Once we had worked our way through that issue, I asked if and when the 1st CAV would be released. Sometime today, John answered. And to us.
John's attitude had undergone a distinct change from the time of my late call to him the night before to today: The night before, we were doing OK. The CINC's intent was for us to conduct a deliberate attack to minimize casualties. Now there was abruptly a greater urgency, a change I was not to understand until long after the war.
In a student monograph at the U.S. Army's War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Colonel Mike Kendall unraveled some of the knots that had long puzzled me. During the war, Mike had been John's exec, and he kept excellent notes of John's discussions with General Schwarzkopf. The monograph bases its conclusions on these notes.
On 25 February, Kendall writes (as we have already seen): Yeosock 'concluded that the CINC was satisfied with the operational pace' of VII Corps, and even 'expressed concern with possible fratricide if the pace increased; the CINC stated that the intent was for deliberate operations with low casualties. In Yeosock's words, the CINC's intent was, 'fighting smart, deliberately, with small casualties, developing the situation, and fixing by fires.' ' Yeosock 'concluded that the CINC expects 26 February to be a slow day because of weather,' and Yeosock 'passed this information to the corps commanders during late-night discussions.' It was this attitude and guidance that Yeosock had passed to me during the night of the twenty-fifth. But at '0215 hours on 26 February, the CINC was awakened by Brigadier General Neal, his night operations officer, with a report that the Iraqis had ordered their units out of Kuwait City. The CINC talked to CJCS [General Powell] and expressed concern that a cease-fire could occur within two days, resulting in the escape of the RGFC.'
In 'private conversations with me during the morning,' Kendall continues, 'General Yeosock discussed the atmosphere of the moment. He understood the CJCS's call to the CINC had caused the intent to change…' from, in Yeosock's (unforgettable) words, ' 'slow and deliberate to magic units forward.' ' This 'reflected a CENTCOM lack of appreciation, in Yeosock's view, for the time/distance factors associated with the movement of a heavy corps against enemy forces whose intent was still ambiguous.'
In other words, John Yeosock was aware that the CINC's perception had changed after his discussions with Powell. Because the Iraqis seemed to be abandoning Kuwait, which could result in an early cease-fire, Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell now believed that the Army — i.e., VII Corps — would have to speed up the attack against the RGFC, if there was any hope of destroying them.
However, I do not think Schwarzkopf recognized that it was Third Army, not VII Corps alone, attacking the RGFC. CENTCOM had the means and, it seemed to me, the responsibility to seal off the theater and bring land, sea, and air forces together to end it right. That was the time to set it in motion.
And yet, because Yeosock was aware that there was no way to make the corps go faster, and because he was aware that we had a defending enemy in front of us and XVIII Corps with a defense plan, he simply told me to keep pressing the attack.
And that is in fact the only intent I got from John that morning. There was nothing about the CINC's or Colin Powell's concerns. 'Press the attack,' John told me.[42]
It was like telling me to do something we were already doing. We were already committed east. We were already attacking. I soon forgot the discussion.
We had maneuvered the corps into a posture that would allow us to sustain the intensity of our attack for two to three days, as necessary. That was what we were out here to do… or at least, so I thought. CENTCOM could orchestrate the air deep to isolate the RGFC with the Third Army attack on 26 to 28 February. It would also help if Third Army could rapidly turn XVIII Corps east to attack to our north, so there would be a two-corps coordinated attack.
BEFORE he left for the main TAC, I said to John Landry, 'John, make sure Third Army knows what the hell we are doing out here. Call them yourself. I talk to Yeosock all the time and tell him, but I'm not sure what picture they have.'
He assured me he would. John was as good a tactician as I knew and had a great feel for what was going on. If anyone could get our ratings up in Riyadh, he could. And he did make sure that reports of our unit combat actions during the rest of the war were as accurate as they knew them at the Main CP.
WEATHER AND AIR
On 26 February, the rotten weather of the night before did not let up. Most of the day, we had intermittent heavy rain, blowing sand, and low cloud cover — with lucky breaks when we could fly helos and CAS. The weather was local and spotty. Some places would be relatively clear and others would have rain and blowing sand. This was our worst weather day.
It was a real tribute to both Army aviators and USAF CAS pilots that they were able to give us so many air attacks. By unit, 2nd ACR had 48, 1st AD 32, 3rd AD 26, and 1st UK 22, for a total of 128. And more were available if we'd wanted them. CENTAF had originated a system they called 'push CAS,' whereby they would push sorties of CAS into our area without request. We could then employ them or send them to someone else.
It worked well — just as CAS had worked well for us in the Blackhorse in Vietnam. CAS pilots went way beyond their duty in order to give us their best. Pilots even ignored the 10,000-foot altitude limit, which put them at considerable risk. Our own Apaches were no less selfless — flying day and night in weather that would have grounded us in Germany in peacetime, and with little regard to rest.
0730 EN ROUTE TO 1ST AD
'JAYHAWK 6, this is JAYHAWK 3 OSCAR.' I was in my Blackhawk, and this was my TAC FWD calling.
'This is JAYHAWK 6.'
'Dragoon reports contact with RGFC, Tawalkana Division.' Dragoon was the 2nd ACR.
'Roger, location?'
'PT 528933.' That was about the 50 Easting, or right on Phase Line Smash.
'Have them continue to attack.'
'WILCO.'
I found out later that, at 0713, 3rd Squadron had killed a T-72 at 52 Easting. The regiment read this as first contact with the Tawalkana. Then, at 0754, a T-72 company was sighted at grid line 5299. And the regimental log records, 'At 0847 T'kana Div screen at 52 Easting. 2/2 reports all units in contact. 3d sqdn had incoming arty fire. At 0915 3d sqdn reported visibility dropped to less than 1,000 meters. At 0918 3 AD passing to north of 2nd ACR.'
That was a big report. It confirmed what I had been expecting. We had them fixed.
What surprised me a bit was the location given; it was about ten kilometers farther west than I had thought. No matter. We were in the RGFC security zone, maybe deeper, and the regiment was doing exactly what a cavalry regiment in front of an attacking corps should be doing in an offensive covering force mission.
Now to keep them attacking while bringing the corps fist together to smash the RGFC. We had been maneuvering the corps for the past day and a half to put ourselves in this position. Now we had them fixed and were going to attack and hit them hard and keep hitting them until they were finished.
0800 1ST AD FIELD LOCATION
As I approached 1st AD, I was thinking that I needed to make clear what I wanted done today and my continued intentions. In light of this 2nd ACR report confirming the location of the Tawalkana, I wanted to be sure
