A history of Russia

procedure. But before long an organization emerged which consciously put terrorism at the center of

its activity. The conspiratorial revolutionary society 'Land and Freedom,' founded in 1876, split in 1879 into two groups: the 'Black Partition,' or 'Total Land Repartition,' which emphasized gradualism and propaganda, and the 'Will of the People' which mounted an all-out terroristic offensive against the government. Members of the 'Will of the People' believed that, because of the highly centralized nature of the Russian state, a few assassinations could do tremendous damage to the regime, as well as provide the requisite political instruction for the educated society and the masses. They selected the emperor, Alexander II, as their chief target and condemned him to death. What followed has been described as an 'emperor hunt' and in certain ways it defies imagination. The Executive Committee of the 'Will of the People' included only about thirty men and women, led by such persons as Andrew Zheliabov who came from the serfs and Sophia Perovskaia who came from Russia's highest administrative class, but it fought the Russian Empire. Although the police made every effort to destroy the revolutionaries and although many terrorists perished, the 'Will of the People' made one attempt after another to assassinate the emperor. Time and again Alexander II escaped through sheer luck. Many people were killed when the very dining room of his palace was blown up, while at one time the emperor's security officials refused to let him leave his suburban residence, except by water!

After the explosion in the Winter Palace and after being faced by strikes, student disturbances, and a remarkable lack of sympathy on the part of the educated public, as well as by the dauntless terrorism of the 'Will of the People,' the emperor finally decided on a more moderate policy which could lead to a rapprochement with the public. He appointed General Count Michael Loris-Melikov first as head of a special administrative commission and several months later as minister of the interior. Loris-Melikov was to suppress terrorism, but also to propose reforms. Several moderate or liberal ministers replaced a number of reactionaries. Loris-Melikov's plan called for the participation of representatives of the public, both elected and appointed, in considering administrative and financial reforms - not unlike the pattern followed in the abolition of serfdom. On March 13, 1881, Alexander II indicated his willingness to consider Loris-Melikov's proposal. That same day he was finally killed by the remaining members of the 'Will of the People.'

Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of Alexander II's reign, while perhaps not quite as dramatic as its internal history, also deserves careful attention. It began with the termination of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris, possibly the nadir of the Russian position in Europe in the nineteenth century, and

it did much to restore Russian prestige. Notably, the Russians fought a successful war against Turkey and largely redrew the map of the Balkans. Also, in the course of the reign, the empire of the Romanovs made a sweeping expansion in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East. But not everything went well. Russia experienced important diplomatic setbacks as well as victories. Moreover, the changing pattern of power relations in Europe - fundamentally affected by the unification of Germany, which the tsarist government helped more than hindered - was in many ways less favorable to the state of the Romanovs in 1881 than it had been fifty years earlier.

The Crimean War meant the collapse of the world of Nicholas I, the world of legitimism with himself as its leader. Specifically, it left the Russian government and public bitterly disappointed with Austria, which, in spite of the crucial Russian help in 1849, did everything to aid Russia's enemies short of actually fighting. As Tiutchev insisted, no 'Austrian Judas' could be allowed to pay last respects to Nicholas I on behalf of the Hapsburgs! It is worth noting that when the new minister of foreign affairs, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, surveyed the situation, he turned to France as a possible ally, and Napoleon III indicated reciprocal interest. Yet at that time - in contrast to what happened thirty years later - the Franco-Russian rapprochement foundered on the Polish rebellion of 1863. As already mentioned, both the French ruler and his people sympathized with the Poles, and, as in the case of Great Britain and Austria, France intervened diplomatically on behalf of the Poles, arguing that from the time of the Congress of Vienna and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland the fate of that country was of international concern and not simply an internal Russian affair. The imperial government could reject the argument of these powers and rebuff their intervention only because of the strong support that it obtained from the Russian public and also from Prussia. Bismarck, who realized the danger of Polish nationalism for Prussia and wanted to secure the goodwill of the tsar, sent Count Constantine Alvensleben to promise the Russians co-operation against the Polish rebels and to sign a convention to that effect. Bismarck's astute handling of the Russians contributed, no doubt, to the rather benevolent attitude on the part of the tsarist government toward the unification of Germany under Prussia, which involved the defeat of Austria in 1866 and of France in 1870. In retrospect, the fact that Russia did nothing to prevent the emergence of Germany as the new continental giant has been called the worst mistake that tsarist diplomacy ever made. To qualify that charge, it should at least be noted that Russian statesmen were not the only ones in that crucial decade totally to misjudge the situation and prospects in Europe. Also, Russia did obtain some compensation through the abrogation of the Black Sea provisions of the Treaty of Paris: at a time when

European attention centered on the Franco-Prussian war, Gorchakov, with Bismarck's backing, repudiated the vexatious obligation not to have a warfleet or coastal fortifications on the Black Sea that Russia had assumed under the Treaty. The British protested and an international conference was held in London in March 1871, but the Russian action was allowed to stand, although the principle of general consent of the signatories as against unilateral action was reaffirmed.

When in the 1870's the tsarist government looked again for allies, it once more found Prussia, or rather Germany, and Austria, which had become Austria-Hungary. For a century the Hohenzollerns had remained, on the whole, the best friends of the Romanovs; as to the Hapsburgs, the Russian rancor against them, generated by their behavior at the time of the Crimean War, had somewhat subsided in the wake of Austrian defeats and other misfortunes. The new alliance, the so-called Three Emperors' League, was formed in 1872 and 1873. Russia's part in it involved a military convention with Germany, according to which each party was to assist with 200,000 troops if its partner were attacked by a European power, and a somewhat looser agreement with Austria-Hungary. The League could be said to represent a restoration of the old association of conservative eastern European monarchies determined to preserve the established order. But, in contrast to earlier decades when Alexander I and Nicholas I led the conservative coalition, the direction of the new alliance belonged to Bismarck. In fact, the Russian government was grateful to be admitted as a partner. Moreover, Russian and German interests did not correspond in some important matters. The lack of harmony became obvious in 1875 when Russia and Great Britain exercised strong pressure on Germany to assure that it would not try a preventive war against France.

The Three Emperors' League finally collapsed over the issue of Turkey and the Balkans, which in the 1870's led to a series of international crises and to war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Beginning with the insurrection against Turkish rule in Herzegovina and Bosnia in July 1875, rebellion swept the Balkans. The year 1876 witnessed a brutal Turkish suppression of a Bulgarian uprising, as well as fighting and massacres in other parts of the peninsula, and the declaration of war on the Porte by Serbia and Montenegro. The Russian public reacted strongly to these developments. Pan-Slavism - hitherto no more than a vague sentiment, except for certain small circles of intellectuals - for the first time became an active force. Pan-Slav committees sent up to five thousand volunteers, ranging from prominent members of society to simple peasants and including about eight hundred former Russian army officers, to fight in the Serbian army, which had been entrusted to another Russian volunteer, General Michael Cherniaev. But the Turks defeated the Serbs, hence the last hope of Balkan nationalities in their uneven contest with the Ottomans

rested on Russian intervention. The imperial government considered intervention carefully and without enthusiasm. The international situation, with Great Britain and Austria-Hungary hostile to Russia, argued against war; and so did the internal conditions, for reforms were in the process of enactment, notably in the military and financial domains, and there was populist unrest. Besides, Gorchakov and other responsible tsarist officials did not believe at all in Pan-Slavism, the exception being the Russian ambassador to Constantinople, Count Nicholas Ignatiev. However, as the Balkan struggle continued, as international diplomacy failed to bring peace, and as Russia became gradually more deeply involved in the conflict, the tsarist government, having come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary, declared war on Turkey on April 24, 1877.