Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing

special leader is Brigadier General Silas Johnson, the commander of the 552nd Airborne Control Wing, and we are proud to know him. Also, thanks to Brigadier General J. C. Wilson, the commander of the 28th Bombardment Wing at Ellsworth AFB, SD, for showing us the 'heavy iron' of the Air Force.

Again, thanks are due to our various industrial partners, without whom all the information on the various aircraft, weapons, and systems would never have come to light. At the aircraft manufacturers there was Lee Whitney, Barbara Anderson, Robert Linder, Tim Courson, Lon Nordeen, Gary Hakinson, Martin Fisher, and Jerry Ennis of McDonnell Douglas; Joe Stout, Donn Williams, Karen Hagar, Jim Ragsdale, Jeff Rhodes, Eric DeRitis, Susan Walker, James Higginbotham, Terry Schultz, Doug McCurrah, and Robert Hartman of Lockheed Martin; Mike Mathews, James Walker, Eric Simonson, Tony Pinella, and Tom Conard of Rockwell International; John Visilla, Tony Contafio, and Patty Alessi at Northrop Grumman; Milt Furness, Cynthia Pulham, and Susan Bradley of Boeing; and finally, Jim Kagdis and Foster Morgan of Boeing Sikorsky. We also made and renewed many friendships at the various missile, armament, and system manufacturers including: Tony Geishanuser and Vicki Fendalson at Texas Instruments; Larry Ernst at General Atomics; Glenn Hillen, Bill West, Kearny Bothwell, and Cheryl Wiencek at Hughes; Tommy Wilson, Adrien Poirier, Edward Ludford, Dave McClain, and Dennis Hughes at Loral; Jody Wilson- Eudy at Motorola; Nurit Bar of Rafael USA; and last, but certainly not least, Ed Rodemsky, LeAnn McNabb, and Barbara Thomas of Trimble, who again spent so much time and effort to educate us on the latest developments of the GPS system. Also, for all the folks who helped us at Pratt & Whitney and Westinghouse, thanks to you all.

Again, we give thanks for all of our help in New York, especially Robert Gottlieb, Debra Goldstein, and Matt Bialer at William Morris. At Berkley Books, our appreciation again goes out to our editor, John Talbot, as well as David Shanks, Patty Benford, Jacky Sach, and Jill Dinneen. To friends like Tony Tolin, Dave Deptula, Matt Caffrey, Jeff Ethell, Jim Stevenson, Norman Polmar, Bob Dorr, Roger Turcott, and Wilber Creech, thanks again for your contributions and wisdom. And for all the folks who took us for rides, thanks for teaching the ignorant how things work for real. For our friends, loved ones, we once again thank you. For being there when we can't, God bless you all.

FOREWORD

As a lifelong practitioner of airpower in the field, I have often had opportunity to watch the coming and going of my profession's technical, political, tactical, and organizational changes. And after more than three decades of service in the Air Force, I have to admit that radical and volatile change seems to be the lot of those who wear the blue suit. While reading this superb book, I was continually reminded that few aspects of modern warfare re-book, I was continually is this more that few aspects of modern warfare remain constant. Nowhere is this more evident than in the dramatic technological changes driving the employment of airpower. In this work, Tom Clancy defines better than anyone this new role of air power and what it means to the nation.

Four significant events have transformed my understanding of airpower during this period of dramatic change — all four of them occurring in a brief eighteen-month span.

The first happened on the day the air war began in the Persian Gulf, January 17th, 1991. I was then the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, and we were sitting in the Air Force Operations Center in the Pentagon… our war room. It seemed ironic that we, along with the rest of the world, were watching the attack live on CNN, just as if it were Monday Night Football. As our F-117A stealth fighters struck targets in the heart of Baghdad, B-52s were launching standoff missiles safely from the Persian Gulf against targets in Northern Iraq; and these were followed by attacks throughout Iraq by an array of other aircraft. This was the first genuine test of our modern air force, and particularly of radar-evading stealth planes equipped with the precision munitions in which we had invested so heavily following the Vietnam War. Although at the time I was confident and optimistic, I still had grave anticipation and many unanswered questions as our planes flew into the formidable anti-aircraft defenses of Iraq. How many planes and pilots would be lost? Would we achieve air supremacy, and destroy the enemy's war- making capability quickly and decisively? Had our intense aircrew training in exercises such as Red Flag prepared our crews for the rigors of modern air warfare? We wondered if our planning decisions were right. As history was to prove, they were.

The second date is February 28th, 1991, the day President Bush ordered a cease-fire. The war had been won, quickly and decisively, and our forces had sustained minimal casualties. Our people had performed magnificently, demonstrating superb professional competence, discipline, and leadership. The results surpassed even my own expectations. While the entire world marveled at the total domination by our air forces, and the demonstrated effectiveness of 'smart' bombs and stealth technology, the essential role of modern land-based airpower had been established. Airpower performance had now caught up with airpower theory, and its decisiveness was now a fact of modern warfare strategy. Viewing the confusion in Baghdad on CNN, when our first planes evaded Iraqi radar and caught the Iraqi armed forces by surprise, convinced a skeptical public of the immense value of stealth weapons in future air wars. In addition, the precision munitions, so clearly described in this book, assured destruction of military targets without unnecessary civilian casualties. Our total air dominance allowed unrestricted surveillance of all enemy ground movements, while denying that same capability to Saddam Hussein. With impunity, we were able to destroy his war-making capability and demoralize his soldiers to the point of ineffectiveness. And finally, this victory of airpower validated the realism of our training programs as well as the superb performance and competence of our pilots and aircrews.

When I first discussed this book with Tom, I mentioned another date with particular personal meaning. On March 26th, 1991, I assumed command of Tactical Air Command (TAC). It was the dream command assignment for any fighter pilot. And yet, who would have guessed then that I'd be the last head of that proud organization, with its rich tradition and honored history… a history that included our proud performance in the Gulf War, when our people basked in the glory of their victory with the boisterous phrase 'It can't get any better than this!' In fact, when I became the TAC commander, I knew that high point could not last, and that we were very quickly traveling a new and uncharted course; for I was already aware that we had to undertake the painful processes of downsizing and restructuring, while simultaneously maintaining our combat capability. With our 'too easy' victory in the Gulf, and the end of the perception of foreign threat, the American public and national leadership felt confident enough in our national defense to conclude that a drastic reduction would not sacrifice security.

The time had come to downsize the Air Force and formulate a complete plan for its reorganization. With increased competition for scarce budget dollars, the military would get a far smaller share. In a short period we eliminated nearly one third of our personnel and retired 35 % of our aircraft. Most of our overseas bases were closed; our people and equipment would now be primarily located in the continental United States. The decision was made to value technology and intense training over numbers. We'd now have a highly trained, but smaller force. In addition, the primary Air Force mission had changed. Where before the focus was on nuclear deterrence and a single major adversary, now we saw a multifaceted requirement to project power and strike anywhere in the world. Thus was born the new mission statement: Global Reach/Global Power. This book chronicles the restructuring of the U.S. Air Force to meet the new mission.

The fourth date of great importance to me is June 1st, 1992. On that day, we witnessed the merger of Strategic Air Command (SAC), TAC, and elements of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the birth of Air Combat Command (ACC). This new organization provides combat-ready air forces for any regional theater commander in chief. By far the largest U.S. Air Force command, ACC has about a quarter million active-duty, reserve, and civilian members; and it has nearly three thousand aircraft, including virtually every bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, command-and-control, electronic warfare, and theater transport plane in the U.S. Air Force inventory. To say there was trepidation by SAC, MAC, and TAC members at the thought of such a merger is an understatement. Thus, as the first commander of ACC, I found it important to assure our people that neither SAC, MAC, nor TAC was losing in a 'corporate takeover.' This was a friendly merger, not a hostile takeover. And in reality, all the different components from the various commands were winners: SAC had prevailed by preventing nuclear war for over forty years. TAC and SAC had combined to win the Gulf War decisively. And MAC had kept both of the other commands equipped and supplied so that they might accomplish their combat missions.

This book details several of the lessons learned in the Gulf War, lessons that have led to many of the