The Conscience of a Liberal

If the new progressive movement succeeds, the need for partisanship will eventually diminish. In the 1950s you could support Social Security and unions and yet still vote for Eisenhower in good conscience, because the Republican Party had eventually (and temporarily) accepted the New Deal’s achievements. In the long run we can hope for a return to that kind of politics: two reasonable parties that accept all that is best in our country but compete over their ability to deliver a decent life to all Americans, and keep each other honest.

For now, being an active liberal means being a progressive, and being a progressive means being partisan. But the end goal isn’t one-party rule. It’s the reestablishment of a truly vital, competitive democracy. Because in the end, democracy is what being a liberal is all about.

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, thanks to Robin Wells, my wife and frequent coauthor. She was deeply involved in every stage of this project: formulating ideas, doing the research, and drafting the chapters. It’s really her book as much as mine.

Thanks also to two historians. Sean Wilentz read an early draft in detail, correcting many of my misconceptions and setting me on the right path. Rick Perlstein talked over some of the basic ideas with me, and let me see an early draft of his terrific forthcoming book Nixonland, which vastly improved my understanding of the crucial transition period in postwar political economy.

Thanks also to Drake McFeely of Norton, who both helped the writing and remained preternaturally calm as we made the final dash for the finish line.

Finally, although nobody at the New York Times was directly involved in this book, I would like to say a word of thanks to those at the Times—especially Gail Collins, the editorial-page editor from 2001 through 2006, who stood by me at a time when there was enormous pressure for critics of the Bush administration to mute their voices.

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Notes

1 THE WAY WE WERE

1.

Much of what we know about long-term trends in inequality comes from the pioneering work of Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 1 (Feb. 2003), pp. 1–39.

2.

Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (MIT Press, 2006).

3.

Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo, “The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United States at Mid-Century,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, no. 1 (1992), p. 1–34.

4.

See, in particular, Ian Dew-Becker and Robert Gordon, “Where Did the Productivity Growth Go?” Inflation Dynamics and the Distribution of Income,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activities, no. 2 (2005), pp. 67–127, and Frank Levy and Peter Temin, “Inequality and Institutions in 20th-Century America” (MIT Department of Economics working paper, no. 07-17, June 2007).

5.

Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective” (National Bureau of Economic Research working paper no. 11955, Jan. 2006).

6.

William Greider, “Rolling Back the 20th Century,” The Nation (May 12, 2003).

2 THE LONG GILDED AGE

1.

Bradford DeLong, “Robber Barons,” econ161.berkeley.edu/Econ_Articles/car negie/DeLong_Moscow_paper2.html.

2.

Vito Tanzi and Ludger Schuhknecht, Public Spending in the 20th Century (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

3.

Wilson was considered a Bourbon before his presidential run but made his peace with Bryan before the election. In practice he did move the government somewhat to the left, adopting a relatively tolerant attitude toward unions and instituting the income tax. But he was no FDR.

4.

Election finance statistics from Historical Statistics of the United States, Series Y 187–188 (US Bureau of the Census, 1975).

5.

For an overview of the evidence, see Peter H. Argersinger, “New Perspectives on Election Fraud in the