and began shuttling the 6th and 7th Companies back to Tocumen. Meanwhile, Battalion 2000, ten miles farther east at Fort Cimarron, headed to Tocumen with a convoy of trucks and V- 150 and V-300 armored cars. There they picked up the 6th and 7th Companies and went on to the Comandancia.
The forces the coup leaders feared had merely flown over the Comandancia, linked up with other reinforcements, and entered the compound from the eastern side — actions that proved very enlightening to Stiner and his planners as they revised BLUE SPOON.
At this point, it was obvious the coup was over. Shots from inside the Comandancia could be heard — executions. Major Giroldi and his number two, a PDF captain, were taken to Tinajitas (five miles north of the city, and the home of the 1st Infantry Company), tortured until they identified the other coup leaders, and executed.
'The PDF's response to the coup seriously demonstrated considerable military capability and resourcefulness,' Carl Stiner remarks. 'That day's events made it very apparent to me that if democracy was ever going to succeed in Panama, we had to clean out the whole kit and caboodle, including Noriega, his PDF force, the command-and-control structure (specifically the Comandancia) — and the national police as well. That was not all — as we came to learn. Noriega had placed his disciples in control of every key position in every institution of government, and all of them were on the take in some form or other. They would all have to go.'
BOOSTING READINESS
After the failed coup, General Thurman acted to improve readiness: All personnel on duty now wore camouflage fatigues. Marksmanship training was intensified, and everyone — individuals and crews — had to be qualified in their weapon systems. Category three and four exercises were increased, and companies on Sand Flea exercises visited some of the twenty-seven planned targets daily (although the troops involved didn't know this). A nightly helicopter assault exercise was also conducted, to improve proficiency with night-vision goggles.
In order to beef up command and control, General Thurman officially designated Stincr as his war planner and war fighter; and on October 10, Stiner was named commander of Joint Task Force South.[26]
Stiner and his staff were already well ahead of the game with planning revisions to BLUE SPOON. In early September, Major General Will Roosma and a team of planners met with the SOUTHCOM staff to further integrate planning. On October 9, Stiner and his key staff flew to Panama for a contingency planning summit with the CINC — again wearing civilian clothes and traveling in an unmarked airplane. For the next three days, the two staffs worked in the SOUTHCOM command post in Quarry Heights, ironing out operational and tactical details.
Meanwhile, Stiner took time off to make a clandestine helicopter reconnaissance of the likely targets, which was critical for finalizing plan development. He was accompanied by Colonel Mike Snell, the commander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade, who was intimately familiar with the country and PDF locations.
As the meetings were concluding, General Thurman announced that Stiner would be in overall command of all U.S. combat forces in Panama, including special operations forces, and that the contingency plan for Joint Task Force South would include the following objectives, to: protect U.S. lives, key sites, and facilities; capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority; neutralize the Panamanian defense forces; support the establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama; and restructure the PDF as directed by the duly-elected government.
An unwritten but high-priority mission from Washington was to rescue Kurt Muse, a CIA operative who had been arrested by Noriega and imprisoned in the high-security Modelo prison. Muse had been told that he would be executed if U.S. forces launched an attack against Panama. His executioner kept him under constant observation.
To accomplish these objectives, Joint Task Force South would have to either protect or neutralize the twenty-seven major targets. Many of them were in or near Panama City, but several, including the elite companies at Rio Hato, Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron, and Torrijos-Tocumen Airport, were some miles from the capital (the airport was dual-use: Tocumen was the civilian side, Torrijos the military). There were also major targets in the Colon area, on the Caribbean side of the country some forty miles northwest of Panama City.
Now that the targets had been determined and prioritized, Stiner and his commanders had to decide on the tactics and forces best suited for each.
At the end of the three days, Stiner summarized his 'Commander's Intent' for the operation.[27]
In essence, he said: 'Using electronic warfare capabilities to jam PDF communications, together with our EC–C130s (Volant Solo and Compass Call) to override civilian media stations and broadcast our message to the people of Panama, we will take advantage of surprise and darkness to attack or secure all twenty-seven targets simultaneously. A vital part of the operation is the protection of U.S. lives, beginning from H-hour and until stability has been achieved. The key to success is surprise and the simultaneous takedown of the PDF, its command-and- control capability, and the national police. The majority of the fighting must be over by daylight, with our forces in control of the area bounded by Panama City to Colon in the north, and from Rio Hato in the southwest to Fort Cimarron in the northeast. Most Panamanians are our friends, and therefore we must minimize casualtics and collateral damage. We will employ psychological operations at the tactical unit level to try to persuade each installation to surrender without a fight. If this does not achieve results, then measured force will be applied to accomplish the mission. At daylight, because there will be no law and order, the tactical units must be prepared to begin stability operations to protect life and property. To support this requirement, we will begin bringing in the rest of the 7th Infantry Division and the remainder of the 16th Military Police Brigade, beginning at H+4 hours and closing by H+24 hours. The capture of Noriega, the rescue of Kurt Muse from the Modelo prison, and other special mission requirements are the responsibility of the JSOTF. These operations are an integral part of the success of this operation, and will commence concurrently with all other operations at H-hour. I hope that the signal which will be sent by our actions at H-hour will make our job much easier as we fan out to take down PDF units in the rest of the country. If we can achieve some degree of surprise, and if we do this right, I don't expect much staying power out of the PDF.'
At the same time, Stiner laid out his warfighting philosophy: 'Hit first; surprise the enemy; overwhelm him with heavy combat power; use the cover of darkness to take maximum advantage of our night-fighting capabilities during the initial assault and follow-on attacks, so that our superior forces are on the objectives come dawn; and always fight under favorable conditions.'
The party returned to Fort Bragg on October 11 to complete the plan.
During the next week, they worked day and night. For security purposes, planning for General Luck's special missions operations continued at his headquarters, but liaison officers were exchanged between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Joint Special Operations Task Force to ensure continuity and integration.
The morning after their return, Stiner spoke to the planners at Fort Bragg:
'As I analyze this mission,' he explained, 'these are the specified and implied tasks that we must be concerned with:
• The priority is to protect U.S. lives and the key sites and facilities in Panama.
• We must capture Noriega and deliver him to competent authority.
• We must neutralize the PDF, and at the same time neutralize the command-and-control mechanism (that is, the Comandancia), as well as the national police.
• We must support the establishment of a U.S.-recognired government.
• We must be prepared to begin stability operations as soon as the fighting is over — because there will be no law and order.
• We must be prepared to engage in necessary nation-building activities to assist the new government get on its feet and begin to meet the expectations of the people.
• We must be prepared to restructure the Panamanian Defense Forces and the national police as the new government decides.
'This is a very difficult and complex mission,' he continued. 'We must plan to defeat the PDF and the national police in one night, and the next day raise those whom we have fought in a new image — no longer the oppressors
