FINALIZING THE PLAN
On October 19, Stiner, his key staffers, and the commanders of his major units made another civilian clothes visit to Panama, this time in two special mission aircraft. For two days, the warfighting commanders met to discuss the plan and put the final details in place. Joining them were General Thurman and the SOUTHCOM staff; Lieutenant General Pete Kemph; Brigadier General Robin Turnow, the commander of Howard Air Force Base; and Rear Admiral Jerry C. Gnechnow, CINCLANT's representative to the operation.
The meeting started with an intelligence estimate:
The Panamanian Defense Forces numbered almost 13,000 troops, including the national guard, the police, and other separate units, but only 4,000 to 5,000 of these could be counted real combat troops. The ground forces were deployed throughout thirteen military zones, and consisted of two infantry battalions, ten independent companies, one cavalry squadron, a riot control company, and a special forces command, which numbered about four hundred specially trained and equipped troops. PDF army equipment included twenty-eight V-150 and V-300 armored cars. The navy numbered about four hundred sailors and was equipped with twelve high-speed patrol boats, all armed with cannons. The Air Force numbered about five hundred troops and was equipped with thirty- eight fixed-wing aircraft, seventeen helicopters, and numerous air defense weapons systems. There were, finally, up to eighteen paramilitary units—'Dignity Battalions' — but intelligence about these units and their missions was spotty.
Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies had begun to develop a most wanted list — people who would have to be removed or neutralized if there was to be a democratic environment in Panama. In addition to Noriega, up to a hundred others were expected to be on the list: Noriega's disciples and henchmen, those in key government positions, and others wanted for crimes against the people, or simply for racketeering — the whole gang was up to their eyeballs in crime.
Stiner then presented his concept of operations: After an analysis of the mission statement, his 'Commander's Intent, the operational command structure, the targets assigned to each major subordinate command, and the allocation of forces, he gave his thoughts on the phasing of the operation:
PHASE I
• Clandestinely deploy JSOTF Headquarters, Army Special Missions Unit, and Special Aviation assets to in- country forward staging base (FSB).
• Infiltrate other needed conventional weapons systems for H-hour activities to in-country FSB.
• Marshall other CONUS [Continental United States] forces for deployment.
PHASE II
• Begin reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
• Deploy rangers to CONUS intermediate staging bases (ISBs).
• Deploy selected CONUS forces to in-country FSB.
PHASE III
• Conduct pre H-hour activities — i.e., secure critical facilities.
• II-hour activities.
PHASE IV
• Conduct follow-on/stability operations.
• Handover and redeployment.
• Transition to nation building (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY).
Stincr concluded by summarizing H-hour activities:
[Task Force Semper Fi had initially deployed to Panama as a battalion-size unit, but was now brigade-size after augmentation by U.S. Army attachments.]