Between 1500 on the twenty-fourth until midnight on the twenty-fifth, the division had crossed the berm, moved the fifty or so kilometers through the boulder- and wadi-laced terrain, then taken over the sector from the 2nd ACR, fought a brigade-sized fight, and moved the 8,000-vehicle division nearly 140 kilometers to al-Busayyah. They had been moving during the twenty-fifth in a division wedge, with 1/1 Cavalry Squadron as a covering force. The 1st Brigade was the lead of the division main body, followed by the 2nd Brigade on the west and the 3rd Brigade on the east. Artillery was in the middle of each brigade formation.
When Ron had encountered elements of a brigade of the Iraqi 26th Division, he had left the 3rd Brigade to finish that fight and pushed the rest of the division forward to just outside al-Busayyah. That meant shifting to a formation of two brigades on line, the 2nd on the left and the 1st on the right. The 3rd Brigade, commanded by Colonel Dan Zanini, closed behind the 1st Brigade later that night, after finishing their fight. At 0500 the morning of the twenty-sixth, after refueling, 3rd Brigade bypassed Purple to the east, wheeled ninety degrees to an easterly attack orientation, and set the 1st AD baseline along Phase Line Smash. Later that morning, 1st and 2nd Brigades would join them giving the division the 1/1 CAV out front, followed by the 2nd, 1st, and 3rd Brigades from north to south. It was a hell of a maneuver, fighting and moving without stopping over thirty kilometers of territory. The division reported that on the twenty-fifth they had destroyed 27 armored vehicles, 9 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 14 air defense systems, and had counted 314 prisoners, although the total was probably double. The 3rd Brigade of the Iraqi 26th Division had ceased to exist; they had overrun it.
Today they would move farther, after the right turn, and would attack into the northern part of the defense that the Tawalkana was trying to set. After the turn, they would have an open flank to the north, if XVIII Corps did not rapidly refuel and turn east as well.
Meanwhile, the 75th Artillery Brigade was not yet back with them from their breach mission. That was troublesome to me, as the 42nd had already linked up with the 3rd AD. I'd have to keep that on my mind and make sure it happened.
Ron and 1st AD would have their hands full today.
Here is how TF 2/70, 1st AD, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Whitcomb, which consisted of three M1A1 companies and a Bradley company, spent the night on the outskirts of al-Busayyah: 'TF 2-70 arrived at PL South Carolina [about 120 kilometers into Iraq] after 2130 and began its move into position. I wanted to get ourselves set to kick off the attack so that we would not have to reposition the next morning. The wind howled at fifty-plus knots, the cloud cover was low, and we had driving rain. Vehicles were refueled and limited maintenance pulled. The task force was settled in by 0030. The brigade's direct-support artillery battalion, 2–1 Field Artillery, Iron Deuce, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Unterseher, fired harassing and interdiction fires all night on al- Busayyah. Multiple-Launched Rocket Systems pounded the town in preparation for the morning attack. The task force S-3 coordinated with the brigade S-3, and at 0100 returned with the attack order. The task force plan was prepared and approved by 0230. We issued a frag order and briefed the plan at 0500.'
This task force attacked that morning, 26 February, at BMNT (about 0540) as one of four task forces subordinate to 2nd Brigade and as part of a two-brigade attack (the first brigade had three task forces) on al- Busayyah. When they finished the almost four-hour attack, this task force had destroyed seven tanks, two BRDMs (wheeled infantry carriers), one BMP, and twenty-five trucks, and captured sixteen enemy soldiers. They had no casualties (their medics treated Iraqi wounded later that morning). They then turned right ninety degrees with the rest of 1st AD and pressed on toward the RGFC.
3RD AD was poised to pass around the 2nd ACR to the north and slam due east into the Tawalkana. They had been in a division wedge and had reported taking more than 200 prisoners the night before (in fact, I knew from my meetings with Butch Funk that the totals were much higher than that). Because they had been corps reserve, they had had little enemy contact the first day and a half, and so they would be the most rested of our divisions. When I had given Butch the FRAGPLAN 7 execute order the night before, that had meant, among other things, that they were no longer our reserve, and I was sending them into the heart of the setting Iraqi defense. They were going to be the first division to hit the Tawalkana — which was the right spot in the attack for my freshest division, especially since their nickname was the 'Spearhead' Division (Butch Funk had even found the original 'Spearhead' emblem from World War II and had it stenciled on the 3rd AD vehicles. In the coming attacks, they would live up to their World War II reputation and then some).
The night before, after a cross-desert journey of 100 kilometers, the 42nd Artillery Brigade, commanded by Colonel Morrie Boyd, had linked up with the 3rd AD with his approximately 600 track and wheeled vehicles. The feat did not surprise me, as I had seen Morrie Boyd in action in a few other leadership situations and knew he could make that happen.
Here is how TF 4/67, 3rd AD, which consisted of three M1A1 companies and a Bradley company, and was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Reischl, spent the night: 'At dark the task force continued to move, now into rain, blowing sand, and cloud cover that reduced visibility to less than fifty meters. The move was complicated by loss of satellite and LORAN coverage from 1800 to 1900 hours; the GPS and LORAN position-locating devices were useless. The task force tightened up the formation and used compasses and a lone inertial navigation device in a Fuchs chemical recon vehicle as guides and continued to move in sector. A halt was called at 2030 hours, and the next few hours were spent collecting vehicles, refueling, and repairing weather damage to the equipment… On 25 February the task force had advanced another eighty-five kilometers… Fifty percent alert for security and four hours of sleep nightly for all personnel was the norm during the move through the desert. The advance was resumed at first light on 26 February, amid reports of enemy movement and contact forward of the brigade.'
The nights referred to were 24 and 25 February. This task force was part of the 3rd Brigade, at that time in reserve in the 3rd AD, directly behind the two leading brigades, 1st and 2nd. Third Brigade was part of the 3rd AD attacks the nights of 26 and 27 February.
2ND ACR had spent the remainder of the night in an active horseshoe defense astride an Iraqi main supply route that the regiment called Blacktop. It was actually the IPSA Pipeline Road along Phase Line Smash. They were there in position to stop Iraqi units from using that route out of Kuwait, either to join the Tawalkana's defense against our attack or to escape the theater.
Though I was a little surprised to see that the 2nd ACR had not moved forward during the night to 'maintain pressure,' I had left the tactics up to Don Holder. Don had used the time for local actions to block the Iraqis and to get orders out appropriate to the change in mission I had given him. Given the terrible weather that had canceled the aviation strikes, and the change in mission, I supported his choice.
Even if they weren't pressing ahead, they weren't sitting on their hands, either. In addition to the action of Company M and the MLRS, they had also had other enemy actions, from an engagement against Iraqi dismounted infantry to heavier action by 2nd Squadron, which had destroyed nine MTLBs and a T-55. Until 0300, most of the action seemed to be in the north of their sector, which is where we were about to attack with the 3rd AD. At a little after 0500 this morning, they reported that 3rd Squadron had turned back an Iraqi recon company attack, destroying twelve vehicles and taking sixty-five prisoners. It had not been an uneventful night for the 2nd ACR.
Today, they were moving out to gain and maintain contact, to pass 3rd AD to their north, and to be prepared at some point to pass the 1st INF through.
The reports to Riyadh, meanwhile, lagged well behind many of these actions, and once or twice they were downright wrong. For instance, the official VII Corps situational report that went to Riyadh as of midnight 25 February (almost two hours after these engagements and actions) said, 'Units are in hasty defensive positions preparing to attack BMNT 27 Feb' — !!?? And of the British, it said, 'The passage of lines through 1ID went extremely smoothly and according to plan… By 180 °C [local time] 7th ARMD had cleared the breach. Fourth ARMD began moving at 1325C from staging area and should complete passage NLT [not later than] 26030 °C' (that is, at 0300 on the twenty-sixth). Because I was out of communications with the corps main CP, the main was out of line-of-sight communications with the units, and many CPs were on the move, I should not have been surprised at this information error.
Friendly information was always behind in the attack. The faster the tempo of the attack, the more behind it was.
There was no mention of the fact that the British had been in contact with the enemy and were fighting, nor of 2nd ACR's activities, nor of the 1st AD attacks by fire on al-Busayyah. It was not surprising, since the VII Corps
