boneyard for a well-earned retirement, the F-16 is taking over all of the SEAD/HARM mission, thanks in part to the introduction of the ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod. By combining the HTS pods with data exchanged from other F-16s via the Falcon's IDM, a rough approximation of the F-4G's SEAD capabilities can be reconstituted, without a gap in this badly needed resource.
So how would a pilot fire such a weapon? Well, let's imagine that we're flying a Block 50/52 F-16C, equipped with an ALR-56 RWR and an ASQ-213 HTS pod attached to the Station 5 (right) pod mount point. You and your wingman each have two HARMs on LAU-118 launchers at Stations 3 and 7. The two of you are flying a loose hunting formation ahead of a strike force, with a lateral separation of about 5 nm./9.1 km. You have been briefed about hitting a pair of Buk-1M/SA-11 Gadfly SAM sites on the ingress route of the strike force, and told to look out for possible mobile SAM launchers, which may have been moved into the area. The two of you have set up your IDMs to exchange HTS data and are flying subsonic at about 350 kt./640 kph into the target area. Down on the multi-function display at your right knee is the readout for the HTS pod data, showing a rotating acquisition radar of the type used to pass targeting information to SAM transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles. At approximately 30 nm./54.9 km. to the target area, the two of you set up a pair of diagonal racetrack-shaped patterns and wait for the action to begin.
As the strike force begins to come up, you see a pair of symbols titled STA 11 come up on the MFD, with indefinite range indications. You call a warning to the strike force to go 'heads up' for a possible SA-11 threat, and go to work. In a matter of seconds, your and your wingman's HTS pods have worked out approximate range and bearing to both sites. This done, the two of you each set up a HARM in RK MODE (RANGE KNOWN) and get ready to launch. Within a few seconds, the range to both SA-11 TELARs has settled down, and been fed automatically to the HARM, and you see the two vehicles going for a lock-on with their radars on your RWR. You select MASTER ARM ON and pull the trigger once to launch the missile from Station 3. As the missile flies off, you turn to keep on the edge of the TELAR's maximum range. Thirty seconds later, you see the symbology from both TELARs go off the air as they are destroyed by the two AGM-88s. The two of you now move out in front of the strike force to continue escorting them to the target area. About 10 nm./18.2 km. to the target, you get a sudden warning alarm from your RWR, indicating that a missile-tracking radar has just locked up your Viper. A quick look at the RWR shows the STA 8 symbology indicative of an SA-8 Gecko TELAR somewhere off to the right front. You quickly select the SP MODE from the HARM options, the azimuth setting being automatically sent to the remaining HARM at Station 7. You squeeze the trigger one more time, call a warning to the force, and begin evasive maneuvers, punching out chaff as quickly as you can. Within a matter of seconds, the SA-8 TELAR goes off the air, another victim of the superior speed of the AGM-88. Meanwhile, the one missile it launched at you goes 'stupid,' flying off to self-destruct somewhere else. The force is safe for now, and you move to a covering position to make sure no wandering MiG tries to hassle your wingman or the rest of the force. Just another day's work.
Today the Texas Instruments AGM-88 production line is going strong, continuing to build the 2,018 replacement HARMs that were contracted to replenish the stock fired during Desert Storm, as well as the foreign orders that are being serviced. There are no known plans to replace the AGM-88 at this time; and there will probably be none in the near future, given the general stagnation in the worldwide SAM development market and the remaining growth potential in the HARM airframe. As for the AGM-88 HARM, it should remain the premier ARM in the world for at least the next ten years.
THE FUTURE: TSSAM AND BEYOND
The future of U.S. long-range air-launched standoff weapons is, to put it mildly, in disarray. This is the unhappy result of the cancellation of a weapon that the USAF and USN had bet the farm on — the Northrop Grumman AGM-137 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. TSSAM was to have been a stealthy, superaccurate, long- range (180 nm./300 km.) guided missile with versions for the Navy and Air Force, and even a ground-launched version for the Army. Unfortunately, development and program management problems drove up the cost of the program. And it took a severe hit when the Army dropped out several years ago.
Since the TSSAM program was canceled, the Air Force has been scrambling to figure out how to provide their combat aircraft with a viable precision standoff missile. The current plan has the USAF buying more of what they already have, ALCM-Cs. Several different options are under consideration to fill the gap left by the cancellation of TSSAM. Some of these include:
• Buying the clipped-wing version of the AGM-142 Have Nap, and fitting it to the B-1B, the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the F-16C. This would provide a large part of the capability promised by the original TSSAM program.
• Retrofitting the IIR seeker developed for TSSAM to existing missile airframes like the AGM-86C/ALCM-C or the AGM-84E SLAM/ SLAM-ER, which is a development of the Navy Harpoon anti-ship missile.
• Producing a reduced-cost version of the AGM-137 TSSAM, with the stealth features installed only on the frontal surfaces of the airframe. This is probably the least likely option, given the current budget climate and the general lack of funding for new weapons systems.
Whatever the decisions reached in the halls of Congress, the Pentagon, and the USAF Material Command, there will have to be new gopher zappers, which will undoubtedly be joint programs with the Navy, and perhaps even foreign partners. That is perhaps the greatest impact of the New World Order on the worldwide weapons market — only through cooperation will the industry survive.
Air Combat Command: Not Your Father's Air Force
ONCE upon a time in America, there was an Air Force. It was created in 1947 as a separate service (from the U.S. Army), with a simple set of goals: to deter our primary Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, from expanding beyond its borders, and, if deterrence failed, to successfully fight the Soviets with the other armed services and achieve victory. For over forty-five years, the United States Air Force stood up to the challenge and outlasted its opponents. This is not to say it did so in the most efficient, economical, or even acceptable way. Its bitter turf battles with the U.S. Navy are legendary around Washington, D.C. Also, like all large organizations, the USAF was prone to internal conflicts. Throughout the Cold War, there were continuous squabbles between the primary commands of the USAF. The bomber pilots and ICBM missileers that made up the leadership of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were always at odds with the fighter pilots who led the Tactical Air Command (TAC). If this was not divisive enough, the 'combat' fliers at SAC and TAC scorned those who flew the transports for the Military Airlift Command (MAC), whom they considered 'trash haulers.'
And in 1991, the U.S. Air Force suffered the greatest disaster (save defeat in battle) that can befall a military force. Its primary enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed as a result of the failure of the August Coup. Of course, only a truly sick and cynical observer of world events would have wished the Cold War to continue indefinitely. Yet scarcely anyone foresaw the end of the conflict between the U.S. and the USSR and the end of the bipolar world we'd known for half a century. Now, if you think
Within the halls of the Pentagon, the leadership of the Air Force was quick to realize that with their primary threat nullified, and with severe budget cuts already planned by the Administration of President George Bush, they would have to remake themselves if they were to survive the coming lean years of the 1990s. Thus, in early 1992, USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak ordered a complete, USAF-wide reorganization. But don't call it a reorganization. Call it a revolution. It so stunned members of the service, they are still trying to fully understand it.
