commanders, and he got it from some of them. But not from Fred Franks, which, for Franks, was certainly a mistake. For General Schwarzkopf, Franks's absence of outward display was interpreted as a lukewarm attitude toward the plan.
In fact, Franks was profoundly enthusiastic about the CINC's concept, and he was absolutely certain that when it came to a fight, his troops would win. Unfortunately, an excited outburst was the farthest thing from his mind just then. Instead, he was rapidly forming maneuver schemes in his head (hoping to give his commanders an early heads-up); he was thinking about Iraqi forces in front of the corps and about what the Republican Guards might do (since the VII Corps mission was force oriented); and he was thinking about force placement on the ground.
After General Schwarzkopf finished speaking, he invited the others up front to look more closely at the maps and the intelligence photos of the minefields and barrier systems, and the like. While Franks was up there, examining them, the CINC approached him and asked, 'Hey, Fred, what do you think?'
And Franks answered, in a calm, confident, forceful, but professional voice, 'We can do this. We'll make it happen.'
For the CINC, that wasn't enough. It turned out to be a burr beneath Schwarzkopf 's skin.
Later, in General Schwarzkopf 's autobiography,
This conversation did not take place on 14 November — though later, in a December briefing, Franks stated that as a planning assumption he presumed that the 1st CAV would be released to VII Corps, if they weren't required to save some situation elsewhere (also a Third Army assumption and a normal planning assumption, since VII Corps was the main attack).
The dissonance between Generals Schwarzkopf and Franks was to grow, with consequences that were unfortunate.
Meanwhile, though Franks was certain that General Schwarzkopf's concept of attack was in fact the right one, with the right maneuver scheme, to achieve his goal of destroying the Republican Guard, nevertheless, he had a few questions about some of the tactical details that the CINC had left to be developed later. Franks actually thought he could help resolve these and be a team player. Since it would have been inappropriate and unprofessional to voice these concerns that day, he didn't, but later, at a more appropriate time, he went directly to John Yeosock and Steve Arnold, and even talked to the 'Jedi Knights.'
In his view, the CINC's campaign operational concept had three areas for further tactical discussion.
First: In the plan's original incarnation, XVIII Corps's attack corridor was many kilometers to the west of the VII Corps sector, which might limit the availability of XVIII Corps's combat power. Though XVIII Corps did not have the heavy combat power of VII Corps, it still had plenty. Yes, XVIII Corps should certainly push on up to Highway 8 and close that lane of escape for the Republican Guards, but if it was that far to the west, could it then move east fast enough to join its combat power to VII Corps's in a coordinated corps attack — if that was called for? If VII Corps attacked north-northeast, it would 'pinch out' XVIII Corps. If XVIII Corps was just to sit on Highway 8 while the main battle was raging a couple of hundred kilometers east of them, all their combat power would be unavailable. (Later, the plan was altered, and the two corps were brought closer together.)
Second: The concept made assumptions about the isolation of the RGFC. It assumed that if the RGFC attempted to escape the theater, then the Euphrates bridges would be destroyed by air, which would make the Euphrates an anvil against which the Third Army hammer could pound the Guards. That detail remained to be planned and then executed.
Finally: There was no discussion of a final air-ground theater maneuver to complete the action and achieve the strategic objectives. There needed to be discussion of the endgame — the tactical finish that would best realize the Coalition's aims. The idea was to come up with some vision of the final disposition of all relevant forces — both air and ground — that would make the most long-term strategic sense. Those discussions would follow.
For Fred Franks and his commanders and staff, however, the leaders' recon turned out to be a terrific three days. Gary Luck and XVIII Corps had given them lessons learned and welcomed them to the team. The few small discords (not in fact then apparent to him) in no way diminished that. It was an intense, packed, and immensely productive time. They had a clear mission, clear goals, and enough work to fill forty-eight-hour days for the next several months. They had to bring the newly retailored VII Corps to the Gulf and prepare the corps to fight our nation's toughest opponents since the Viet Cong and NVA.
When Franks flew back to Stuttgart, the little C-21 was so stuffed with papers and maps in the aisles and beneath the seats, there was scarcely room for passengers.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Preparing for War
The first unit from the 2nd ACR began loading trains for German ports on 19 November 1990. The first troops from the 2nd Squadron, 2nd ACR, and support elements arrived in the Gulf on 5 and 6 December. This was a small wave foretelling the vast flood that was soon to follow.
Over the next two and a half months, VII Corps would be stretched and pulled in a hundred different directions. A commander's job is to focus his energies on the main objective while making sure that all the myriad activities that contribute to that objective's success are not ignored. For VII Corps, the main objective was to go to Saudi Arabia and, if needed, to attack and destroy the Republican Guards, and in order to achieve that objective, Franks fixed responsibility for the corps into four separate, but linked, areas. They would have to (1) deploy the corps while caring for families at home, (2) assemble the corps in Tactical Assembly Areas, (3) prepare for war, and (4) conduct combat operations.
Franks knew that he could not afford to take his eyes off any one of these activities, but his greatest focus had to be on the actual combat operations. In the other areas, he could accept some imperfection, and he trusted the commanders and noncommissioned officers to get the job done, but in preparing and conducting combat operations, the tolerance for failure to meet expectations had to be extremely low. Here was where he had to place his main personal effort, intervening in the other areas only when they needed him or when, in his own judgment, he needed to step in to break a logjam.
He threw himself into a series of meetings, war games, visits, and constant chattering over phones and tactical radios to get the job done on the combat side. In the meantime, to ensure family support, he established VII Corps Base in Germany. To handle the continued deployment of the corps after the corps headquarters had moved to Saudi Arabia, he left his deputy commander, Brigadier General Gene Daniel, and a headquarters element in Stuttgart to work with USAREUR and EUCOM. And to get the 152 ships and 927 aircraft of VII Corps debarked and then moved the 500 kilometers to the Tactical Assembly Areas in Saudi Arabia, he formed a special command called the Port Support Authority, or PSA, and to command it, picked his friend and 1959 West Point classmate, Brigadier General Bill Mullen, and his commanders and leaders from the 1st Infantry Division Forward.
It was time to begin.
GETTING MOVING
As a matter of priority in VII Corps, Franks had always stressed attention to fundamentals, agility, teamwork, and discipline. Though he would take those same priorities to the desert, there was now a new lineup of units and a new mission in a new set of conditions. The priorities would have to be adapted to these new
