Toward the end of the first day, each commander made a clandestine reconnaissance of his targets. That night, they made adjustments to their plans, and these were briefed and finalized the next day in open session, with everyone present. That way, the process was coordinated, and each commander was familiar with the overall plan and its details.
Toward the end of the second day, three fire support concerns came up:
First: The fire support systems available at H-hour were not powerful enough for the 193d Brigade's building-busting mission in and around the Comandancia. Although the 82d Airborne would be dropping twelve Sheridans at H+45, these would not be available for support of the 193d brigade as they entered the built-up area near the Comandancia.
Second: It was feared that low cloud cover could limit the effectiveness of the AC-130 gunships. Given the kind of 'surgical' fighting planned for built-up areas, an additional highly accurate fire support system was needed.
Third: Colonel Buck Kernan, commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, pointed out that the airfield at Rio Hato, the only available drop zone for the parachute assault, was close to the 6th and 7th PDF Companies, two of Noriega's best. If surprise was not achieved, his Rangers could take heavy casualties during the jump. For that reason, Kernan asked for air strikes against these two companies' barracks.
'This was a serious problem,' Carl Stiner observes, 'because air strikes against the PDF had been ruled out by the Secretary of Defense, on the grounds that most of them were our friends — just misguided — and if at all possible, we had to give them a chance to surrender.
'We had to find another way to deal with this threat. In fact, over the coming days, we had to come up with solutions to each of these three problems — and we did.'
At the end of the conference, the commanders discussed the various employment options — the time necessary to round up all the planes and crews and get them to the right bases for loading the assault troops. BLUE SPOON would most likely be launched following a Noriega-inspired provocation. He had already stepped up the frequency of these events, a flash point was always possible.
The urgency of the provocation would determine the launch time available. The deliberate employment option was based on a forty-eight-to-sixty-hour notification — plenty of time.
However, there always remained a strong possibility that Noriega would create an incident requiring a quicker response than BLUE SPOON allowed. To cover that possibility, two corollary plans had to be worked out: a no-notice response (in case of a hostage situation or a threat to a key facility — such as the canal locks), and a short-notice response (less urgent, but still requiring action within fourteen to sixteen hours).
In either case, the initial response would have to come from forces already in place — seven U.S. combat battalions, including a Special Forces battalion, and aviation support; General Luck's forces would follow on from CONUS within twelve hours. Responsibility for both the no-notice and short-notice option was laid on General Cisneros, the U.S. Army South commander, who was tasked to develop these plans.
On the way back to Fort Bragg, Stiner worked on fire support issues: The 193rd Brigade H-hour problem at the Comandancia was relatively easy to solve. They would clandestinely pre-position four Sheridans, with their large-caliber main guns; six Apache helicopters, with their hellfire missiles; and three OH-58 scout helicopters. A few days later, he put this into a formal request, and on November 7th, Secretary Cheney signed the deployment order.
Buck Kernan's problem with the drop at Rio Hato was tougher. They had to keep the PDF from killing Rangers when they were most vulnerable — descending in parachutes — but they also had to do all they could to avoid killing PDF, if that was prudently possible.
The answer, when it hit Stiner, was logical: 'We don't have to kill PDF in their barracks. We just have to put them in no condition to fight.' A way had to be found to stun them long enough — five minutes would do it — for the C-130s to get safely across the drop zone. Once the Rangers were on the ground, they could do the rest.
Offset bombing[28]— for shock and awe — was the solution. The question, then, was by what?
He first considered using F-111s, with their standard 750-pound bombs; then called his air component commander, Pete Kcmph, to get his views. What he wanted, he explained, was to create five minutes of shock and confusion by dropping bombs maybe 150 to 200 meters from the 4th and 6th PDF Companies barracks.
'I'm thinking of using F-111s,' Stiner told Kemph.
'There is a much more accurate system,' Kemph replied. 'The F-117. And it can carry bigger bombs — two thousand pounds.'
'But F-117s are black,' Stiner said — secret.
'For something as critical as this, it could probably be brought out,' Kcmph pointed out. 'I'll tell you what. The next time you are down in Panama, I'll send the F-117 wing commander down with bomb data, and you can decide for yourself.'
Not long after that, Stiner reviewed the data with the wing commander, and there was simply no comparison. The F-117s could put 2,000-pound bombs exactly where he wanted them. With the F-111s, there was a significant risk of error. In due course, the Secretary of Defense approved an F-117 drop of two bombs at Rio Hato in support of the Rangers.
Toward the end of October, General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff, asked Stiner and Luck to come to Washington to bring him up to date — primarily to make sure they were getting the support they needed.
'This is the most sophisticated thing I've ever seen,' he announced when he'd heard the details. 'Over three hundred planes and helicopters in one small area, attacking twenty-seven targets at night. You'd better rehearse this thing all you can.'
'It's not going to be as messy as it looks,' Stiner explained. 'A lot of detailed flight planning has already gone into it. All the pilots are proficient with night-vision goggles, and the AC-130s can illuminate the key targets with their infrared searchlights; the night will look like daytime. We'll own the night.
'Our units can do this. We've trained them that way. '
Vuono liked what he'd heard and pledged his support.
Planning continued until October 30, 1989, when General Thurman signed USCINSCO OPORD 1-90 (BLUE SPOON), making BLUE SPOON official — though planning did not stop there. Stiner's planners completed the Corps plan a few days later, and he signed it as ready to execute on November 4. Gary Luck's planners completed their plan the same day.
On November 3, Thurman, Stiner, and Luck gave the BLUE SPOON briefing to the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon in a room called the Tank. Though the Chiefs were generally supportive, like Vuono, they questioned the plan's complexity. Assurances of the capabilities and readiness of the forces convinced them, and they approved it.
Meanwhile, the Sheridans and Apaches were set to deploy on the nights of November 15 and 16. The Sheridans would go the first night on a C-5 aircraft, and the Apaches the following night on another C-5.
Stiner took advantage of the transportation to set up another commanders' conference in Panama. Accompanying him on the C-5 hauling the Sheridans were Colonels Needham, G-3 (operations), and Walters, G-2 (intelligence); Colonel Bill Mason, Corps Signal Officer; and Major Huntoon, one of the chief planners. Three days later, he was joined at Fort Clayton by his major subordinate commanders and staff officers.
The four Sheridans and their crews arrived at Howard AFB at about midnight. For the sake of operational security, the crews had removed their 82nd Airborne division patches and sewed on 5th Mech Division patches.
With their swim shrouds raised to break up their outline, the tanks were loaded on tractor trailers and taken to the mechanized battalion's nearby motor pool and placed inside large tents, where they'd remain until needed — though the crews drove them two nights a week in the motor pool to keep the seals lubricated to prevent leaking.
