also normally availed itself of what is called host-nation support: that is, territorial units of the German army and some German civilian agencies were set up to supplement the corps's need for logistics, troops, equipment, and supplies. Saudi Arabia, at best, offered a much more austere operating environment. In Saudi, there was little to no infrastructure. When you're out in the middle of the desert, you have nothing
They would have to deploy. It was never intended for a corps to plan and execute its own strategic deployment. Both USAREUR and EUCOM HQ sent planning cells to Kelly Barracks, and Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, Saint's deputy, was to be a big help.
General Saint, who was himself the leading proponent of mobile armored warfare in the Army, wanted VII Corps to be successful and to give them what they needed, yet at the same time, he and his boss, General Jack Galvin, EUCOM commander, faced serious tensions between the needs of VII Corps in the Gulf and the needs of their own residual mission in Europe. VII Corps was already forward-deployed into a theater with an immediate and very serious mission; now it was to be deployed to still another theater. In such cases, conflicts between the two theaters' needs are inevitable. General Saint had to balance the residual Army mission capability of the forces remaining after VII Corps had deployed with the need to provide the corps with the necessary forces to accomplish their mission in CENTCOM in Saudi Arabia. It was not an easy choice for him, and it was not always easy for General Franks to accept what General Saint wanted him to take. At times the discussions between the two generals about the right mix of forces and amount of support grew heated.
Heated discussions between generals are not uncommon. To Fred Franks, this kind of candor is expected behavior. It goes with the job of general. Commanders who do not pound the table to make their case for accomplishing their mission are
Heated discussions require a particular kind of atmosphere in order to be productive, however. They demand openness on both sides. There has to be a true exchange, with each side asking questions and arguing his case, and then when all the arguments are exhausted, the senior commander has to make his decision. After that, it's 'Yes, sir, WILCO,' and you get to work and execute.
It's the senior commander's responsibility to create the work atmosphere that suits him, and that will be the most productive. It's called the command climate, and it's a function of a commander's command style. Coming out of cavalry, Fred Franks and Butch Saint were used to a command climate of fast-moving, open, often-animated discussions. Other commanders, either consciously or as a result of personality or the service culture they come out of, will favor something different. General Norman Schwarzkopf, for instance, was a passionate, charismatic leader with a famously thermonuclear temper and an equally famous propensity to verbally gut any subordinate who — in his perception — crossed him. All commanders like the visible and enthusiastic support of subordinates. Schwarzkopf went further. He didn't welcome contradiction, much less the kind of openness and candor that is often the way with other commanders. This difference would become important later.
This is the makeup of VII Corps that Generals Franks and Saint hammered out:
From their European VII Corps divisions, they would take only the 1st Armored. From Europe, they would additionally take the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the Support Command, plus other corps regimental and brigade units, totaling about 42,000 of the original 110,000 soldiers — in the end, only 40 percent of the original European corps. The rest of VII Corps would come from other units in Europe and the continental United States. These would include units from the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve, who would join the Support Command and the existing corps brigade units. VII Corps also would eventually include the British 1st Armored Division, but they had no idea of that in November. Some major specifics: The 3rd Armored Division, from V Corps, commanded by Major General Paul 'Butch' Funk, would go in place of the 3rd Infantry Division (though a brigade from the 3rd Infantry Division did go). And the 1st Infantry Division would deploy with two brigades from Fort Riley, and add the 2nd Armored Division forward brigade from northern Germany, which would join them in Saudi Arabia. Three complete artillery brigades (one from V Corps in Germany, one from the Arkansas National Guard, and one from III Corps in the United States) were added to the 210th Brigade, one of three in NATO VII Corps, to form its corps artillery. The VII Corps support command in Germany — in that built-up modern infrastructure — numbered 7,500 U.S. soldiers. In Desert Storm — in the austere desert environment — they grew to over 26,000 soldiers, including a medical brigade of fifteen hospitals.
Each of the eight non-division brigades in the corps also grew. For example, two brigades of three battalions each were added to the 7th Engineer Brigade. And to increase air defense capabilities, a composite air defense task force of Patriot and HAWK units was added. Many of these additions, made by Franks's 1959 West Point classmate and FORSCOM commander, General Ed Burba, came from the Reserve component (National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve) in the States. From the Reserve component, 21,000 soldiers and their equipment were added (19,000 in units and another 2,000 as individual replacements). In a little over ninety days, VII Corps grew by a total of 124,000 soldiers. And when the corps attacked the Republican Guards, it was a new corps team of 146,000 U.S. and British soldiers and close to 50,000 vehicles.
Once this essentially new corps team was in the desert, just to live and train, everything had to be created from what they brought with them — shelter, sanitation, waste disposal, mail system, water, and training ranges for weapons firing and maneuver practice. Beyond that, capabilities to attack over long distances had to be provided, such as additional trucks for fuel and ammunition, additional communication (capable of reaching longer distances), and additional support of all types, such as medical personnel and engineers (to build roads, airfields, and breach minefields).
Units and equipment had to be added to make up the difference. VII Corps had to become a corps much like XVIII Corps, capable of being deployed, then of fighting and supporting itself. That meant adding many units for a contingency role for which they had not prepared. Although XVIII Corps also had to add units for their mission, for them it proved less of an adjustment, for they were already trained and configured for that. VII Corps had been deployed, permanently stationed, and configured to fight in Central Europe. There had been no thought to making it a 'contingency corps,' capable of being picked up from Germany and deployed worldwide. In going through this experience, VII Corps was to be a microcosm of what the entire U.S. Army would be required to do over the next few years — that is, rapid tailoring to accomplish missions that were difficult to predict far in advance. Such rapid tailoring is now part of the U.S. Army's revised (1993) doctrine, and is now done with relative ease (as we have seen recently in Army deployments to Haiti and Bosnia).
So for VII Corps it was not a matter of picking up the existing Cold War VII Corps in Germany, moving it to Saudi Arabia, fighting the Iraqis, then boarding ships and planes and coming home. In a little less than 100 days, a new corps was built from a no-notice start; it was moved via ship and air to southwest Asia; units got used to operating together; and then they fought a major land campaign.
The VII Corps name was the same, but in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, it was quite a different corps.
When VII Corps did deploy — and even at this late date it was not certain that they would — VII Corps would no longer be part of the NATO coalition in Germany, but of a new coalition, led by a new command team, General Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM, and Lieutenant General John Yeosock, Third Army, in a part of the world where they had absolutely no experience. They had a lot of work ahead of them, and not a lot of time to accomplish it.
On Thursday, 8 November, Franks was again in Heidelberg with General Saint. At that meeting, the final troop list was approved, and many other details were worked out.
Sometime during the meeting, Franks asked, 'Sir, when do you think we might get the word to go?'
'Should be sometime later today, I think,' Saint answered.
