1 six Afghan soldiers were dead and nine wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, 25 Nov. 2009, Exhibit II-1 (P.7).
2 Swenson brought back two dead jihadists, too: Swenson, Exhibit BI.
3 Fabayo got into our turret and Hafez got on the radio: Fabayo, Annex E, Appendix e12.
4 picked up Dodd Ali, and rolled his stiff body into the open back: Swenson wrote to me on 6 Jan. 2012: “At the time, Dakota was a Marine E-4; I did not know him. I was situationally aware of the location of those who fought at the battle, but putting a name to the role performed is different. You referenced football: I know where the QB [quarterback] was, but I do not necessarily recall his roster number. What I witnessed of Dakota’s heroism, I am certain of.”
1 Swenson got out to talk to the Army platoon leader: Swenson, Tab J.
2 four Americans were missing: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit BR.
3 “You’re not going back into the fight”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes.
4 left the battlefield: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit II-1. (P.7), concluded that “the 2-8 ETT commander, the record shows that he performed capably and courageously.”
5 “Hold where you are”: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
6 move into the valley: Email Swenson to West, 6 Jan. 2011.
7 “Spot”: Meyer interview with CBS, 60 Minutes.
8 we pulled out about ten or twelve wounded: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit AJ.
9 waiting their turn to enter the valley: Bassett statement, Appendix e13, 14 Sept. 2009.
10 fire missions kept getting denied: Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit U. “I heard constant requests for fire support,” Sgt. Summers, up at Shadow 4, said.
11 fended off the endless questions from the TOC at Joyce: Summers, Werth/Hooker Investigation, Exhibit C1, 17 Nov. 2009. “My feeling is that the Marines and Afghan forces were left out to dry,” Shadow 4—Sgt. Summers—said. “It’s a horrible feeling but that’s how I feel about it. QRF? Air? Nothing but endless questions [by the TOC].”
12 the pilots didn’t return fire: Silano telecommunication with West, 7 June 2012.
13 they were fighting the outsiders: This is unsurprising. See, for instance, Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 437.
1 a PKM was still shooting at some Askars: Fabayo, Appendix e14.
2 fell into a deep, well-constructed trench: Swenson brief to West at FOB Joyce, 13 Oct. 2009.
3 villagers returning to Ganjigal: The Werth/Hooker investigation (JP, Exhibit A, Part 2, page 16) stated that “no Afghan civilians were either killed or injured during this operation.” In all due respect, this cannot be confirmed. Tens of thousands of bullets were fired over the course of the day. No one walked around keeping count of who was struck, whether Afghan soldiers, civilians who were not involved, civilians who were aiding the enemy, or enemy who were wearing civilian clothes.
1 set the two dead aside for burial: Exhibits AI and J.
2 bloody handprints: Kerr reminded me of this in an email dated July 11, 2012.
1 his command had made progress in eastern Afghanistan: DoD press briefing by Maj. Gen. Scaparrotti, 3 June 2010.
2 The Americans handed out Korans and prayer rugs: Regional Command East archives, 19 Dec. 2009, reprint of 3 Dec. 2009 story citing Capt. J. L. Saxe, 1-32.
1 “I am staring at the target”: Swenson, Appendix B1.
2 “I expect to be kicked out”: Swenson to West at Joyce, 18 Oct. 2009.
3 recommendation for the Medal of Honor in December of 2009: USFOR-A DCDR- COS Letter of Lateness: Medal of Honor Recommendation, Captain William D. Swenson, United States Army, signed by Col. J. H. Chevallier, USA, 11 Aug. 2011. (Swenson was part of a sixteen-man team advising seven Afghan Border Police units along a 480-kilometer stretch of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. There was very little internal administrative support for the police advisor program. For fitness reports and ratings, Swenson was evaluated by Battalion 1-32 at Camp Joyce.)
4 commanded by Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti: USFOR-A DCDR-COS Letter of Lateness: Medal of Honor Recommendation, Captain William D. Swenson, United States Army, signed by Col. J. H. Chevallier, USA, 11 Aug. 2011.
5 signatures required for the Medal of Honor: Army Regulation 600-8-22, 15 Sept. 2011.
6 one of the most important things a commander does in combat: Michelle Tan, “Missing Medals,” Army Times, 2 June 2012.
7 investigation by the television correspondent Dan Rather: Dan Rather Reports, TV series, 13 Sept. 2011.
8 packet recommending the Medal of Honor: The narrative written to justify the recommendation for Swenson’s Medal of Honor implied, despite Swenson’s testimony, that strong artillery support had been provided at Ganjigal. “Due to the extreme close proximity of insurgent fighters to their ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] positions,” the narrative stated, “multiple fire missions were unsuccessful in deterring the enemy’s advance.” Source: Narrative for the Medal of Honor, Cpt. William D. Swenson, undated, p. 3.
9 guidelines were crystal-clear, with no ambiguity: See Army Regulation 600-8- 22.
10 uploaded into the Army electronic archives: AR 600-8-22 Military Awards, Fort Knox, KY, plus DA form 638.
