prevailed. It was still largely experimental, but over several years of continuous exercises it had been showing considerable promise.
Where the most important advances had been made in preparations to defend the Federal Republic, however, was without any question in the organization of home and civil defence — including the protection of vulnerable points and attention to the problem of refugees — and in the better use of reserves.
Of the other Allied forces deployed in the Central Region on 4 August 1985 (in addition to their most powerful component, those of the United States), I Belgian and I Netherlands Corps in NORTHAG were almost up to strength (though the training of reservists in some units gave little cause for confidence) and were already, at least in part, deployed forward. Pressure within NATO over the years to increase the long-service content in these formations, thus placing less reliance on reserves, and to deploy a higher proportion of them within the Federal Republic near their battle stations (and less in their adjacent homelands) had met with incomplete success. I Belgian and I Netherlands Corps were not the strongest links in the NATO chain.
The embryonic II British Corps, composed in part of reserve units manned by former long-service regulars and in part of regular units, had been due this year, as it happened, for the first time to carry out a full formation exercise, with troops, in BAOR. It was building up in north-west Germany. Its equipment, stockpiled in advance but not yet fully up to scale and, where reserve units were concerned, not always of the latest type, had already been drawn. Its personnel embodied a considerable level of experience, fortified both by a leaven of regular units and by judicious cross-posting from I British Corps. The morale of its reservist soldiers was high.
The much strengthened Canadian Brigade Group, in the rear of the CENTAG area, was held in the Central Army Group reserve.
CHAPTER 15: The Storm Breaks on the Central Front
Active hostilities opened first of all in inner space, very shortly before 0400 hours, Central European time, on Sunday, 4 August 1985, with widespread and clearly very carefully prepared attacks on US communications and surveillance satellites. The Soviet interference capability was known to have developed considerably since the resumption of a programme temporarily discontinued in the USSR in 1971. The extent of its development came as an unpleasant surprise. Airborne relay stations of the US Air Force, already deployed, took up some, at least, of the communications load, though with a high initial degradation of efficiency. The sudden removal of large areas of satellite surveillance cover, however, was to be much more acutely felt than reduced communications capability. The latter could be largely replaced at short notice by other means. Satellite surveillance could also be restored in time, but that would take longer.
A few minutes later, at about 0400 hours, massive air and missile attacks, using both high explosive and chemical munitions, on airfields, headquarters locations, logistic areas and
Surprise was nowhere complete: NATO troops in forward positions were already alert. The expectation that an attack, however likely, would not take place just yet had some effect, at least initially, in reducing the effectiveness of protective and defensive measures in rear areas, but even here the numerous, widespread and carefully prepared strikes by under-cover parties met with gratifyingly little success. It was just not possible, as Kremlin planners had very sensibly realized, to prepare a sudden attack on so many points at once with complete surprise. They had therefore sought concealment in deception planning, particularly in terms of timing. It proved to be ineffective. A few discoveries of under-cover attacks on the very verge of delivery, together with other unmistakable signs of what was imminent, served to set off a general alert among Federal German police and territorial forces already standing by at short notice. Damage there was, even serious damage, but the first armed clash between the Warsaw Pact and the territorial defences of the Federal Republic resulted in at least 75 per cent failure and something of a boost to civil morale. (The attack on HQ NORTHAG noted above was, in spite of initial penetration of the HQ building and some casualties, a total failure, like very many others.)
Though Allied forces everywhere were already dispersed, as far as possible, in an anti-nuclear posture (with all its inconveniences), no nuclear attack was anywhere reported. Warsaw Pact forces, on the other hand, confident that nuclear release by the NATO defence was at this stage most unlikely, were able to operate with only that degree of dispersion required against conventional air attack, which was much less.
Chemical agents were used in the attack from the start, but only on some sectors of the front. They were not used against the two US corps, perhaps because USAREUR possessed integral and effective chemical offensive weapons of its own. US policy had consistently been that US troops would retaliate in kind if attacked with chemical agents but would not use them otherwise. The Soviet commanders seemed to have taken this threat seriously and did not use chemicals against any formation in CENTAG.
In the NORTHAG sector none of the national corps possessed a chemical offensive capability. This position had persisted in the 1980s despite the growing strength of the argument that possession of a retaliatory capability would be a relatively unsophisticated and economic means of discouraging recourse by the Soviet Union to chemical weapons, whose use by them would further add to the Warsaw Pact’s non-nuclear superiority. There was now widespread use by the enemy of chemicals to support attacks against NORTHAG, principally launched in BM-21 rockets. These equipments operated in battalion groups of eighteen which, when fired in unison, were able to land 720 rockets on a square kilometre within fifteen seconds. The warm weather was ideal for the use of non-persistent agents such as HCN. This has a hazard duration of only a few minutes at 10 °C in moderate wind conditions with rain, of at 15 °C in sunny conditions with a light breeze. Soldiers not wearing respirators within the target area died within a few minutes of inhaling the vapour. The agent evaporated so quickly that Soviet assault troops would be able to move through the target area with only minor precautions. Despite peacetime training, Allied casualties in forward areas as the offensive opened were considerable.
At the same time, major airfields were attacked with chemical agents (usually mustard, or G- or V-type nerve gases) delivered by missiles, each one of which could put down sufficient of a persistent agent to cause severe disruption over the whole airfield complex. Ground crew were forced to wear full personal protective equipment to carry out maintenance and aircraft refuelling and re-arming. This severely handicapped their performance and increased aircraft turn-round times significantly.
Major logistic installations and communication points, where large numbers of the civilians operating them had no protective equipment, received similar treatment. Physical removal of persistent agents was virtually impossible while further missile attacks maintained a high level of lethal contamination. Such attacks upon airfields and logistic installations caused more prolonged disruption than sustained high-explosive bombardment.
Even a minute quantity of a highly toxic agent such as HCN, either inhaled or absorbed through the skin, was capable of causing death within a few minutes unless prompt medical attention was available. Medical services soon overloaded with battle casualties were severely taxed to cope with casualties caused by chemicals as well.
Constant precautions and the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment quickly reduced the casualty rate. Excellent personal protective equipment had been available to I British Corps since the middle 1970s and had been rushed into service by other European NATO countries just in time to prove its value. Without it, very heavy casualties would have resulted from chemical agents delivered against forward troops not only by rocket launcher and
The Warsaw Pact attack had also been preceded by very extensive ECM and anti-radar activity from the Eastern side. This was initially by no means ineffective, but was very soon seen to be quite dramatically inferior to the resources in electronic warfare available to the West.
In rather less than an hour after the opening of initial preparations for the land offensive, four powerful armoured thrusts, each on a divisional front led by an advanced group of mixed arms in regimental strength, had
