Into the Storm: On the Ground in Iraq

embrace his concept for defeating Saddam Hussein with the same passionate intensity that he himself felt.

The CINC walked into the room after everyone was seated. During his remarks, he occasionally referred to an outline on Army standard 'butcher paper' charts; off to his side was a fifteen-foot-wide map of Kuwait and Iraq.

Franks and those around him took notes. For Franks and the others from VII Corps — the new guys in town, who had had only a few hours to get a sense of the country and what they were about to face — it was a time to take in and internalize. (New guys should be seen, and not heard.) They weren't ready with anything like operational questions, and even if they had been, it was clear that Schwarzkopf was not looking for feedback that day. Thus, from the CINC's opening words, Franks was intent on mentally processing the concept the CINC was laying out. ('What do I have to do to make my part of it work?') He was excited ('Here is our mission! It's a great mission! It's exactly what I want us to do!'), but it was a sharply focused, interior kind of excitement.

The briefing followed logical military format: it was a statement of the mission, preceded by enemy and friendly capabilities, and some restraints the CINC wanted imposed on his commanders.

He started by talking about security. Since the best source of intelligence the Iraqis had was the Western press, and since it was certain that the press would hit all the commanders with questions whenever the chance presented itself, commanders must not, he emphasized fiercely, discuss operational matters with them. 'I will deal brutally with anyone who compromises anything from operations,' Franks quoted in his journal.

These were the CINC's strategic objectives: to throw Iraq out of Kuwait, restore the government of Kuwait, defend Saudi Arabia, and free the U.S. hostages then held by Iraq. To accomplish those objectives, he continued, they would have to go after the Iraqi center of gravity, which he identified as Saddam Hussein himself, their chemical and biological weapons capability, and the Republican Guards.

The Iraqis' strength was in their numbers (at this point twenty-six divisions) and in their chemical capability. Their weakness was in their over-centralized command and control, their supply lines (they fought during the day and resupplied at night), and their limited air.

U.S. strength lay in air (especially in projection of strategic airpower), in ground technology (especially in tanks and at night), and in leadership.

At that point, Schwarzkopf outlined U.S. battlefield goals: 'The first thing that we're going to have to do is attack leadership, and go after his command and control. Number two, we've got to gain and maintain air superiority. Number three, we need to cut totally his supply lines. We also need to destroy his chemical, biological, and nuclear capability. And finally, we need to destroy — not surround — I want you to destroy the Republican Guards. When you're done with them, I don't want them to be an effective fighting force.'

The campaign would have four phases:

• PHASE I: Strategic air campaign (six days) aimed at Iraqi command and control, gaining air superiority, and destruction of strategic logistics.

• PHASE II: Gain air superiority in the Kuwaiti theater.

• PHASE III: Conduct battlefield preparation; that is, conduct tactical air operations on Iraqi positions on the ground in the Kuwaiti theater of operations (about twelve days).

• PHASE IV: Ground attack.

By now you could feel the intensity in the room. There was total concentration. There were no questions.

At that point the CINC turned to the plan for the ground offensive.

He listed the forces available as principally four corps equivalents: the U.S. Marines, Arab Corps, VII and XVIII Corps. Though the strategic aim of the offensive was to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait, the tactical aim of the offensive maneuver was to close the Iraqis — and especially the RGFC — in a box in and near Kuwait, to maneuver against them with the U.S. heavy punch, and then to destroy them. He talked about the adjustments that needed to be made as the enemy kept changing, and thought that it might not be until D-15 that battle plans would finally be decided.

The area of the maneuver was vast — larger than the state of Virginia. Part of the box's sides were natural, and part were, or would be, created by Coalition fighting forces. Looking at Kuwait: to the east was the natural barrier of the Gulf; to the north was the Euphrates, a potential barrier once air cut the bridges over it; to the south was Saudi Arabia, now closed to the Iraqis because of Desert Shield forces; and to the west was the desert vastness, the main corridor of attack. Schwarzkopf discussed the trafficability of the desert and directed the commanders to pay attention to that.

After noting that detailed intelligence of the Iraqi barrier system would be available by D-15, he emphasized, 'Logistics is the long pole in the tent' — commanders must be prepared with logistics to support their operations — and directed them all to begin offensive training immediately. He added that he would reposition forces when the Iraqi recon capability was gone, and directed the Arab forces to liberate Kuwait City. And finally, he said, his worst-case scenario was that the attacking Coalition forces would be hung up in the Iraqi obstacle system and get hit by chemical attack. (Franks was to hear Schwarzkopf constantly stress the need to reduce casualties, a drive he shared with the CINC.)

He concluded, passionately, 'Let me leave you with one thought, guys. In order for this to succeed — because the enemy is still going to outnumber us' — and because they had built what appeared to be a tough, extensive, potentially deadly barrier system along the border—'it is going to take… killer instinct on the part of all of our leaders out there… We need commanders in the lead who absolutely, clearly understand that they will get through' the barrier system. 'And that once they are through, will move. We will attack, attack. I will look for commanders who can attack. We cannot afford failure. We will not fail.'

And that was it. It was a masterful presentation in content, in format, and in motivational language. No one there could possibly have a question about what he was supposed to do.

Many outside the Army erroneously imagine that when a commander like Fred Franks receives a plan — such as the one General Schwarzkopf outlined — all he has to do, more or less, is follow the numbers. People tend to think the whole thing is completely worked out, like a recipe in a cook-book, and all that's left for the subordinate commander is to say, 'Yes, sir,' and go execute it.

Not true.

General Schwarzkopf 's campaign outline was indeed an excellent operations concept, but it did not provide — nor did it ever intend to provide — Fred Franks or Gary Luck or any of the other commanders more than a very general design for what they were supposed to do. The tactical details had to be worked out later. The outline defined the missions of each corps and its general scheme of maneuver; it gave each corps the sector it was to operate in (the corridors that Schwarzkopf talked about); and it laid out the phases of the campaign. But it was not at all specific in terms of the tactical operation.

So, in effect, the CINC was saying, 'OK, VII Corps, your mission is to destroy the Republican Guards. And, XVIII Corps, your mission is to go up and interdict Highway 8. But how you do that, that's up to you.' He even made a point of that during the briefing.

Consequently, as Franks was internalizing and processing the plan that morning, a host of questions was racing through his head: How extensive is the Iraqi barrier system in my sector? Will it go all the way across it? Will I have to breach the barrier before I can get my forces through? Or can I go around it, farther to the west? And how is the terrain out there? Can my heavy stuff pass over it? What options are available to the RGFC? What are my schemes of maneuver? How do I mass my corps for the RGFC destruction? How do I structure and orchestrate my corps for that attack? What are the battles and engagements I need to fight, sequentially and simultaneously, to get to and destroy the RGFC?

The CINC had nothing to say about that. That was Fred Franks's responsibility.

Some of them gave the obligatory expression of confidence and enthusiasm for the plan, but it was still little more than a concept or a notion. Fred Franks was already working the idea and analyzing the mission — keeping his own counsel until he had processed the task before him intellectually.

When the briefing was over, the CINC doubtless expected an outpouring of enthusiasm from his