and Myhrum each received an Air Medal for attacking the fake SA-2 SAM site that fateful day in July. Horner was surprised; he hadn’t expected it. And he was proud: nobody else in his wing who’d entered the Air Force since the end of the Korean war over a decade earlier had one of those blue and yellow ribbons on his chest.[14]
For the next two years Horner volunteered every chance he could to return to the war, but was told by the TAC personnel assignments people that he was too valuable for that; his combat experience was needed to train the rapidly growing pipeline feeding replacement aircrews into the war. This meant a move to Nellis AFB as an instructor in the F-105 school, where they trained new and old pilots to fly the Thud in combat.
During the time Horner was an instructor at Nellis, nearly all the experienced F-105 pilots had been or were being cycled through the war. By late 1966, that pool had been used up; those in it had either completed their tours (the normal tour for an F-105 pilot being 100 sorties, about four months) or had been shot down and killed or captured (the F-105 had the dubious honor of leading the pack in this category). This meant that the turnover rate in the F-105 (which flew only over North Vietnam or Laos) was at best four months. And this meant TAC had a tremendous training load in order to qualify replacement pilots. Since the pipeline could not feed the vacancies, the Air Force impressed non-fighter pilots, trained them in quickie courses, and shipped them off to war and near- certain death or capture. The term “There ain’t no way” became common in the F-105 community about this time. It meant: “There’s no way to make it to 100 sorties in the F-105, because you are going to get shot down before you reach 100.”
Here is how the training at Nellis went:
An instructor was in a squadron with normally fifteen other instructors. Every six months he’d get a long- course class — second lieutenants just out of flying training with shiny new wings and shiny new attitudes, willing to learn. Every three months he’d get a short-course class — pilots who came from staff jobs or from flying other aircraft.
To both long and short, he’d teach classroom instruction on the systems in the F-105, as well as taking off and landing, flying in formation, and air-to-air and air-to-ground gunnery, weapons, and tactics. Even though these students were being sent off to Vietnam when they graduated, there was still considerable inertia in the Air Force, so he also taught nuclear weapons deliveries. But whenever he was teaching his students what they would actually use in war — bombing techniques, lookout procedures for MiGs and SAMs, and so on — he always made sure they got the message that this would be a test question administered in the sky over North Vietnam.
Predictably, Horner was best with pilots who were aggressive and quick to learn. If they were slow learners or incompetent, then he had no patience with them, and they suffered his verbal abuse. The long-course people, the real fighter pilots, were usually a joy to check out — a clean sheet of paper for what he could give them. All he had to do was tell them the function of the various switches and the unique aspects of the Thud.
However, the pilots who’d been flying heavies — the cannon fodder schooled in other ways of operating who were being packaged and sent off to war — resisted change and were difficult to teach. Though he could coax them through, and for the most part could make them safe in the Thuds, their minds did not move at the pace flying fighters required. They lacked good situational awareness. Most of them got by using checklists and rote procedures, but some — because they were behind the jet all the time — were dangerous. These he taught survival skills, such as: “Don’t worry about hitting the target with your bombs. Worry about hitting the target with your airplane. Someday you’ll get through all this and return to your C-118, where you are happiest.”
Just as the conduct of the war in Vietnam was riddled with insanities, so also was the training for it: thus, instructors weren’t allowed to wash anyone out of the program. While many pilots did not meet standards, they were graduated and sent off to war. However, in the case of those few who would clearly die if sent off to war in a Thud, instructors did their best to figure out ways to keep them from going.
Horner had a young heavy pilot who was so far behind the aircraft it was a sure thing that even if the enemy didn’t get him, he would kill himself. One day, Horner learned that the young pilot had had a growth removed from his forearm. That was the excuse he needed. He had him sent to the squadron flight surgeon for an examination, and there it was “discovered” that this pilot’s forearm was too weak to pull back on the stick of an F-105 and that he should be returned to transports. And so it came about… even though anyone who knows aircraft knows that pulling on the wheel of a transport requires a lot more strength than the hydraulically boosted controls of a modern fighter. Sometimes the only way to beat insanity is by canceling it out with another insanity.
? All of this pointed up the deep flaws in the assignment of pilots into combat.
First, all military personnel sent to fight the war had to operate under an arcane accounting system that governed how long they would be exposed to combat. To CPAs and bean counters this made sense. To warriors this was madness. But it was the bean counters who were running the personnel system, and the personnel system was establishing the policy that drove the strategy.
Second, all pilots were to have an equal chance to gain combat experience, and no pilot was expected to spend more than one year in theater or 100 combat missions over North Vietnam. The constant injection into the F-4, F-100, and F-105 units of bomber and tanker pilots who were not experienced fighter pilots, but who were given a quickie checkout in fighter jets and sent to war, at least hurt and at times crippled the war effort. Often these people wound up in charge by virtue of their rank and tried to lead when they didn’t know what they were doing. Some proved out, but most just muddled around until they finished their 100 missions or were shot down.[15]
This policy was obviously wrong on several counts, starting with the assumption that all pilots were of equal ability when it came to fighting. It further encouraged unusual tensions and risk avoidance, as pilots tried to stay alive for their 100 missions or their year rather than concentrate on the job of defeating the enemy. (Pilots with 90 missions would really get edgy.) Thus, it removed the primary incentive of a pilot for doing his combat duties to the best of his abilities, the goal of winning.
At Korat, one of the pilots was shot down after about 88 missions. He survived, came back to the base, and wanted to finish his tour flying with the Wild Weasels.
The job of the Wild Weasels was to locate and destroy SAM sites; and it was the job of the number one and three pilots in a Weasel flight of four aircraft to do that. The number two and four pilots were not Weasels; and they flew ordinary F-105Ds with bombs. Their job was to stick close and look out for MiGs while the other two were teasing the sites. If the one and three cornered a SAM site, two and four would drop regular bombs or CBUs on it.
This pilot figured that flying with the Weasels would be a soft touch, since the one and three often left their wingmen on the ridge in comparative safety, while they ventured out on the Red River valley floor to find the SAMs. They could maneuver a lot more aggressively if they didn’t have to take care of a wingman.
As luck would have it, though, on his first mission with the Weasels, this pilot had sixteen SA-2 missiles shot at him. They all missed, but when he returned to base he couldn’t even get drunk. His hands shook so much, he couldn’t hold a glass.
To his credit, he finished his 100 missions, but he became a dip bomber and was never again effective.
A dip bomber was a pilot who went in at 15,000 feet, rolled in over the target, and at 14,000 feet dropped his bombs so they were sure to hit somewhere on the surface of the earth. He then immediately started a climb until he could rejoin the rest of the flight, who’d gone down to much lower altitudes to try to hit the target, even though it meant getting shot at. There were a number of dip bombers at Korat. Some, like this one, evoked sympathy; some were the object of scorn.
It’s not hard to understand why pilots who’d been shot down became dip bombers. For a pilot the cockpit is an air-conditioned and familiar womb, but when he is about to go down and he blows the canopy, he’s jerked out of the womb into the real world of wind blast, noise, and if he’s flying at high speed, pain. The uncertainty as he floats down in his parachute quickly follows:
Why did the Air Force fall into this particular trap?
Partly for old-style ticket-punching reasons — to give every officer a chance for quality combat time in order to justify promotions. Worse, in Horner’s view, the Air Force felt that since the war offered an opportunity to renew the combat experience of the force, they wanted to offer that experience to as many pilots as possible. Since it
