Enemy at the Gates

TO: Chief of General Staff of the Army

1. The development of the situation on the left flank [Italian sector] of the Army Group makes it necessary to move up forces there very soon….

2. This measure means that the Sixth Army cannot be relieved for some time and that, as a consequence, the Army must be adequately provided with supplies for a long time. In order to maintain the physical strength of the Army through adequate nutrition and to enable the Army to engage in defensive operations, an average daily supply of at least 550 tons is required…. According to the opinion of Richthofen [the Luftwaffe general] in this area we can but expect an average of 200 tons, considering the long distance to be covered by the aircraft…. Unless adequate aerial supplies can be ensured… the only remaining alternative is the earliest possible breakout of the Sixth Army.

In pointing out the patent impossibility of meeting the required air supply, Manstein was reminding Hitler once again that the total withdrawal of Sixth Army from the Kessel was the only alternative left.

Convinced he had made the options clear, the choice obvious, the field marshal ordered the message sent to East Prussia and turned to his other problems.

Meanwhile, the teleprinter from Novocherkassk to Stalingrad kept up a steady chatter. Its stark vocabulary failed to underline the fact that the hours left for deliverance had vanished.

Teletype: General Schmidt—General Schulz

22 Dec 42-1710 hrs. to 1945 hrs.

Here is General Schulz. Hello, Schmidt. I want to report on the situation:

Hoth’s 6th and 17th Armored Divisions at Vassilevska [on the Mishkova south of the Kessen] were engaged all day today in repulsing strong enemy attacks from the southeast, east and north, so that the armored divisions were not able to make the intended thrust toward the north.

It is planned to make this thrust as soon as the impetus of the Russian attacks has been stopped. Developments will show whether that will already be possible tomorrow…. Unfortunately, during the last 24 hours weather conditions were such that no air supplies were made because of the danger of icing and fog. No air reconnaissance was possible either. We must hope for an improvement of weather conditions in the near future. The 175 “Ju” aircraft for an increase of air supplies are on their way. This much on the situation.

The field marshal requests that the following question, which is of importance for an estimate of the Army’s supply situation, be clarified. According to the report of the quartermaster Sixth Army, there are still about 40,000 horses in the pocket. This report is contradicted by Major Eismann, who reported that the divisions had only about 800 horses left. Can you tell me the exact number of existing horses; if possible state number of ponies [Panjes] and normal-sized horses separately? This is very important, and have steps been taken on your side to ensure that the horse meat is used sparingly for the provision of the troops?…

Schmidt had slightly more than 23,000 horses left, only enough to feed the Army until mid-January. The general soon gave Schulz this total. He had been giving other statistics to higher headquarters all day.

…Ration strength on 18 December: 249,600 (including 13 thousand Rumanians) 19,300 auxiliary volunteers [Russian Hiwi laborers] and approximately 6,000 wounded.

…Battle strength: In front line… infantry 25,000, engineers, 3,200….

…Ammunition: Stocks in Army reserve are low and include 3,000 rounds for light field howitzers, 900 rounds for heavy field howitzers, and 600 rounds for other guns….

…Health: Men have been on half rations since 26 November…. Under present conditions they are incapable of undertaking long marches or engaging in offensive action without a large number falling out….

End

At 6:30 A.M. on December 23, the 6th Panzer Division renewed its offensive to widen the bridgehead at Vassilevska on the Mishkova River south of the Kessel. Six hours later, at 12:30 P.M., 57th Corps commander, General Kirchner, arrived in the area “to obtain firsthand information…” on what was going wrong. For in the intervening time, 6th Panzer Division had been unable to move any closer to Stalingrad.

A short time later, at 1:05 P.M., the teleprinter clicked out a message from OKW in Rastenburg. Field Marshal Manstein expected it to be the answer to his plea for giving the code word Thunderclap. It was not.

PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATE

Following from Fuhrer begins: The railway junction Morosovskaya and the two air bases at Morosovsk and Tatsinskaya will be held and kept in operation at all costs…. Fuhrer agrees that units of 57th Panzer Corps be transferred across the Don…. Army Group Don will report measures being taken….

Zeitzler

Hitler was ignoring Manstein’s carefully worded warning of the dangers of leaving Paulus inside the Kessel. In fact, Hitler had not even alluded to Operation Thunderclap. Instead he was telling Manstein to strip combat units from Hoth’s relief force and save the situation at the threatened Italian front.

Astonished that Hitler had never given Paulus a chance to escape, Manstein dispatched a fateful order to 6th Panzer Division at the Mishkova River: “The division will be taken out of the bridgehead tonight. Trail guards will be left behind….”

The order spread gloom among the staff officers of the 6th Panzer Division, but they had to agree with its logic. It had become clear that “it would be impossible to break through to Stalingrad without the assistance of added troops which were not available….”

One-hundred-fifty miles northwest of Gumrak, the steppe lay under two feet of snow. The sun, reflecting off its frozen wavy crust, cast a shimmering haze. Across the bleak landscape wound a black column of prisoners, the Italian survivors of Kalmikov, Meshkov, and the Don River approaches. They shuffled painfully, haltingly through the subzero wilderness.

When patrolling Russian guards shouted, “Davai bistre!” (“Hurry up!”), the prisoners tried to walk a little faster. But their pace was still slow, and the men groaned constantly as the biting cold froze fingers and toes.

Felice Brazzi walked in the middle of this ragged line. He staggered on, like an automaton, one foot in front of the other, again and again. Almost unconscious from the cold, he barely heard the hoarse commands of the guards and the grim croaking of black ravens that circled overhead. One sound always brought Bracci out of his reverie: single rifle shots, which cracked loudly in the clear air as guards shot men who stumbled out of the column to seek rest. For two days, Bracci had listened to this symphony of murder. And on the trail from Kalmikov, both sides of the path were now marked by two irregular patterns of corpses. Bracci had figured out that the Italians were marching north toward the Don, because evidence of harsh fighting was everywhere. Pieces of uniforms, cases of unused bullets, submachine guns, 210-millimeter artillery, arms, legs, the wreckage of his Eighth Army littered the steppe.

Another heavy snow began to fall and it slashed the faces of the bearded soldiers and froze on their eyebrows and chins. His head tucked in like a turtle, Bracci walked on toward a village sitting precariously on the crest of a hill. He hoped the Russians would stop there to feed their captives, none of whom had eaten in at least forty-eight hours.

At dusk the Russians did halt the column, and Bracci crawled into a stable to find a place to sleep. Across