families, to his court in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. Muscovite rulers also incorporated the princes of territories annexed by Moscow into their court, although some of them, known as service princes, retained some organizational autonomy within the court until the end of the sixteenth century.
As a result of the reforms of the 1550s, the sovereign’s court functioned on the basis of a mixture of hierarchical and territorial principles. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the court acquired a clear hierarchy of ranks: boyars, okolnichie, counselor cavalrymen, counselor secretaries, the household ranks and chancellery secretaries, the ruler’s personal guard (stolniki, stryapchie, zhiltsy), service princes, and the lowest ranks (dvorovye deti boyarskie, later vybornye dvoryane). Service relations between courtiers were subject to rules of precedence (mestnichestvo), a complex system that defined the status of a courtier on the basis of the prominence and service appointments of his ancestors and relatives. Territoriality was crucial to the court’s lowest strata, which included members of collateral branches of boyar families, people who had advanced through faithful service, and newcomers of lower status. The people who held the lowest court ranks were leading members of local cavalrymen communities and were listed by the town where they had service lands. They served in Moscow on a rotating basis. Secretaries entered the court thanks to their literacy and the patronage of the ruler or influential courtiers. A servitor’s career at court thus dependent on his pedigree, his position in the local cavalrymen community, his personal skills and merits, and the favor of his patrons.
The princes of Moscow used a variety of means to secure the integrity of their court. Members of the court swore an oath of allegiance and received land grants on condition that they served the prince. Muscovite rulers secured the loyalty of distinguished newcomers by granting them superior status over the boyars, manipulating their land possessions, encouraging marriages with members of the royal family and the local elite, and subjecting the disloyal to disgrace and executions. Ivan IV’s reign saw the climax of repressions against members of the court, which was divided in two parts during the Oprichnina. The social and genealogical composition of the court, however, remained stable until the middle of the seventeenth century, when people of lower origin began entering the court’s upper strata. At the same time, the leaders of local cavalrymen communities were excluded from the court. Peter I stopped making appointments to the upper court ranks during the early 1690s.
The sovereign’s court included the most combat-worthy Muscovite troops and provided cadres for administrative and diplomatic tasks. An efficient military and administrative institution, the sovereign’s court was vital to the victory of the princes of Moscow over their opponents and to the functioning of the Russian state during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See also: BOYAR; CHANCELLERY SYSTEM; IVAN III; IVAN IV; OPRICHNINA
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alef, Gustave. (1986). The Origins of Muscovite Autocracy: The Age of Ivan III. Forschungen zur Osteurop? ischen Geschichte, vol. 39. Berlin: Osteuropa-Institut; Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Poe, Marshall T. (2003). The Russian Elite in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters.
The Governing Senate was founded in 1711. Its initial primary responsibility was to govern the empire when the emperor was on military campaigns. The establishment of the Senate was also part of a government re- organization undertaken by Peter I (1689-1725) who wished to make the government structure more responsive to his wishes and more effective at tapping society’s resources for military purposes. In 1722 it was transformed from a higher governing organ to a higher supervisory one responsible for resolving legal and administrative disputes. Catherine II (1763-1796) further systemized the Senate by dividing it into six departments with relatively clear institutional responsibilities related to administrative oversight.
The governmental reforms undertaken by Alexander I (1801-1825) fundamentally changed the role of the Senate. According to his decrees of 1801 and 1802 the Senate had the right to judicial
GRAIN CRISIS OF 1928
review and supervision of the highest governmental organs, including the newly established ministries. No legislative bill could become law without the Senate’s approval. However, one year later a new decree stripped the Senate of these powers. The founding of the ministerial system and the State Council (1810) fatally weakened the Senate’s role in practice. For the remainder of the nineteenth century it played the role of a High Court of Review and along with other institutions exercised limited administrative supervision. Until 1905 the Senate, whose forty or fifty members were chosen by the tsar, rarely met, except on ceremonial occasions. Six departments that dealt with a myriad of judicial, social, and political issues continued to work under the supervision of the Senate.
After the Revolution of 1905 the role of the Senate changed once again. It became the High Criminal Court dealing with corruption in the bureaucracy. Its first department played a role in the preparations for the formation of the First Duma, while its Second Department became the supreme appellate court for land-related issues. See also: ALEXANDER I; CATHERINE II; PETER I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Seton-Watson, Hugh. (1991). The Russian Empire 1801-1917. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yaney, George. (1973). The Systemization of Russian Government. London: University of Illinois Press.
The Grain Crisis of 1928 was economic and political in nature and was a turning point in the Soviet regime’s policy toward the peasantry, a preview of Josef Stalin’s harsh methods of collectivization. Ten years after the Revolution, agriculture was still based on individual farming, with peasants cultivating more than ninety-seven percent of the land and selling their product to the state at set procurement prices in order to meet their tax obligations. The most important product was grain, and the system of state procurement supplied grain to feed the cities and the military, and for export. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), the existence of a free market for agricultural products helped keep procurement prices competitive. Most peasants were at or near the subsistence level. A small number of richer peasants (the so-called kulaks) supplied most of the grain sold on the free market. Prices for industrial products produced by the state sector were kept relatively high in order to accumulate capital. In December 1927, the Fifteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party endorsed the idea of planned economic development, requiring the state to accumulate even more capital from domestic sources, principally the peasantry, while maintaining exports. Grain procurement prices were lowered in order to keep state expenditures down. A war scare in 1927 led people to hoard food.
Within this context, the grain crisis began to take shape toward the end of 1927. Although it was an average harvest, grain procurements fell precipitously at the end of the year; in November and December of 1927, procurements were about half of what they had been during the same months of the previous year. The problem was especially acute in Siberia, the Volga, and the Urals, even though the harvest had been good in these areas. Richer peasants withheld grain from the market, waiting for prices to rise. Peasants also switched from producing grain to other agricultural commodities. For example, in the Urals, while peasant grain sales to the state declined by a third, the sale of meat rose by fifty percent, egg sales doubled, and bacon sales went up four times.
Stalin insisted that the kulaks were withholding grain from the market to sabotage the regime, creating as much a political problem as an economic problem. He argued that the class struggle was intensifying. In January 1928 he visited the Urals and West Siberia and called for a series of emergency measures to extract grain from the recalcitrant peasantry. In direct opposition to the views of Nikolai Bukharin and other moderates in the Politburo, quotas for compulsory grain deliveries were imposed on kulaks and also on middle peasants. Peasants responded by decreasing grain production during 1928, but this simply intensified the crisis. For the year October 1927-October 1928, grain procurements fell by fourteen percent relative to the same period a year earlier, although the harvest was down by only seven to eight percent.
The grain crisis of 1928 was a critical turning point in Soviet economic and political history. Applying compulsion to the peasants rather than using economic incentives meant that NEP was dead. Most significantly, the events of 1928 showed that Stalin saw the peasantry as the enemy and established the context of a warlike crisis that would
GRAIN TRADE
