of capitalism and increased engagement with the rest of the world, the nation of China would, slowly but surely, come over to a more liberal way of thinking. But this ‘liberal evolution’ theory has sadly not panned out. Instead of embracing political liberalization, the Communist Party of China has grown more resistant, more paranoid about the West, and more hostile to liberal values.
“Even though Wei has been at the forefront of economic liberalism, he also leads the charge in fighting back against Tuidang and personal liberty.”
Scott Adler, secretary of state, said, “Wei has always worn two faces. He believes in the party, in the devotion to the central government. He just doesn’t believe in the communist economic model. Since he came into power he has been crushing dissent, backing off on freedoms of travel between provinces and pulling the plug on more websites per day than his predecessor pulled per month.”
Ryan said, “He just does it all with a wide grin on his face and a regimental tie that makes him look like an Ivy Leaguer, so he gets a pass from the world’s press.”
Ambassador Li said, “Maybe not a full pass, but he sure gets a mulligan or two.”
Jack shook his head. He thought, but did not say, that the world’s press liked Wei Zhen Lin more than it did John Patrick Ryan.
“What are his intentions? Why the saber rattling? Is it just to fire up his party and his military? Scott?”
The secretary of state replied, “We don’t see it as that. We have witnessed major speeches by generals and admirals for that purpose, and they seem to work quite well at whipping up nationalist pride and animosity against their regional rivals. Having their decidedly nonmilitant president and general secretary taking up the bully pulpit to echo the generals, Wei has to know, will just create ill will with the rest of the world. This was not done for the purpose of political grandstanding. This seems to be an aggressive policy shift, and we should accept it as such.”
“So you are saying,” Ryan asked while leaning forward, “that this actually
“We at State are very concerned that it does mean the PLAN will be reaching out to the south to exert more influence.”
Ryan turned his head to the director of national intelligence. As the chief of all seventeen U.S. intelligence agencies, Mary Pat Foley was well positioned to fill in any details.
“What does it mean, Mary Pat?”
“Honestly, sir, we are taking this at face value. We expect them to land troops on some of the nondefended but contested islands, to push their Navy out further, and to claim international waters, not just with rhetoric but with gunboats.”
“Why now?” Ryan asked. “Wei is an economist; he’s shown no evidence of this militancy.”
Secretary of Defense Bob Burgess said, “True, but Chairman Su has real clout. He had, arguably, one-third of the power before the coup. After he pulled Wei’s butt off the grill over the summer by sending tanks to his compound to stop the Ministry of Public Security from effecting Wei’s arrest, you have to assume Su’s stock went through the roof.
“Wei can’t think he’s going to help his economy by taking control of a bigger portion of the South China Sea. Sure, there is oil and there are minerals and fish, but the headaches that it will generate for him with the West just aren’t worth it.”
Regina Barnes, secretary of commerce, said, “If anything, sir, significant military action in the SCS will destroy them economically. They rely on safe passage of freighters and tankers, and that passage will be disrupted if things get ugly in those waters. Saudi Arabia is the largest supplier of oil to China, which should surprise no one. What is surprising, perhaps, is that Angola is the second-largest supplier. Both nations deliver oil through the SCS via tankers. Any disruption of sea traffic in the South China Sea would be devastating for the Chinese industrial machine.”
Foley said, “Look at the Strait of Malacca. That is the choke point, and the Chinese know it. It’s their Achilles’ heel. Seventy-five to eighty percent of all oil heading to Asia passes through the Strait of Malacca.”
Ambassador Ken Li offered, “Maybe, sir, Wei is not doing this to help the economy. Maybe Wei is doing this to protect himself.”
“From what threat?”
“From Chairman Su. Maybe he is going along with this to placate Su.”
Ryan looked to a point on the far wall of the Oval Office. The crowd of people in front of him sat silently.
After a moment Jack said, “I agree that’s part of it. But I think Wei has something up his sleeve. He knows this will hurt business. If you look at his entire career, you can’t point to a single thing he has ever done to jeopardize trade with the West, unless it had something integral to do with his internal domestic situation. I mean, yes, he’s been involved with some hard-line Standing Committee decisions to put down insurrection in ways that were bad for business, but these were things he saw as necessary to keep the party’s hold on power absolute. I believe there must be something else to his comments.”
Admiral Mark Jorgensen lifted a hand slowly to get the President’s attention.
“Admiral?”
“Sir, just speculation.”
“Speculate,” Ryan said.
Jorgensen made a face like he was sucking a lemon as he hesitated. Finally he said, “Su wants to take Taiwan. He’s been as clear as any Chinese government figure has ever been. Wei wants to strengthen his economy, and Taipei under Chinese rule could arguably do that. Area denial of the South China Sea is a necessary first step for the Chicoms before they can make a play for Taiwan. If they don’t control their unfettered access to the Strait of Malacca, we could shut off their oil spigot, and their entire country would grind to a halt. It just may be that this is step one in their bid to finally suck Taiwan back into their control.”
It was perfectly silent in the Oval Office for several seconds. Then Jorgensen added, “Just throwing that out there, sir.”
Scott Adler was not buying this line of thinking. “I don’t see it. Cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan are good economically, or better than they were, anyway. Direct flights, business deals, visitations of offshore islands… normal peacetime engagement. There is one hundred fifty billion a year in Taiwan money invested in mainland China.”
SecDef Burgess interjected, “Mutual prosperity doesn’t mean that nothing bad will happen.”
President Ryan sided with Burgess. “Just because everyone is making money does not mean that the Chicoms won’t muck it up. Money has never been their only aim. There are other paths to power over there. You may be absolutely right, Scott, especially in light of all the good tidings at the moment between the mainland and Taiwan. But don’t forget that this rapprochement is reversible by the Communist Party of China in a heartbeat. The CPC leadership is not satisfied with the status quo with relation to Taiwan. They want it back, they want the Republic of China in Taipei gone, and a few direct flights between Shanghai and Taipei isn’t going to change that long-term goal.”
Adler conceded this point.
Ryan sighed. “So… the admiral has outlined a worst-case scenario that I want everyone to keep in mind while we work on this. We thought Wei’s term would be the most friendly toward Taiwan, but the attempted coup and Chairman Su’s strength have, possibly, changed the equation.”
Ryan could see most people in the room thought Jorgensen was being overly pessimistic. He himself felt Wei’s going after Taiwan was doubtful, even with Su urging him forward, but he didn’t want his top people caught napping if that happened.
The United States had officially recognized Taiwan, and the United States could easily be forced into war if fighting broke out between the two nations. And though Jack Ryan was called a warmonger in much of the world’s press, he sure as hell hoped open war in the Pacific was not on the horizon.
Ryan next said, “Okay. President Wei said China owns the sea due to some historical precedent. What about international law? Laws of the sea, whatever. Do the Chinese have
Secretary of State Adler shook his head. “None whatsoever, but they are smart. They have made a point to not join binding agreements that could allow their neighbors to band together to gang up on them on this or on any other issue. To the Chinese, the South China Sea is not an international issue; they call it a bilateral issue with
