Enemy at the Gates

it is doubtful whether a speedy advance toward the north [by Hoth’s relief force] is possible, as long as the enemy does not feel the counterpressure against his forces from the pocket of the Sixth Army. It is therefore necessary that the Sixth Army starts Wintergewitter ['Winter Storm,” the physical linkup of the relief force with the Sixth Army] as soon as possible. When can you form up for the attack?

The question was almost impossible to answer. Sixth Army was trying to form up for the attack, but Paulus’s uncertainty about an actual date for the breakout, plus his worries about the lack of gasoline, caused confusion among his troops. The new recruit from Boblingen, Pvt. Ekkehart Brunnert, suffered from one of these command failures.

When his regiment was chosen to lead the attack to the south, all unneeded cars, trucks and motorcycles were quickly destroyed. For his part, Brunnert was delighted. The destruction of cumbersome equipment signaled a decisive attempt to break out, and he had noticed one special truck, filled with warm clothing sent by German civilians to men at the front. The vehicle would have to be burned, but its contents—fur boots, warm gloves, and scarfs— obviously would be distributed among the soldiers. Standing in line at the door of a huge convoy bus, Brunnert ogled the giftfilled vehicle, until a soldier poured gasoline on it and set it afire.

Brunnert could not even scream his rage as the precious cargo was consumed in the blaze. Instead, he boarded the bus, sat down heavily on his assigned seat and began to cry. Suddenly bitter, lie fumed: “As long as our superiors are well clothed, nothing else seems to matter.”

Outside the bus, seven Russian Hiwis waited for seats. When four of them found they were to be left behind, they rushed to a senior sergeant and begged for a ride. He refused. Wailing in terror, they got down on their knees and pleaded with him. The sergeant kicked one in the groin and walked away, leaving the distraught Hiwis huddled together at the side of the road. Their heads lowered, they tried to ignore their three comrades happily packing for the trip out of the Kessel.

Inside the bus, Brunnert had regained his composure and was ready to go. With his rations lying under the seat, he dismissed a momentary fear of Russian sniping and was relaxing for the first time in weeks. Suddenly an officer stuck his head inside the door and shouted: “Unpack everything!” Paulus had changed his mind again.

The disgusted Brunnert picked up his rations and walked slowly out of the bus. He had lost all hope of being saved.

Still not totally aware of the dangers posed by the collapse of the Italian Eighth Army, General Schmidt continued his teleprinter dialogue with Schulz.

+++ If we are to form up regardless of whether the fortress can be held or not, the earliest date for such an attack would be 24 December.

By then we hope to have received the necessary fuel to have the re-grouping for the assembly of the attack forces completed. However, the General [Paulus] is of the opinion that the fortress cannot be held if the breakthrough involves major casualties and loss of armored vehicles. If there is no prospect of relief in the near future, it would be more advisable to refrain from the sortie and, instead, to bring in sufficient supplies by air, so that the men may regain their strength and we may have sufficient ammunition for defensive operations over a longer period. In that case we believe we can hold the fortress for some time even without relief.

[Schulz replied:] +++ I shall immediately report your opinion to the Fieldmarshal and it will also be submitted to the Supreme Command of the Army. Have you any other questions regarding the situation?

[Schmidt answered:] +++ Of the forces considered for the attack, we were already compelled to commit one battalion on the west front, since there were heavy casualties in that section during the recent days and there were already some gaps. One of these days we must also move up another battalion to the city of Stalingrad, because the units committed there are also constantly decreasing in number and, since the Volga is covered by solid ice, that front must be manned more closely. The Russians engage in lively combat activities in the city, which cost us numerous casualties. This decrease of fighting capacity is the main reason why the General [Paulus] considers a sortie extremely dangerous, unless contact is established immediately after the breakthrough and the fortress is reinforced by additional troops. We believe that the breakthrough is more promising if Winter Storm is immediately followed by Thunderclap since, in that case, we can withdraw the troops from the other fronts. However, on the whole, we are of the opinion that Thunderclap is an emergency solution, which, if possible, should be avoided, unless the general situation requires such a solution. It must also be kept in mind that in view of the present physical condition of the men, long marches or major attacks would be extremely difficult.

At the Barrikady and tractor factories, the slag heaps lay under a thick blanket of snow that masked the ugly scars of war. Rusted gun barrels, twisted girders, and railroad tracks had also disappeared, along with the frozen corpses of the unburied and forgotten.

Inside the cavernous rooms, German soldiers lived as best they could. For warmth, they ripped up wood flooring and lit tiny fires. The oil-soaked wood produced a sooty smoke that turned everyone’s face black.

In Tool Hall 3C at the Barrikady, an ordinary turner’s lathe began to attract unusual attention from lonely Germans after someone discovered that the machine had been manufactured in a town southeast of Stuttgart. Men slipped quietly into the room to stand beside it and read the small name plate: “Gustav Wagner, Reutlingen.” Former machinists softly caressed the metal created by German hands. Others just stared at the machine, and through it were transported home in their fantasy world of memories.

They wondered openly whether the lathe could still be used. “Would it work again for the Russians if?…” Or, “Where is Reutlingen?” asked those from the Rhineland and further north.

Gustav Wagner’s lathe became a shrine.

Thirteen hundred miles to the northwest, at the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, a tragic war of nerves was being played out. Chief of Staff Gen. Kurt Zeitzler had dropped his role of sycophant as he desperately sought approval for Operation Thunderclap. Deeply committed to saving the Sixth Army, Zeitzler even insisted on reducing rations at the officers’ mess as both a tribute to the beleaguered men in the Kessel and a reminder that it was OKW’s responsibility to bring them out alive. In his daily conferences with the Fuhrer, Zeitzler began acting like his predecessor, Franz Halder, badgering Hitler to endorse Thunderclap. When the annoyed dictator waved his entreaties aside, the frustrated Zeitzler often walked back to his office in a towering rage.

He and Manstein, at least, were of one mind on the issue, and he had promised the field marshal that Hitler would eventually relent. But when Gen. Arthur Schmidt’s figures on auto and diesel supplies landed on Hitler’s desk, Kurt Zeitzler lost his battle. Schmidt’s report of Sixth Army’s having only about 140 cubic meters of fuel, which he had given to General Schulz in the teleprinter conversation of December 21, had been forwarded quickly to East Prussia. And his statement that the Sixth Army could only move twenty kilometers (twelve miles) toward a linkup with the German relief force created a negative reaction to Zeitzler’s argument for Thunderclap. For if the Fuhrer had ever entertained any thoughts of granting Paulus permission to pull back with his entire army, Schmidt’s report swept them away.

Facing the stubborn Zeitzler with the report in his hand, Hitler scornfully asked: “But what exactly do you wish me to do? Paulus can’t break out and you know it!”

Zeitzler had no rebuttal. The evidence was too damning and as he left the room, he thought about the tragedy that was developing. Now, at this very moment, Hitler was correct about Sixth Army’s inability to break out. But his earlier mistakes and adamant refusal to let Paulus escape when the Kessel was first formed thirty days earlier had created this disaster.

At Army Group Don Headquarters in Novocherkassk, Erich von Manstein prepared a final summation in hopes of changing Hitler’s mind.

Document Army Group Don 39694/5

Teletype

22 Dec. 42

TOP SECRET, “Chefsache,” transmittal by officers only