practiced at long unit moves — the best in the theater.
Just as Tom Rhame had done, John Tilelli used his initiative and called me right away — though how he got through to me with the fragile comms was a mystery. It also was a tribute to our signal troops, who were busting their butts trying to keep us in touch with the rest of the corps.
'JAYHAWK 6, PEGASUS 6.' PEGASUS 6 was John's call sign. 'We've been chopped to VII Corps.'
'Roger,' I answered, 'welcome back to the team.' Then I moved quickly to what I had in mind. 'I want you to move your division as fast as you can to Area Lee. We are executing FRAGPLAN 7, and have just hit the RGFC. First INF will pass through 2nd ACR later today and attack east. Depending on how our attack goes today and tonight, I will commit you either around to the south of the 1st INF or around to the north of the 1st AD. Too soon to call.'
'WILCO. We're on the move.'
Even though he had still been under the command of CENTCOM, John had been thinking ahead and monitoring our situation. On their own initiative, he and his commanders had prepared for the two release possibilities: that they would either reinforce the Egyptians or go to us. John had had tentative plans and was ready to execute them, whichever way CENTCOM turned. And so they were soon on the move.
DEVELOPMENTS IN-SECTOR THAT MORNING
True to his earlier assurances, by late morning Ron Griffith had the 1st AD in the northern part of Collins and was attacking east. They had secured Purple and were on line with the 3rd AD to their south. The only disturbing note was that by now units of XVIII Corps were thirty to fifty kilometers behind the 1st AD, leaving Ron an open flank. To Ron's north in that sector were RGFC army-level artillery and three RGFC infantry divisions, reinforced with some armor. In other words, the open flank gave Ron other tactical situations to deal with until the XVIII Corps attack closed the gap. In my own mind, I began to question the feasibility of executing the Third Army two-corps attack plan.
Meanwhile, Butch Funk had maneuvered the 3rd AD into two brigades forward (the 2nd on the left and the 1st on the right), with his 3rd Brigade in reserve. By a little after 0900, he was passing north of the 2nd ACR. Once that was done, Butch turned the 3rd AD sixty degrees east into his FRAGPLAN 7 attack zone, no easy maneuver on the move, and he would soon be in contact with the middle of the Tawalkana's hastily drawn defense.
We now had a giant left hook forming, with 1st AD coming around on the outside, 3rd AD in the center, and 1st INF coming up on the right to take over from 2nd ACR, which was already moving east to initiate the attack. We had formed on the move the most powerful attacking armor force in the history of the U.S. Army, and maybe ever; the tank battle that followed was as big or bigger as any in history. We would hit the forming RGFC defense from south to north with a force the likes of which they had never imagined.
I was later to learn that on his own initiative, Don Holder had linked the 2nd ACR TAC with the 3rd AD TAC, and smoothly coordinated the passage of 3rd AD to 2nd ACR's north. (He also was in contact with the British, on his south, who were pressing their attack aggressively to the east.) Simultaneously he had brought his regiment on line, with three squadrons abreast to get maximum combat power forward. By now his sector was the same as a division's, about thirty kilometers wide. I also later learned that, in order to prevent fratricide, Zanini's 3rd Brigade of 1st AD and Colonel Bob Higgins's 2nd Brigade of 3rd AD had established physical contact and put units together throughout the attack.
All in all, it was an impressive display of teamwork. Much maneuvering of major forces and vehicles in a confined space in a short time. Much initiative at small-unit level. Everyone doing the little things to reduce the friction without being told. A combat team. I was proud of them.
2ND ACR LATE MORNING
Around noon, I flew over to 2nd ACR to see how much farther to push them into the RGFC and to learn if they had found the RGFC's southern flank. I was still thinking of passing 1st INF forward during the daylight, a much easier move than a night passage, and less risky for fratricide. But I also did not want to break the momentum of the attack and give the RGFC any more time to set their defense.
Command judgment time. After 1st INF's all-day move, should I then push them in a night forward passage of lines into the attack? Or should I continue the attack with the 2nd ACR and pass the 1st INF the next day early in the daylight?
In the back of my mind, I also was trying to figure what our next move should be, because if I wanted to continue the momentum, I needed to set it in motion soon. I needed to sustain the regimental attack until the last possible moment, and maybe even reinforce them temporarily. Perhaps another AH-64 battalion from corps? Hard to manage. I had the 11th Aviation Brigade focusing on a deep attack that night. Using them for this purpose would screw that up.
At 1130, while I had still been at the TAC FWD, I had gotten the following SITREP over the radio from Dragoon:
'Regiment along 52 Easting, encountering covering force of Tawalkana Division. Attached infantry and armor. Destroyed tank company by air. Contact with dug-in tanks. Possible cuts in flanks north-south.' They knew they had located the southern flank of the Tawalkana when they stopped seeing T-72s and started seeing older equipment.
I asked them then if they needed more AH-64s.
'Request a battalion.' The CAV never turned down combat power.
They were already employing a battalion of Apaches from the 1st AD. If they needed another to continue, they might soon be at the end of their attack. I had to go talk to Don.
At 1250, I arrived at the Dragoon TAC and got a quick SITREP from Don Holder and Steve Robinette.
The Iraqis were in defensive positions. There were numerous reports of dug-in tanks, battalion defensive positions, some artillery fire. You could feel the defense beginning to stiffen. They might not be as skillful as they could have been, because we had not given them time to set a defense, but they were not running away, not here, and not in 1st AD or 3rd AD sectors. This was a different enemy from the one we'd encountered in their frontline infantry divisions. Those divisions had put up some fight, but they'd soon cracked when hit by our firepower. These units fought back; they were not surrendering at the rate we had seen earlier.
Now to the question of where to make the passage with the 1st INF.
Tom Rhame had said he would be at Hartz, ready to pass at dark. Hartz was at about 40 Easting (named after the north-south 40 grid line that ran through the battle area), or a little more than ten kilometers west of 52 Easting, where the 2nd ACR now was engaged. Don, Steve, and I estimated that the 2nd ACR could go another ten kilometers before they would be ready for the 1st INF to begin passage, which would make passage at about 60 Easting. That meant the 1st INF would roll into an area about twenty kilometers to the rear, take care of coordination, then move forward and make the passage.
It was a judgment call. Don was reaching out to around 80 Easting with air, and he had a good feel for what was in front of him, and I could see in their faces that they still had a lot of fight left in them. But I had to decide where I thought the regiment would run out of combat power. Sixty Easting was my best judgment at the time. Don agreed.
After I left, I went back to the corps TAC for some quick discussions with Brigadier General Mike Hall about our continuing frustrations with air/ground coordination. Mike promised to see what he could do to help. And just then — finally — the main TAC arrived.
1325 VII CORPS TAC FWD
