http://www.longwarjournal.org/?archives/2009?/06/seventeen?_taliban_ki.php.
11. “It created a havoc”: Unsigned report by
1. Humam al-Balawi arrived alone: Accounts of Balawi’s early weeks in Pakistan were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials briefed on the events.
2. “You have made us proud”: bin Zeid’s words, as recalled by Balawi in Dec. 26, 2009, video interview, op. cit.
3.
4. from his Taliban interviewer: Interview excerpts, as published in “An Interview with the Shaheed,” posted by al-Sahab Web site on Feb. 28, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
5. The two had a mutual acquaintance: Descriptions of Balawi’s relations with Mehsud and his early interactions with the Pakistan Taliban provided interviews with a Tehrik-i-Taliban member and two Pakistani intelligence officers who later investigated the Balawi affair after the Khost bombing. Additional insights are drawn from Balawi’s accounts of his meetings with the Taliban chief.
6. Qari had beheaded a kidnapped Polish geologist: For a description of the incident, see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Feud over Murder of Polish Hostage,”
7.
8. the “father of smoke”: For more on the terrorist Imad Mughniyeh and the circumstances of his death, see Matthew Levitt and David Schenker, “Who Was Imad Mughniyeh?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy online, Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.washington?institute.?org/template?C05.php??CID=2716.
9. who had killed Abdullah Azzam: For more on the influential cleric and the circumstances of his death, see Aryn Baker, “Who Killed Abdullah Azzam?”
10. the logistics of Balawi’s journey came together: Details about the arrangements for Balawi’s insertion into Pakistan were described by two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials personally knowledgeable or privy to classified briefings on the events.
11. he could make out a familiar form: Balawi describes his encounter with the guard Ahmad, a disabled Taliban fighter, while sleeping outdoors in a videotape essay titled, “O Hesitant One: It Is an Obligation!” posted by al-Qaeda’s media arm, as-Sahab, April 30, 2010; English translation courtesy of SITE Intelligence Group.
12. “We pray to God”: For a fuller description of the interview with Baitullah Mehsud, see Nick Schifrin, “More Dangerous than Osama: Militant Leader Claims He Is Fighting a ‘Defensive’ Jihad to Destroy the White House,” Brian Ross Reports, Jan. 28, 2008, ABC News online, http://?abcnews.?go.com/?Blotter/?story?id=? 4199754&page=1.
13. capturing an entire garrison: For a discussion of Baitullah Mehsud’s defiance of Pakistan’s government, see “Baitullah Mehsud,” a Times People Topic,
14. the real target would be a decoy: This controversial story was described in detail by an official of the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the main Pakistani Taliban alliance, and related separately by two other Taliban associates, suggesting that it is a widely shared story that was used to establish Balawi’s credibility. There is no independent corroboration of the event by the CIA or other U.S. sources.
15. “Every drone strike”: Quote related in interview with Taliban official close to Mehsud.
16. his every move was being recorded: Detailed description of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud provided in author interviews with three U.S. intelligence officials involved in the planning or oversight of the operation.
1. Taliban leader was “alive, safe and sound”: “Taliban Ask Gov’t to Prove Mehsud Death Rumors,” AFP/Reuters, in
2. his staff was caught up in the drafting of a proposal: Details of the CIA’s proposal for strengthening its campaign against al-Qaeda, and of the White House’s reaction to the plan, were provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials and one administration official involved either in the planning meetings or in the presentation.
3. helicopter gunships swept the Taliban’s valley: For a discussion of the Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan from its faltering start in June 2009 to its final phase in October, see Bill Roggio, “What Lies Ahead in Waziristan,”
4. touched off several bloody rounds of:
5. Shadow Army, a paramilitary force: Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda’s Paramilitary ‘Shadow Army,’ ”
6. technology had helped turn the tide against Iraq’s insurgents: Bob Woodward, “Why Did Violence Plummet? It Wasn’t Just the Surge,”
7. “We don’t know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is”: Defense Secretary Robert Gates interview with George Stephanopoulos on ABC News’
8. One of the most promising involved: Details of CIA discussions and activities during the six-year search for bin Laden’s courier were described in interviews with two current and two former intelligence officials with direct knowledge of the events.
9. The Taliban’s defeat had been engineered by a small group of CIA officers: For perhaps the most authoritative description of the CIA-led offensive, see Gary Berntsen,
10. “will have flies walking across their eyeballs”: Jane Mayer,
11. shut down for good: Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,”
12. She arrived in Kabul in August: Details of Hanson’s time in Afghanistan provided in author interviews with two agency colleagues and two family members.
1. attempted to bury an IED: An account of the premature mine explosion is contained in International Security Assistance Force incident logs for Afghanistan’s eastern district for Sept. 19, 2009, and released publicly by the anti-secrecy Web site WikiLeaks in July 2010.
2. She would be safe at Khost: A detailed description of Matthews’s experiences and conversations during her early weeks at Khost was provided in author interviews with eight former agency colleagues as well as two relatives who were in frequent communication with her during the relevant periods.
3. “the only women in a sea of men”: A narrative of Matthews’s early years in the CIA was drawn from accounts provided in interviews with six agency colleagues who knew her professionally and socially during that period, with additional insights provided in interviews with family members.
