The three traditional flying commands, SAC, TAC, and MAC, were abolished, with combat aircraft (fighters, bombers, electronic warfare and theater transport aircraft) going to the newly formed Air Combat Command (ACC) headquartered at Langley Air Force Base. Virtually all heavy airlift (C-141, C-5, and C-17) and airborne tanker (KC- 135 and KC-10) aircraft went to the newly formed Air Mobility Command (AMC), based at Scott AFB, Illinois. The strategic nuclear mission was handed off to a new unified (i.e., joint USAF/Navy) command called Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Incidently, STRATCOM does not own any of the bombers, submarines, or missiles that it operates.
On June 1st, 1992, when the reorganization took place, it was as if every major airline in America (and a few large service companies as well) had merged overnight and thrown their individual corporate cultures to the winds. As might be imagined, this has caused a great deal of stress and personal disorientation. It has also created one of the most powerful and diverse fighting forces in the world. Definitely a revolution! Let's take a look at it.
TAC TO ACC: THE GREAT MERGER
When ACC was formed in June 1992, the man who was tasked as its first commander had the advantage of also being the last commander of TAC. Thus, General Michael Loh, USAF, had the unique distinction of commanding major USAF military commands on both sides of the great merger. A career fighter pilot, he suddenly found himself leading a force that would have been inconceivable just five years ago.
General Loh makes no secret of his tactical bias in the eternal struggle between the fighter pilots of TAC and the bomber pilots of SAC. It is even conceivable that on the night of May 31st, 1992, he may have hoisted a beer or two to celebrate the end of TAC's 'true' enemy, the Armageddon-oriented bomber culture of SAC, which was to vanish at midnight that evening. But to listen to him now is to understand the transformation of the old Air Force he grew up in into the new one that he helped create. Gone is the cocky, triumphant fighter pilot. As he hands off command of ACC to General Joe Ralston there is an intense (you could define intensity by spending an hour with General Loh!), almost desperate drive to weld the formerly distinct elements of his new command into a single fighting force. Not in ten years, or even five. But now! Before they are needed again in some far-off, dangerous place. This is the reality that he faced as he finished his final year of command at ACC (he retired in the summer of 1995). His challenges have been simple but formidable. They included:
• Merging personnel, bases, and aircraft from all three of the former major flying commands (bombers from SAC, medium transports from MAC, and tactical aircraft from TAC) into a unified combat flying command.
• Continuing modernization of ACC aircraft, weapons, and equipment, despite the fiscal limitations of the 1990s.
• Maintaining operational and tactical proficiency when out-of-area (i.e., overseas) operations rates (Op Tempos, as they are known) for our forces have never been higher, and operations and maintenance budgets (per pilot and aircraft) have never been lower.
• Supporting Administration plans to be able to fight in two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) of the size that might be anticipated in Korea, or perhaps Iran.
• Doing all this in a time of planned drawdowns and budget shortfalls that are challenging even to those who survived the dark fiscal days of the 1970s.
ACC currently has units spread over the globe, conducting missions on a global scale. In Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Italy, ACC aircraft are helping to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq and Bosnia. In Korea, ACC aircraft and personnel are providing muscle to diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and stability in that troubled region. And U.S.-based ACC aircraft were key to the recent efforts to build and enforce democracy in Haiti. All this while trying to maintain normal commitments in NATO, Latin America, and the Far East, as well as providing continental air defense for North America.
THE ACC MISSION
All this brings us to the question of just what are normal operations for ACC. To understand this requires a short history lesson. Back in the mid-1980s, during the Reagan buildup, questions were asked about the effectiveness of the military the buildup was buying. Less-than-perfect joint operations in Grenada (1983) and Libya (1986), along with the disaster of our intervention in Lebanon (1982 to 1984), were disturbing signs that more than just money was needed to get the most out of the American forces. The Congressional response was the Military Reform Act of 1986, known more popularly as Goldwater-Nichols, after its sponsors. Goldwater-Nichols reformed the various military chains of command, and concentrated actual power to command forces in the field in the hands of regional commanders in chief, or CinCs as they are called. These CinCs, of which there are currently eight, control all forces, regardless of service, that are assigned to their geographic area of responsibility (AOR) in the world. These joint commands range from the Middle East (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) to forces based in Europe (U.S. European Command, EUCOM). For example, anyone assigned to operate in Latin America would come under the command of General Barry McCaffrey, USA, who (at the time of this writing) is CinC of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) based in Panama. In addition, the Goldwater-Nichols bill strengthened the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), so that the billet is now considered a cabinet-level position and the President's senior military advisor. The underlying idea was to clarify the chain of command between the civilian leadership of the national command authority in Washington, D.C., and the forward leadership of our armed forces in the field.
So far, Goldwater-Nichols seems to have worked, with joint operations from Panama to the Middle East running more smoothly than those of the post-Vietnam era. This is not to say that poor political objectives can't cause such operations to fail, as was proven in Somalia in 1992. On the contrary, Goldwater-Nichols places a much greater burden of responsibility for military operations on the civilian leadership of the United States, something future Presidential candidates might be wise to consider before seeking the office.
At this point, you might ask just what all this has to do with getting a wing of combat aircraft into action somewhere in the world? More than you might think, actually. Since the end of the Cold War, the military of the United States has increasingly become a home- or continental-based force. Just in the last five years, we have closed the bulk of our overseas bases in the Philippines, Germany, Spain, and many other countries. This means that interventions by U.S. armed forces are increasingly made at the request of a host nation or as part of a coalition of forces. Thus, the current U.S. military basing strategy has relatively few units forward based, with the CinCs frequently owning few or no forces of their own.
For example: When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf owned exactly
To support this shift in the U.S. defense paradigm, a new joint command has been created, called United States Atlantic Command (USACOM). In essence, this massive command 'owns' virtually every military unit based in the continental United States. The role of USACOM is to be the 'packager' of joint task forces for shipment to the various unified commands around the world. Delivery of the package is handled by the folks at U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) at Scott AFB, Illinois. TRANSCOM controls all the ships, heavy airlift, trucking, and rail
