before. This docs not mean that an astute Chairman does not consult with the service Chiefs; but it eliminated consensual decision-making that was sometimes influenced by service parochialism. The act also included the warfighting commanders-in-chief in the chain of command, and gave them additional authority for conducting military operations in their theaters for wartime as well as peacetime activities.
Second, clear guidance was given by the National Command Authority to General Thurman.
Third, from the start, General Thurman gave me full authority over all forces and the necessary freedom for developing the plan.
Fourth, once the plan was completed, we briefed it all the way up through the decision-making authority, and it was approved as written.
Fifth, we were allowed enough time to fully rehearse.
Sixth, when the operation was launched, we were allowed to execute it without changing the plan.
Back to the question: 'What lessons did you learn?'
I can't say we really learned any lessons. In my opinion, you only learn a lesson as a result of a big mistake, or when you have failed to anticipate an event somewhere along the line — training readiness, plan development, or the like — that could effect the mission.
With that said, however, we did validate some principles and procedures that contributed to our success in Panama, which also apply to future operations:
• Integrated planning and execution are key to success for all contingency operations, particularly for joint operations when forces from other services are involved.
• A streamlined 'warfighter'-oriented command-and-control structure, responsive to needs at lowest levels, is imperative.
• Overwhelming combat power results in quick victory with fewer casualties on both sides.
• Continuous review of rules of engagement, with responsive and assured dissemination, maximizes combat capability and flexibility.
• Use of Joint Communications Electronic Operating Instructions (CEOI) is crucial for successful joint operations.
• Troops fight to standards to which they are trained — and nothing more. There is no substitute for live-fire training, under the most realistic conditions, as you expect to fight.
• Maximum latitude must be allowed units at lowest level; otherwise don't expect their fullest potential.
• No force more powerful than PSYOPs can ever be brought to the battlefield. If you can influence the minds of your foe, the job is much easier and less expensive by every measure.
• Appropriately integrating Special Operations and conventional forces maximizes force potential and capability in ways not otherwise possible.
Though all of this contributed immeasurably to the success of Operation JUST CAUSE, it is no more than what is normally expected of senior commanders.
And finally, the plan the leaders create may be a thing of great beauty, yet it is only as good as the troops that execute it. The outcome is determined at their level.
I cannot praise enough the motivation, the technical and professional competence, the daring, the maturity, and the caring of our troops at all levels from all the services. Our officers and NCOs were superbly trained; they led their troops the way troops expect to be led. They and their troops did everything we asked — and then more. They have earned the credit for all that was accomplished in Operation JUST CAUSE.
One more group deserves recognition — the wives in Panama who were embroiled without warning in mortal combat, and who spent the night of December 19 and 20 huddled over their children in closets as the battles raged. These same women, two days later, opened and operated the Commissary and P.X. so families could get much- needed supplies. They were professionals of the highest order, most deserving of our deepest respect and gratitude.
YES, Operation JUST CAUSE was an occasion of deep satisfaction. We didn't rest on our laurels, though. We knew another major crisis could come any time, and we had to be prepared for it. Little did we know, however, just how soon that would be.
XII
SHADOWS IN THE STORM
At 1:00 A.M. on August 2, 1990, three divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard, equipped with nearly a thousand tanks, streamed across Iraq's border with Kuwait. Within half an hour, helicopters dropped Iraqi commandos on rooftops in Kuwait City. By dawn, the massive invasion of the small Arab country at the top of the Persian Gulf was well under way. By nightfall, it was nearly complete, and Saddam Hussein could declare that Kuwait was now his country's '19th province.' By week's end, eleven Iraqi divisions had backed up his claim.
Though early on American satellites had detected the massing of Iraqi troops along the border, there had been mixed interpretations of Saddam's intent, and the initial U.S. approach had been uncertain and at times muddled. In the early hours of the invasion itself, the Bush administration seemed unsure about what to do. All that quickly changed, however, and on August 5, President George Bush made his famous 'line in the sand' speech, declaring that the invasion 'will not stand.' Within hours, Bush had put together a powerful multinational coalition, including leading Arab nations, and American troops were en route to the Gulf. The massive buildup that followed eventually brought half a million U.S. troops to the region.
Among them would be nearly 9,000 special operations soldiers—7,705 in Saudi Arabia and 1,049 in Turkey. Special Operations Forces (SOF) would perform a wide variety of tasks, ranging from simple language interpretation to strikes against targets more than a hundred miles behind enemy lines. During the early stages of the American buildup, small groups of SOF operators would be posted on the front lines, both to gather intelligence and to serve as trip wires, symbolic sacrifices in the event Saddam chose to invade Saudi Arabia.
The range of SOF missions in the Gulf amply demonstrated the potential of special operations in the post — Cold War era. It would have done so even more if their initiatives had not been blunted for several reasons — including command attitudes that would have been familiar to the earliest special operators.
When news of the invasion came in, General Stiner, now the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), was sitting in a room at CIA's headquarters in Langley Virginia. Unlike some of the career intelligence officers around him, Stiner was not surprised by the news. Months before, his intelligence people had pegged Kuwait as one of the next geopolitical hot spots, and SOCOM had been working on contingency plans for possible SOF involvement since July. Even after national intelligence agencies declared that the Iraqi pre- invasion buildup amounted to mere saber-rattling, Stiner had begun mentally drawing up a list of SOF personnel who would be needed to augment the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters in the event of war.
In order to better support the warfighting CINCs in planning for the employment of SOF forces, each CINC had been given his own Special Operations Command (SOC), resident in his own headquarters, and commanded by either a brigadier general or colonel, with thirty to forty officers and senior NCOs. In time of crisis, it was SOCOM's responsibility to augment the Special Operations Command as necessary to fulfill its warfighting responsibilities. Colonel Jesse Johnson, a very capable and experienced SF officer, was Schwarzkopf's SOC Commander. He required at least two hundred augmentees right off the bat — and more later as the need for SOF capabilities became more clearly identified.
Under the U.S. military's regional joint command organization, CENTCOM was responsible for all operations in Southwest Asia. In many ways, Stiner's SOCOM functioned as a service agency to the different regional commands. With the exception of individual operations directly ordered by the President, CENTCOM's four-star commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, would direct SOF personnel in Southwest Asia, as Thurman had in Panama.
