'
He led Stiner to a quiet spot about thirty feet from the reviewing stand. 'What 1 am about to tell you is close-hold, he said. After a quick nod from Stiner, he went on. 'I am not retiring. The Noriega regime in Panama has got the President very worried. For that reason, I'm being retained on active duty to take command of SOUTHCOM' — the United States Southern Command. SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility included Central and South America, and its mission was mainly security assistance and counterdrug activities. 'Though I'm not the CINC yet, I have already talked to Carl Vuono and Admiral Crowe' — Vuono was the Army Chief of Staff and Crowe was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—'and you are my man in Panama. I'm holding you responsible for contingency planning and combat operations that may have to be executed there. I want you to go down and take a look at the staff, the training readiness, and whatever else needs it.'
'What about the joint task force already down there?' Stiner asked. U.S. Army South (USARSO), commanded by Army Major General Bernie Loefke, included all the forces already stationed in Panama.
'You absorb it,' Thurman answered. 'I'm going to hold you responsible for everything. All forces will be under your control.'
'Yes, sir.'
'The reason I want you is that in XVIII Airborne Corps you've got a headquarters twice the size of SOUTHCOM's, and the best communications, equipment, and trained forces in the Army for conducting contingency opcrations.'[24] By that he meant that XVIII Airborne Corps was a warfighting-capable headquarters, while SOUTHCOM, by the nature of its mission, was not.
'Here is how it is going to work. You remember Admiral McCain' — the CINCPAC from 1968 to 1972, who'd operated from Hawaii. Stincr nodded yes. 'There was a man in Vietnam by the name of Westmoreland, who was doing the fighting from Saigon.' He gave Stiner a hard look. 'Me McCain, you Westmoreland. 1 can't give you detailed instructions now, but when I am confirmed by Congress, that is the way it is going to be. Now get with it.'
'Yes, sir,' Stiner answered. There wasn't much else to say. He understood Thurman's guidance. He knew exactly what had to be done, and how to go about it.
HISTORY
The isthmus of Panama is one of the world's most strategically important pieces of real estate. At its narrowest, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are barely fifty miles apart, making a link between them feasible. The economic, political, and military ramifications of this fact arc incalculable.
Once part of Colombia, Panama won its independence in 1903—with help from the United States, which was eager to build a canal across the isthmus on terms Colombia had opposed. That same year, the new nation signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty, which allowed the United States to build the canal. The United States also gained control over a 'canal zone,' extending five miles on either side of the fifty-two-mile-long waterway. The canal project was completed in 1914.
As the years passed, the Panamanian people increasingly resented U.S. control of the Canal. Eventually, the United States recognized their concerns, and President Carter negotiated an agreement whereby the United States promised to cede control by the year 2000 and, until that date, to share many U.S. military installations in Panama with Panamanian defense forces. After the handover, the United States would withdraw its troops, and revert all military installations to the Panamanian government.
None of the treaty provisions pleased the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Treaty or no, the Canal remained strategically vital to the United States.
The U.S. Senate shared many of the Joint Chiefs' concerns. In ratifying the treaty, it inserted a provision that permitted the United States to continue to defend the Panama Canal after 1999.
NORIEGA
Manuel Antonio Noriega rose to power as an intelligence officer for the dictator, Brigadier General Omar Torrijos. After Torrijos's 1983 death in a plane crash, Noriega took over the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF), an organization that included that country's armed forces, police, customs, and investigative services. During his rise to power, Noriega had cultivated friends and patrons within the U.S. intelligence community. After Torrijos's death, he continued this practice, but broadened it, to include clients within Colombia's Medellin drug cartel and arms traffickers.
By 1985, Noriega was in total control of the country.
The first confrontation between Noriega and the United States took place in June 1987, after the former PDF chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz-Herrera, had publicly accused Noriega of involvement not only in the death of Torrijos, but also in the 1985 murder of an opposition leader, Doctor Hugo Spadafora, and in electoral fraud. The Panamanian people, who had never supported Noriega, took to the streets, but Noriega's riot police ruthlessly put down the unarmed demonstrations.
The U.S. Senate promptly passed a resolution calling for the dictator to step down. After a Noriega-inflamed mob attacked the U.S. Embassy, the State Department cut off economic and military aid to Panama. Later, on February 5, 1988, federal judges in Miami and Tampa indicted Noriega and assorted henchmen on numerous counts of drug trafficking. Noriega counterattacked by organizing a harassment campaign against U.S. citizens, setting up obstructions to U.S. rights under the 1977 Panama Canal treaties, and turning to other outlaw states — such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya — for economic and military assistance. Cuba and Nicaragua provided weapons and instructors to help develop 'civilian defense committees,' which became known as 'Dignity Battalions,' for intelligence collection and control of the population, while in 1989, Libya contributed $20 million in return for use of Panama as a base to coordinate terrorist activities and insurgent groups in Latin America.
As a result of this military and economic assistance, the PDF grew to a well-equipped and — armed force numbering some 14,000 men.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING: FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1988
After the U.S. federal indictments against Noriega, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), to revise existing contingency plans according to the following guidelines: to protect U.S. lives and propcrty; to keep the canal open; to provide for noncombatant evacuation operations in either peaceful or hostile environments; and to develop a plan to assist the government that would eventually replace the Noriega regime.
A series of new plans followed — collectively known as ELABORATE MAZE — which would be executed by Major General Loefke, commander of U.S. Army South (USARSO), as Commander of the Joint Task Force, Panama (JTFP).
These plans envisioned a massive buildup of forces within U.S. bases in Panama. These forces would either intimidate the PDF leaders and cause them to overthrow Noriega, or failing that, invade Panamanian territory and overthrow the PDF.
Though General Woerner's mass approach offered several serious drawbacks, he favored it over the surprise strategy preferred by some planners, which was that, after a period of buildup, forces from the United States, in concert with Special Operations Forces and General Woerner's troops, would conduct a quick, hard, deliberate attack against Noriega and the PDF.
The most serious drawback to the Woerner approach: It was too slow. It gave the bad guys time to recover and respond. Thus, if Noriega escaped capture during the initial assault, he could flee to the hills and organize guerrilla warfare. The nearly 30,000 U.S. citizens living in Panama were also vulnerable to hostage-taking-or worse
