of whatever magistrates had responsibility, and let the hostages identify the terrorists.
'This should be possible,' he told me. 'And perhaps it's a good idea.'
'Then would you contact the local district attorney and set this up sometime later in the evening?' I asked. 'And I'll work on getting an airplane to bring the hostages here.'
About an hour later, he reported that the district attorney had agreed to my proposal, but would like a two- hour notice to arrange the lineup in the presence of the magistrates.
I then called Vice Admiral Moreau to ask for a C-141 to bring the American hostages to Sigonella. I also pointed out to him how important it was for the hostages to positively identify the terrorists before the magistrates who would have ultimate responsibility for their trials.
'That's a good idea,' he said. 'I'll work it and get back to you.'
Just before dusk, the executive jet returned, taxied to the end of the runway, turned around, and stopped, but kept its engines running and its landing lights on. The two men I'd met before got off the plane, approached the 737, and again asked permission to board. They stayed on board for half an hour, then took off again.
All of this strengthened my suspicion that someone was setting up the machinery to get Abu Abbas and his partner out of the country.
Shortly after dark, the Italian base commander, the Egyptian 'ambassador,' and the Egypt Air crew showed up at the 737. Twenty minutes later a panel truck arrived with the Egyptian 777 guard force. At about 9:30 P.M., the 737's engines were started. At the same time, the Italians began to move trucks and construction equipment to block the entrances to the main runway. The only one they left open was the one the 737 would travel.
I called the Navy T-39. 'Get ready,' I told them. 'The 737 has cranked up. It will probably make a dash for the runway very soon.'
At about 9:50 P.M., the Egyptian 737 turned around and headed toward the end of the active runway. He began his takeoff run at about 10:00 P.M.
The T-39 began his own takeoff run at the same time. Since access to the main runway was blocked, the T- 39 took off down the taxiway, which paralleled the main runway; and the two aircraft passed each other going in opposite directions, with Italian officers diving in the ditches as the T-39 roared over their heads.
Just after liftoff, the T-39 made a hard right turn and took up its trail position as I'd instructed.
Meanwhile, the Italians launched four jet interceptors from another base to try to drive the T-39 off and escort the 737 to its destination. Some very heated conversations took place between the interceptor pilots and the T- 39 crew, but to no avail. The T-39 crew continued their mission.
The Egyptian 737 flew to Fuciamo Airport, an auxiliary field next to Rome's main international airport, Leonardo da Vinci.
When permission to land the T-39 was denied, the T-39 pilots declared a tactical emergency and set down right behind the Egyptian 737. The Egyptian 737 taxied to a position near the VIP lounge, and the T-39 parked beside it. Abu Abbas and his companion exited the plane and went inside. About an hour later, they emerged, dressed in Italian air force officers' flight suits, and boarded a waiting Yugoslav civilian airliner which had been delayed for a scheduled flight to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
Meanwhile, Ambassador Rabb had presented the Italian government with a request for the arrest of Abbas preparatory to his extradition. Craxi continued to stonewall. This request, he said, 'did not, in the Justice Minister's opinion, satisfy the factual and substantive requirements laid down by Italian law…. This being so, there was no longer any legal basis… [for] detaining Abbas, since at the time he was on board an aircraft which enjoyed extraterritorial status.'
Shortly after the plane took off for Belgrade, Ambassador Rabb arrived at the Chigi Palace, the official residence of the Italian Prime Minister, to protest the release of Abbas. As he left, Rabb told reporters, 'I'm not happy about what happened here today.'
The State Department scrambled to prepare another extradition request for Yugoslavia; it was actually delivered before Abbas landed in Belgrade. But it was a lost cause. Yugoslavia had diplomatic relations with the PLO, and Abbas, as a member of the PLO's executive council, enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Two days later Abbas flew on to Aden, South Yemen, and from there to Baghdad.
At about 11:00 P.M. October 11, a C-141 from Cairo landed, with twelve American hostages aboard. We took five of them, including Marilyn Klinghoffer, to the jail downtown; the others remained in the VIP lounge. At the jail, the district attorney had arranged a very professional lineup (with magistrates present, as well as my Italian three- star counterpart). The five Americans positively and without hesitation identified the four terrorists as the ones who had hijacked the ship.
When the time came for Marilyn Klinghoffer to take a close look at Majiad al-Molqi, she spat in his face, then turned to me. 'Let me have your pistol,' she told me, her voice cold with rage. 'I want to shoot him.'
'I know how you feel,' I told her. 'I'd want to do the same thing. But you have to understand that it would only further complicate matters. It's best to let the Italian courts handle this thing in the appropriate way.'
She looked at me and said, 'It hurts, but I guess you are right. Please pass my thanks to all your troops for what they have done for us.'
At about midnight, I took the hostages back to their C-141, which was waiting with its engines running, and prepared to launch.
In the meantime, all our people who'd remained behind with me had loaded my C-141, and were also prepared to launch… except we couldn't go anywhere. The Italians had blocked the plane with construction equipment.
Meanwhile, I went over to the plane that would carry the hostages home, to say 'goodbye.' While 1 was there, the lieutenant general arrived.
After thanking him for his cooperation, I told him, 'In my judgment, we've together been able to bring about the best possible ending for this complex incident.
'Shortly,' I also told him, 'the hostages will be taking off for the United States, and I plan to be about thirty seconds behind them.'
He then looked me straight in the eyes and said, 'We have decided that you're not going anywhere.'
'What do you mean by that?' I said.
'You have created all this mess, and we just can't let you fly away from it.'
1 looked him in the eye. 'Did you bring along clean underwear and a shaving kit?' I asked.
'No, why?'
'Then I hope the ones you're wearing are clean, because if you don't unblock my plane, you arc getting ready to take a free ride to the United States — with me.'
He looked at me for a moment, smiled, and then said, 'Good luck, my friend.'
Moments later, on his order, the construction equipment that blocked my plane was removed, and we took off, following the C-141 carrying the hostages.
It was a new day, Saturday, October 12, 1985.
For all of us in the JSOTF, as well as the Navy participants (Rear Admiral Dave Jeremiah, his staff, and all the crews of the USS
When we landed back at Pope Air Force Base, my aide handed me a card, which indicated that although this was only the twelfth of October, we had already been on the road for 154 days that year, had been in fifteen different countries, and had flown 197,000 miles. Some of these missions had gone well, others had been frustrating; but all of them had been rewarding learning experiences in the war against terrorism, and many close relationships had been developed with our allies.
I was amused to learn later that warrants for my arrest had been issued by both Italy and Egypt. However, for the next two years I continued to travel on missions through both countries, usually in a plain flight suit, without ever being questioned or delayed.
In fact, forty-one days after the
