, Franks had a meeting on force drawdown with General Saint at U.S. Army Europe Headquarters in Heidelberg, about forty-five minutes from Stuttgart by helicopter. It was clear by then that VII Corps HQ was soon going to be deactivated. 'Look, sir,' Franks suggested, 'if another corps is needed, why don't you just send us to the Gulf? We're already halfway there. We're going to be out of a mission in Central Europe. The decision is, V Corps will be the residual European corps with headquarters in Frankfurt. Why don't you just send VII Corps? We know what to do. We've had our BCTPs. You know about the training we've been doing. Send us.'
Saint was open to that idea and passed it on to higher command. But nothing immediately came of it, at least to Franks's knowledge.
By October, it was becoming increasingly obvious to the military leadership in Washington that the XVIII Corps was not going to provide them with an adequate offensive option against the Iraqis, if the President chose to exercise such an option. And so, in due course, Franks was alerted to send to the Gulf the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Ron Griffith. But soon this deployment was put on hold.
Later in October, he received official instructions to begin planning to send the whole corps. But a few days after that, the message from higher up took another zigzag: 'Stand down on your planning,' he was told. 'But don't throw anything away.'
'WILCO,' Franks and his team, good soldiers, replied, but the order was a painful jolt for all of them. They wanted to go; they expected to go; and they had all been working hard to prepare to go. And then… well, what did
And just a few days after that, on 2 November, there was still another zigzag: 'No, revive that, but keep it very, very close hold' — meaning, under tight security, with very few people in the know.
A very small planning cell was reconstituted, including Franks's deputy, Brigadier General Gene Daniel; chief of staff, Brigadier General John Landry; Support Command commander (VII Corps logistics), Brigadier General Bob McFarlin; corps G-3, Colonel Stan Cherrie; G-3 plans chief, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Goedkoop; deputy G-4, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Stafford; G-4 planner, Lieutenant Colonel Bob Browne; and G-1 planner, Major Paul Liebeck. It was a smart, talented team.
The days after 2 November saw Franks shuttling back and forth to Heidelberg and General Saint. Under the cover of discussions on the planned drawdown of VII Corps, he and Saint worked on the troop list and all the other myriad choices needed for the deployment of VII Corps to the Gulf. It did not take them long to realize that the Cold War, NATO-oriented VII Corps would not work in that theater. The new mission demanded a new team. VII Corps would have to be reconstituted from a terrain-oriented, defensive corps to a maneuver, contingency corps, with fully modernized maneuver battalions, equipped with the latest M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicles — not an easy transformation.
To make matters even more difficult, the corps would be moving to a location that was, for all practical purposes, empty… nowhere. VII Corps was now configured to fight in Central Europe, where they operated within a sophisticated infrastructure of communications, roads, railroads, supplies, and fuel. In Central Europe, the corps
