different, for example, if Joe Lennox and Kenneth Lenan and David Waterfield had simply stayed out of his way? Without American interference, would Wang Kaixuan and Ablimit Celil and Josh Pinnegar and all the hundreds of other victims of TYPHOON still be alive today? Almost certainly. And would a small band of Uighur radicals have conceived, let alone executed, an attack on the scale of 6/11 without outside interference? I very much doubt it.
From time to time, during the long, complex process of researching and writing the book, I put these questions to its principal players. Had the security and wellbeing of British and American citizens been improved one iota by the activities of their respective governments in China? Who had really benefited from this new version of the Great Game, besides a few shareholders in the Macklinson Corporation?
Nobody, not even Joe Lennox himself, was ever able to give me a satisfactory answer.
