• The capability to recover the weapon (in either a permissive or nonpermissive environment), to render it safe, and to evacuate it to a safe area for turnover or destruction was the focus of USSOCOM's efforts.
These efforts continued as an assumed mission requirement, and much progress was made with the cooperation and help of national agencies — though at our initiative. When Wayne Downing replaced me, he invited Secretary of Defense Bill Perry to observe firsthand the capability that had been developed. The Secretary was impressed. 'Who should have this mission?' he asked.
'We'll take it,' Downing answered.
'You've already got all these other high-priority missions,' Perry replied, doubtfully.
'True,' Downing said. 'But as you can see, we have very capable and smart forces, and we can do this thing.'
'What should the mission for counterproliferation say?' Perry asked.
'We'll send you a draft.'
When Perry received the proposed mission statement, he signed it, and counterproliferation became an official USSOCOM mission. Along with that came funding and formalized cooperation and support from other agencies of government.
Since then, enormous progress has been made not only in developing and fielding essential technologies but in training special operators in all the skills needed to accomplish this mission. USSOCOM special mission forces have made vast strides in that direction, but that is not enough. The critical key is accurate intelligence for timely warning.
Since 1987, SOF has become the force of choice for theater CINCs and ambassadors; and SOF forces have been involved in virtually every contingency operation, as well as thousands of joint training exchanges, peacetime engagement activities, and humanitarian relief operations. I've already mentioned several contingencies and training activities. Some other significant operations, involving all elements of SOF, include: Somalia (1992–1995), Haiti (1994–1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-present), Kosovo (1999-present), and Macedonia (1999-present). Many others cannot be mentioned for security reasons.
During the same period, SOF forces have performed a wide variety of missions under the category of 'Operations Other Than War' (OOTW). OOTWs include a wide range of missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian demining, peacekeeping, crisis response, combating terrorism, enforcement of sanctions or exclusion zones, and show of force.
During the 1990s, these increased significantly.
For the UN's first forty years, only thirteen OOTWs were conducted, but from 1988 to 1994 their numbers more than doubled — with far greater scope and complexity. U.S. Special Operations forces have served in most nations of the globe, performing as instruments of U.S. national policy, executing missions, and providing assistance possible only through their unique skills, language capabilities, and cultural orientation — missions that conventional units could not perform, and in many cases where a U.S. military signature was unacceptable to the host.
SOF takes up less than 1.4 percent of the total force structure and only 3.5 percent of the DOD budget; yet the increase in optempo is ample evidence of their usefulness. During 1993, USSOCOM averaged 2,036 personnel deployed away from home station each week, serving in 101 countries. By 1996, the number had climbed to 4,613; and by 1999, it had climbed to 5,141, deployed to 149 countries and foreign territories.
This is an incredibly small investment compared to the payback.
1 here are significant intangible benefits as well. Enduring personal relationships with the militaries and government officials of host nations will serve our national interests for years to come.
These deployments also benefit SOF — providing training in foreign cultures and languages and knowledge of potential operational areas.
APPENDIX II:
LEADERSHIP
C
The Army does a better job producing leaders than every other institution of which I am aware. This achievement derives primarily from the Army's institutionalized education system, which is designed to provide each officer and noncommissioned officer the technical and tactical proficiency necessary for every level of command: from second lieutenant all the way through general officer, and from sergeant E-5 through sergeant major.
Leadership is the fundamental 'core' subject throughout all the curriculums of the schools in the 'system.'
Leadership and professional training for officers begins with the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) or service academy. The basic-level course for newly commissioned lieutenants is the Basic Officers Course, which is designed to develop the technical and tactical proficiency essential for leading at the platoon level. The Advance Course prepares captains for command at the company level. The Command and General Staff College prepares majors for duties and responsibilities as principal staff officers at the brigade level, as well as the essential prerequisites for commanding at the battalion level. The War College is designed to prepare officers at the colonel level for commanding at the brigade level, as well as for serving as a principal staff officer at division and higher levels of responsibility.
Other subjects increase the officer's breadth of knowledge: politico-military affairs, the Arm's programming, planning, and budgeting system, and so on. For those fortunate enough to be selected for flag rank, each scrvice runs its own two-week-long general officer orientation course, followed by the seven-week-long CAPSTONE Course, which is mandatory within the first year of promotion for all flag-rank officers of all services. This course broadens the officers' knowledge and understanding of responsibilities and joint warfighting at the unified command levels.
Other courses, such as at the Armed Forces Staff College, primarily for majors and lieutenant colonels of all services, are required for those who have been selected for joint assignments, and focus on developing proficiency in joint operational techniques and procedures.
The 'Army's Educational System' is not limited to the 'schoolhouses'; there is other specialized training as well — advanced degrees at civilian education institutions in appropriate technical fields; master's courses in advanced executive-level management; and branch specialized courses, like the Special Forces Qualification Course.
Credit for bringing the Army back from its post-Vietnam downturn is due to the vision and efforts of General Shy Meyer, who institutionalized the Army's education system; to Ceneral Carl Vuono, who established our national 'Maneuver Training Centers'; and to General Cordon Sullivan, who gave priority to the training process by providing necessary resources and updating doctrine. These great leaders made training and combat readiness their number-one priority and spent vast amounts of time personally supervising training. The results were manifested in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM.
WHAT MAKES A LEADER?
Some people claim that leaders are born. That may be so in some cases, and leaders certainly share basic characteristics; but not everyone with those characteristics becomes a leader — or becomes a good one. Leadership is primarily acquired. It has to be learned. 1 have a number of thoughts about how this should be done, based on my own experience learning leadership.
No one all of a sudden realizes, 'Hey, I'm a leader.' It doesn't come out of the blue. A person becomes a leader because he has a sincere desire to lead, he is willing to give it whatever it takes, and he has within him the
