Panama. The use of SOF by the theater CINCs increased significantly during General Lindsay's tenure.
The creation of MFP-11 was a special and unique priority for both General Lindsay and Congress. Like the services, USSOCOM was to have its own budget and would be responsible for determining its own funding needs, including research and development, and equipping and training all the Special Operations forces of all the services.
Although the Nunn-Cohen Amendment had created MFP-11 to reform SOF funding, the wording of the law permitted varying interpretations, and some Defense Department officials argued that the new command should not submit its own Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which defines and justifies all programs and initiatives necessary for readiness, including the spread of funding over time (the POM thus serves as the basis for building the budget). The services wanted to keep control of the budgeting process for SOF forces so they could use the money on things other than SOF, as they had always been accustomed to doing.
This debate lingered until September 1988, when Senators Nunn and Cohen clarified congressional intent, saying that the sponsors of the law 'fully intended that the commander of the Special Operations Command would have sole responsibility for the preparation of the POM.' Congress enacted Public Law 100–456 that same month, which directed USCINCSOC to submit a POM directly to the Secretary of Defense.
Four months later, on January 24, 1989, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, William H. Taft IV, signed a memorandum giving USCINCSOC budgetary authority over MFP-11. Soon afterward, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) gave USSOCOM control of selected MFP-1 1 programs on October 1, 1990, and total responsibility in October 1991.
By law, the services are responsible for training, equipping, and modernizing their respective forces. The CINCs are not. They take the forces they are given and employ them. The services had long been 'robbing' SOF by transferring previously approved money to other requirements. Giving financial control to SOF was the fundamental basis for the Nunn-Cohen Amendment.
For the first time ever, a CINC had been granted authority for a budget and POM.
The complex, politically sensitive process of establishing a new unified command extended into Carl Stiner's tenure as CINCSOC. He pushed the command to fulfill the provisions of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment; oversaw the implementation of developing and acquiring 'special-operations-peculiar' equipment, materiel, supplies, and services; and watched over the command's submission of fully supported budgets based on SOF mission requirements.
After DESERT STORM, he devoted much of his time to raising awareness about SOF capabilities and successes in and out of the military. Supporting the theater CINCs and maintaining SOF combat readiness were also top priorities. Finally, he convinced the Secretary of Defense to designate Psychological Operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs as part of SOF. This enabled USSOCOM to command and control these units in peacetime as well as war, which greatly improved the command's ability to fund, train, equip, and organize these forces.
During his time in command, SOF optempo rose 35 percent. USSOCOM supported a number of operations worldwide, most notably DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT (support to Kurdish refugees), PROVIDE RELIEF, and RESTORE HOPE (Somalia relief operations).
The main challenges of General Downing's tenure were to continue the revitalization of SOF and to prepare the SOF community for the twenty-first century. to these ends, General Downing streamlined the acquisition of SOF-specific equipment, increased the command's focus on new emerging threats, and realigned SOF budget requirements with the reduced Defense Department's budget. His changes in the allocation of resources resulted in a far more efficient strategic planning process.
During his watch, SOF optempo again increased, with SOF participation in UNISOM II (Somalia), SUPPORT and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as many smaller contingencies and deployments.
General Henry H. Shelton guided the command through a time of greatly constrained resources and extraordinary worldwide demand for SOF support. SOF operations increased by more than 51 percent, and personnel deployments increased by 127 percent. In 1996 alone, SOF deployed to a total of 142 countries and engaged in 120 counterdrug missions, 12 demining training missions, and 204 joint combined exchange training exercises with other nations. General Shelton's largest SOF operations commitment was to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR/JOINT GUARD, the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, and special operators assisted in noncombatant evacuations from such crisis areas as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Albania.
General Peter J. Schoomaker's top priority was to organize SOF in ways that kept it relevant to national security requirements. To that end, he initiated or accelerated numerous projects — headquarters reorganization; planning, programming, and acquisition enhancements; and the integration of SOF's components into one resourcing and acquisition team.
On his watch, SOF took part in the transition from JOINT GUARD to JOINT FORCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina, DESERT THUNDER in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (to thwart Saddam Husscin's restrictions on UN inspectors' freedom of movement), and numerous contingencies and peacetime engagements. SOF played crucial roles in ALLIED FORGE, the operation that forced Serbian forces out of Kosovo, and joint GUARDIAN, which enforced the Kosovo Peace Agreement.
GENERAL CARL STINER, CINC USSOCOM
In my thirty-five years of service, I have never known anyone who faced a challenge of greater complexity than General Jim Lindsay's in the standing up of the United States Special Operations Command, nor do 1 know an officer who could have done the job better. If you had the choice of whom to succeed in command, it would certainly be Jim Lindsay. Not only did he turn over a well-trained and functioning staff, but all operating systems were in place as well.
Because he had kept me constantly in the loop on his challenges and decisions, very little transition was needed when I assumed command. My challenge became to take what he had given me and move it forward.
Two major objectives remained in achieving Congress's intent: developing a new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process to structure a SOCOM POM and budget, and bringing under the command the major weapons development programs that were still being managed by the services.
Even with a congressional mandate, the Command found itself in a very difficult position to establish MFP-11. The command was still 'standing up,' and some 100 key personnel short of reaching its manning objective, when the Chairman directed USSOCOM to take personnel cuts proportionally equal to other commands, as part of the downsizing of the military resulting from the fall of the Soviet Empire. The Command had to take a measured approach to assuming its budget tasks.
The POM was the first step. The initial one was completed and submitted in 1988 during Jim Lindsay's tenure — but through the Department of the Air Force (which was USSOCOM's executive agent for budgeting issues at the time). The Command only assumed budget execution authority by October 1990.
Meanwhile, many critics at OSD level who resented the decision to give USSOCOM its own budget argued that the Command would never be able to submit a POM. They believed USSOCOM didn't have the intelligence and expertise to develop it. Nevertheless, in 1991, the Command submitted its first fully supported POM, totaling $3.2 billion-and it was the first one in, ahead of all the services. This was the first time USSOCOM had researched SOF mission requirements and developed the analysis for the POM justification instead of 'cross-walking' requiremcnts to other services.[33]
The establishment of MFP-11 set up a more focused resource process and insured a balanced review of special operations requirements and programs.
