Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989-1999. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Smith, Steven, and Remington, Thomas F. (2001) The Politics of Institutional Choice: Formation of the Russian State Duma. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
The Russian Federation, as its name implies, is a federated political entity. However, this concept continues to evolve and is periodically challenged by a variety of political forces. Even if using one of the simpler definitions of federalism-that of “self rule plus shared rule” within a country-the Russian case defies easy classification.
According to the Russian constitution, there are eighty-nine distinct territorial entities within the Russian Federation, with some based on ethnic groups and others on territorial foundations. How these entities fit together in the Russian political system is a result of more than a decade of negotiation and practice. After all, the initial challenge was that while the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) was called a federation during the Soviet period, it was a unitary system in practice. Thus, at the time of independence in 1991, each of these political units had to renegotiate its
FEDERAL PROPERTY FUND
standing within the new state, which eventually developed a system referred to as “assymetrical federalism.” A number of the ethnic-based republics, for example, sought greater autonomy, or outright independence.
The Federation Treaty of March 1992 was the first step in formally resolving the question of powers and rights within the federated system. By the end of that year, all but Chechnya and Tatarstan signed the agreement, and the abstention of these two republics raised questions of a possible splintering of the Russian Federation. With the adoption of the new Russian constitution in December 1993, however, the Federation Treaty was enshrined in the main legal basis of the country. Beginning in 1994, the government in Moscow worked out an agreement with Tatarstan, as well as treaties with the other republics of the Russian Federation, leaving the Chechen Republic as the sole holdout. Indeed, that part of the Russian Federation remains contested and in the early twenty-first century is mired in a bloody conflict.
There are several key issues that continue to confront the federal structure in Russia. First, there are questions concerning basic budgetary and taxation rights. Are the regions able to create their own financial bases from which to fund specific projects? From education policies to economic development plans, problems exist as to what the republics can do. Second, there remains a problem of resource management on the national level. This is particularly important in the energy and strategic mineral fields. For example, control over energy deposits in the Yamalo-Nenets okrug was contested by that entity, the Tiumen oblast within which it is located, and the government in Moscow. Third, there are questions about the actual political power of regional governors. During the late-Yeltsin era, there was a tendency for the federal government to appoint regional officials in order to better control them from the center. Since that time, however, these officials are elected, and a few of these have begun to exercise real authority in their specific regions. In addition, the Federal Council, the upper chamber of the Russian legislature (similar to the U.S. Senate), is designed to represent the interests of these various subnational entities.
Given the vast territorial expanse of the Russian Federation, as well as the ethnic diversity of the regions, political leaders in Russia at least support the idea of a federated political system. However, the history of unitary control, both during tsarist and Soviet times, has yielded a legacy within the bureaucracy and administration that is difficult to change. In addition, the specific conditions and needs of each region undoubtedly dictate the specific level of authority that may be attained throughout the country. Most analysts and experts suggest that “federalism” in the Russian Federation will remain a multi-level system that will continue to see variations from region to region. See also: FEDERATION TREATIES; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; PEOPLE’S COMMISSARIAT OF NATIONALITIES; RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Kahn, Jeffrey. (2002). Federalism, Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. Kempton, Daniel R., and Clark, Terry D., eds. (2002). Unity of Separation: Center-Periphery Relations in the Former Soviet Union. Westport, CT: Praeger. Ross, Cameron. (2003). Federalism and Democratization in Post-Communist Russia. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. (2002). “Soviet Solutions to Post-Soviet Problems: Has Vladimir Putin Really Strengthened the Federal Center?” PONARS [Program on New Approaches to Russian Security] Policy Memo No. 283, October. Walker, Edward W. (1995). “Designing Center-Region Relations in the New Russia.” East European Constitutional Review 4(1): 54- 60.
The State Property Committee agency charged with receiving and overseeing privatization of state enterprises designated for privatization began operations in October 1992 (under Anatoly Chubais) in what became a large-scale sale of state enterprises. The first stage was voucher privatization. Vouchers were sent to every man, woman, and child in Russia. These voucher checks could be used to purchase shares in what had previously been state enterprises. Or they could be invested in managed mutual funds or sold on the secondary market.
Enterprises slated for privatization were transferred to the Federal Property Fund. The initial stage of privatization excluded enterprises of national significance, such and oil and electric generation
FEDERATION TREATIES
and those of military or strategic significance. Large scale, non-military enterprises were transferred subsequently in 1994-1995 and many were auctioned off under what was called the “loans for shares” program. When enterprises were transferred to the Federal Property Fund they were required to be converted into open joint stock companies before privatization. The Federal Property Fund was to oversee this transformation and supervise the privatization process.
In the end the Federal Property Fund participated in the largest privatization program in economic history, one that was replete with insider advantages, corruption, bribery, and scandalous underpayment by the ultimate owners. Privatization was also incomplete because the government maintained either a majority ownership or “golden shares” that allowed a veto over management decisions. See also: PRIVATIZATION
Gregory, Paul R., and Stuart, Robert C. (2001). Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure, 7th ed. New York: Addison Wesley. Hedlund, Stefan. (1999). Russia’s “Market” Economy: A Bad Case of Predatory Capitalism. London: UCL Press.
JAMES R. MILLAR
On March 13, 1992, representatives of eighteen of Russia’s twenty ethnic republics initialed a treaty of federation with the Russian federal government. Two republics-Chechnya and Tatarstan-refused to sign. A separate agreement was initialed by representatives of Russia’s oblasts and kraya (administrative divisions) that same week, followed several days later by a third agreement with the country’s autonomous okruga (territorial divisions) and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. On March 31, 1992, the three treaties, which would be collectively referred to as the “Federation Treaty,” were formally signed into law. After the formal separation of the Chechen and Ingush Republics was ratified by the Sixth Congress of Peoples’ Deputies in April 1992, the number of republics under Russian constitutional law rose to twenty-one. While Ingushetia signed the Treaty upon its establishment, Chechnya refused to do so, asserting that it had declared formal independence in November 1991.
The April 1992 Treaty provided for a complicated and vague division of powers between the federal government and Russia’s eighty-nine “subjects of the federation.” It also required as many as one hundred enabling laws, most of which were never adopted. Symbolically, the most important provision was the Treaty’s designation of the ethnic republics, but not the Russian Federation’s other constituent units (oblasts, kraya, and autonomous okruga), as “sovereign,” although it was not clear what legal rights, if any, “sovereign” status entailed. Some advocates of the republics argued that it implied a right to refuse to join the federation as well as a right of unilateral secession. Unlike the USSR constitution in effect at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
