Consequently, bean counters and analysts began casting about for another option. They found it in the Joint Strike Fighter: a sort of one-size-fits-all warplane equipped to perform a variety of seemingly contradictory missions. JSFs became a growth industry.
The concept was not new. In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration pushed the multi-service TFX, the experimental fighter that would simultaneously serve the Air Force and Navy. It became the signature program of Kennedy's defense secretary, Robert Strange McNamara, previously a Ford executive. The F-111 struggled through an extraordinarily difficult gestation, earning the sobriquet 'The Flying Edsel.' From the Navy viewpoint, it was indeed a lemon: The B model proved too difficult to operate from aircraft carriers, with marginal landing characteristics. The Navy's top flying admiral, Tom Connolly, risked his career by undertaking a dangerous enterprise: he told Congress the truth, stating 'There isn't enough thrust in Christendom to make that airplane into a fighter.' The denizens of Camelot were furious. The Navy was grateful. A decade later it named the F-14 the Tomcat.
Eventually, the Air Force took a hard look at the F-111A. It was reworked and committed to combat in Vietnam with some success. Though technically a fighter bomber (FB-111), it was dedicated to a strike role and eventually became a countermeasures platform in the EF-111A 'Raven' configuration. Australia became the only foreign user, with — C and — G models.
MEANWHILE, the best example of a joint-service aircraft had already proven itself: McDonnell Douglas's long-lived, enormously versatile F-4 Phantom. Originally a Navy design, it was also flown by the Marine Corps and became an Air Force icon. Nearly a dozen other nations also became 'Phantom Pflyers.'
Therefore, the JSF concept had some appeal, especially its multi-mission capability and lower cost. Two industry teams were awarded development contracts: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. It was touted as a head-to- head shootout; a financial dogfight with the winner taking home the biggest defense contract yet. Boeing's X-32 and LM's X-35 both had to meet design specifications, but were free to interpret the best approach.
It was a daunting task: meeting the needs not only of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but of the British Royal Navy as well. The latter two organizations required a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capability to replace the aging Harrier and Sea Harrier. Consequently, the design teams opted for a modular approach in three iterations: a strictly land-based (Air Force) version, a conventional carrier aircraft (Navy), and the STOVL machine (Marines and Brits). The program called for at least 70 % commonality of airframe parts with the same basic engine. Both teams succeeded: Lockheed Martin's design was selected.
The USAF version is the F-35A. And, incidentally, don't ask why the American fighter series jumped from FA-18 to F-35, even discounting Northrop's dead-end F-20 Tigershark (a sad story, deserving the thanks of every taxpayer for Northrop's venture capital effort). Purists were justifiably upset, just as they were when the F-117 designation was chosen. The 'stealth fighter' is no fighter at all — it cannot carry air-to-air weapons, but there is no requirement for consistency or logic in the U.S. government.
The best explanation available is from an industry source: 'During the JSF down-select announcement on October 26, 2001, Air Force Secretary Roche referred to the JSF as the 'F-35'… and sort of looked around the room for confirmation. A few months later the government made F-35 the official designator!'
Beltway insiders compare the F-35 moniker with Lyndon Johnson's transposition of the designators in the RS-71 Blackbird. After Johnson referred to it as the SR-71 in a speech, the designation was changed in order to prevent a minor embarrassment to the commander in chief.
Meanwhile, students of aircraft nomenclature note that the JSF has a pure fighter designator (F-35), while the original Raptors (FA-22s) have no strike capability. 'Go figure' is an oft-heard phrase.
Anyway, the Air Force wanted to streamline its tactical air wings, replacing existing types with JSFs. Consequently, the F-35A is slated to take the slots on the ramp currently occupied by A-10s and F-16s, beginning in 2011. The long-range goal was for 'migration' (another Pentagon buzzword) to an all stealth fighter force around 2025.
ONE SIZE FITS ALL?
The Joint Strike Fighter became the closest thing to a one-size-fits-all warplane. In addition to the Air Force variant, the Marine version is an F-35B with 600 some aircraft to replace Harriers, as well as F/A-18C and — D Hornets. The Bravo model JSF will have the vertical and short takeoff capability of the Harrier, which also suits the British Royal Navy requirement.
The U.S. Navy F-35C differs in having catapult fittings and a tailhook plus larger wing and horizontal tail surfaces. The airframe is beefier to withstand the high sink-rate shock of carrier landings. The Navy buy is expected to run to 480 to relieve the early model Hornets. F/A-18E and — F (two-seat) Super Hornets are a growth industry and will be around well into this century. The naval JSF variants are expected to reach squadrons beginning in 2011.
Thus, the JSF is intended to replace most of a generation of current tactical jets: Warthogs, Falcons, Harriers, and the older Hornets.
Simply building the most efficient aircraft was not the be-all and end-all of the JSF contract. Maintainability figured heavily in the equation, as sortie generation rates were an important part of the concept. So were survivability and lethality, though the required stealth element was a given, as was the variety of ordnance required. Both competitors were capable of a 'first look, first pass' kill of a variety of targets with current and planned ordnance. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were going to be a factor in JSF regardless of the version chosen.
According to industry reports, some 250 officials were involved in making the selection. That's a committee by any standard, and everybody knows what committees are like. Many of them tend to analyze, cuss, and discuss a subject to tears. But JSF was different. Rather than the traditional fly-off, the Boeing and Lockheed Martin prototypes were evaluated not head to head, but side by side. At a 2002 briefing a manager said, 'They were evaluated not against each other but in comparison to how well they fit the requirement.'
Experienced test pilots in the audience shifted in their seats, muttered to themselves, and essentially said, 'Batguano.' The explanation sounded like doublespeak, and in a sense it was. Whether the X-32 and X-35 flew against each other or were rated separately, it was still a competition. The winner was the one that looked most promising in the context of the criteria.
At least that was the official view. Some insiders postulated that there wasn't enough technical or operational difference between the two designs, so the contract went to the company with greater need. If so, that was LM, since Boeing had sold the Super Hornet and was doing well in other areas, including its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas (nee Hughes) Helicopters.
Or perhaps there was another factor at work. Two military pilots known to the author have stated, 'Man, I'm not gonna fly anything as ugly as the Boeing JSF!'
WANTED: ONE BOMB TRUCK
One phrase often heard in JSF briefings during the 90s was 'bomb truck.' The services began sorely missing
