4. The officers … drew up contingency plans for killing bin Laden: For an authoritative account of pre– September 11 failures in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, see the final report of the so-called 9/11 Commission,
5. “We’re at war now, a different kind of war”: Former CIA counterterrorism director Cofer Black’s words as remembered by a former CIA officer, in John Kiriakou and Michael Ruby,
6. the case became the center of a roiling controversy: See Mayer,
7. Zubaida was never truly an al-Qaeda leader: For an assessment of Zubaida’s role in al-Qaeda, see Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, “Detainee’s Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots; Waterboarding, Rough Interrogation of Abu Zubaida Produced False Leads, Officials Say,”
8. Teams of SAD officers and Special Forces commandos spearheaded the assault: See Berntsen,
9. They arrived in Khost at 2:00 A.M.: An account of the CIA’s first days at Khost was provided in author interviews with one current and one former agency officers who were present at Khost during the events.
10. Green Beret sergeant named Nathan Chapman: For more on Chapman, see the Special Forces tribute site to him: http://www.quietpros.com/Afgan/chapman_nathan_ross_5sfg.htm.
11. Haqqani had spent years on the CIA’s payroll: For a comprehensive history of the network and its founder, see Jeffrey Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” Afghan Report No. 6, Institute for the Study of War, October 2010, http://www.understandin?gwar.org/?report/?haqqani-network.
12. “It’s just rudimentary, baseline, box-checking training”: Author interview with retired CIA instructor who led training courses and exercises for CIA officers at Camp Peary, near Williamsburg, Virginia.
13. There were three thousand of these soldiers in the eastern half of Afghanistan: For an account of the CIA-trained Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams, see Bob Woodward,
1. first big score as a spy: Details of Balawi’s video attachment and the reaction within the CIA were described in interviews with three current intelligence officials who participated in meetings to discuss the finding, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2. a top aide to bin Laden: For more on Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, see Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, “Al- Qaeda’s New Leadership,”
3. “You have lifted our heads”: bin Zeid’s reaction to Balawi’s apparent success as a spy, as described in Balawi’s Dec. 26, 2009, videotaped interview, op. cit.
4. serve up graphically detailed descriptions of the damage: Descriptions of Balawi’s assistance to CIA targeters in the fall of 2009 were provided in author interviews with three U.S. and two Jordanian intelligence officials.
5. code-named Agent Hero: For an official account of the double agent Colonel Penkovsky’s espionage achievements during the Cold War and his eventual execution in Russia at the hands of the KGB, see his official CIA profile at https://www.cia.?gov/news?-information/?featured?-story-archive/?2010-?featured?-story-?archive/colonel?- penkovsky.?html.
6. Indonesian terrorist ring known as Jemaah Islamiyah: For a detailed description of the terrorist group, see the profile “Jemaah Islamiyah” at HistoryCommons.com, at http://www.history?commons.org/?entity?.jsp??entity=? jemmah_?islamiyah.
7. “I have to be there for Ali”: Darren LaBonte’s comments, biographical information, and friendship with bin Zeid described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues as well as with members of the bin Zeid and LaBonte families.
1. The Jordanian had made direct contact with the deputy commander of al-Qaeda: Details of Balawi’s e- mails about his reported interaction with Zawahiri, as well as the internal reaction to his messages, were described in author interviews with U.S. intelligence officials who participated in meetings convened to discuss the e-mails, and one former U.S. intelligence official who reviewed internal memos and notes about the events.
2. “we have a chance to go after Zawahiri”: CIA director Leon Panetta’s words, as recalled in author interviews with two intelligence officials and one administration official who attended the meeting.
3. the al-Qaeda version of a mad scientist: See Lawrence Wright,
4. “To kill Americans and their allies”: Ibid.
5. an alleged 2003 plot to attack New York City’s subway system: See Ron Suskind,
6. Zawahiri was known to have visited the same province: For a description of the failed assassination attempt on Zawahiri, see analysis by Bill Roggio, “Zawahiri, and al-Qaeda’s Future Plans,”
7. “Bush, do you know where I am?”: Andrew Buncombe, “Zawahiri Taunts Bush in New Videotape,”
8. a series of options for a meeting with Balawi were weighed: The CIA’s internal debate over the meeting with Balawi was described in author interviews with three CIA officers who participated.
9. “government was crying out for information”: Interview with the author.
10. Balawi became increasingly insistent: Negotiations with Balawi over the details of his meeting with the CIA and bin Zeid recounted in author interviews with two Jordanian and three U.S. intelligence officials.
11. “We need to go slow on this case”: LaBonte’s words and his bosses’ response, as described in interviews with two CIA officials briefed on the exchange.
12. “But it’s my case”: The Jordanian intelligence agency’s effort to replace bin Zeid as the case officer for Balawi was confirmed by CIA director Leon Panetta in a press briefing on Oct. 19, 2010. Additional details about the internal discussions and events preceding bin Zeid’s departure for Afghanistan were described in author interviews with two Jordanian and two U.S. intelligence officials, as well as with bin Zeid’s and LaBonte’s families.
1. She would join them via Skype: Details of Matthews’s experiences during Christmas week were provided in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and two family members.
2. the most important ops plan of her life: Matthews’s plan and the various reactions to it were described in author interviews with two senior U.S. intelligence officials, three CIA colleagues, and two former Special Forces officers with personal knowledge of the events.
3. no formal counterintelligence review for Balawi: The CIA’s internal review, as described by Panetta on Oct. 19, 2010, confirmed deficiencies in the agency’s counterintelligence review of the case. Additional insights provided in author interviews with two senior intelligence officials.
4. they had found Balawi’s behavior suspicious: Author interview with Pickering, op. cit. at Langley, Virginia.
5. everything seemed wrong: LaBonte’s and bin Zeid’s concerns about the Balawi case were described in author interviews with two CIA colleagues and family members with whom they discussed their feelings in the final days of December.
6. “Sometimes it’s your job to say something”: Dec. 21, 2009, e-mail from Jeremy Wise to former navy colleague, provided to author.
7.
