Two things follow. With Philo's ideas of the sepration between God and matter, it was impossible always to account for miracles or interpositions. Accordingly, these are sometimes allegorised, sometimes rationalistically explained. Further, the God of Philo, whatever he might say to the contrary, was not the God of that Israel which was His chosen people. 2. Intermediary Beings. Potencies (). If, in what has preceded, we have once and again noticed a remarkable similarity between Philo and the Rabbis, there is a still more curious analogy between his teaching and that of Jewish Mysticism, as ultimately fully developed in the 'Kabbalah.' The very term Kabbalah (from qibbel, to hand down) seems to point out not only its descent by oral tradition, but also its ascent to ancient sources. [1 For want of handier material I must take leave to refer to my brief sketch of the Kabbalah in the 'History of the Jewish Nation,' pp. 434-446.] Its existence is presupposed, and its leading ideas are sketched in the Mishnah. [a Chag. ii. l.]The Targums also bear at least one remarkable trace of it. May it not be, that as Philo frequently refers to ancient tradition, so both Eastern and Western Judaism may here have drawn from one and the same source, we will not venture to suggest, how high up, while each made such use of it as suited their distinctive tendencies? At any rate the Kabbalah also, likening Scripture to a person, compares those who study merely the letter, to them who attend only to the dress; those who consider the mnoral of a fact, to them who attend to the body; while the initiated alone, who regard the hidden meaning, are those who attend to the soul. Again, as Philo, so the oldest part of the Mishnah [a Ab. v. 4.] designates God as Maqom, 'the place', the, the all-comprehending, what the Kabbalists called the EnSoph, 'the boundless,' that God, without any quality, Who becomes cognisable only by His manifestations. [1 In short, the of the Stoics.]
The manifestations of God! But neither Eastern mystical Judaism, nor the philosophy of Philo, could admit of any direct contact between God and creation. The Kabbalah solved the
difficulty by their Sephiroth, [2 Supposed to mean either numerationes, or splendour. But why not derive the word from ? The ten are: Crown, Wisdom, Intelligence, Mercy, Judgment, Beauty, Triumph, Praise, Foundation, Kingdom.] or emanations from God, through which this contact was ultimately brought about, and of which the EnSoph, or crown, was the spring: 'the source from which the infinite light issued.' If Philo found greater difficulties, he had also more ready help from the philosophical systems to hand. His Sephiroth were 'Potencies' (), 'Words' (), intermediate powers. 'Potencies,' as we imagine, when viewed Godwards; 'Words,' as viewed creationwards. They were not emanations, but, according to Plato, 'archetypal ideas,' on the model of which all that exists was formed; and also, according to the Stoic idea, the cause of all, pervading all, forming all, and sustaining all. Thus these 'Potencies' were wholly in God, and yet wholly out of God. If we divest all this of its philosophical colouring, did not Eastern Judaism also teach that there was a distinction between the Unapproachable God, and God manifest? [3 For the teaching of Eastern Judaism in this respect, see Appendix II: 'Philo and Rabbinic Theology.']
Another remark will show the parallelism between Philo and Rabbinism. [4 A very interesting question arises: how far Philo was acquainted with, and influenced by, the Jewish traditional law or the Halakhah. This has been treated by Dr. B. Ritter in an able tractate (Philo u. die Halach.), although he attributes more to Philo than the evidence seems to admit.] As the latter speaks of the two qualities (Middoth) of Mercy and Judgment in the Divine Being, [b Jer. Ber. ix. 7.] and distinguishes between Elohim as the God of Justice, and Jehovah as the God of Mercy and Grace, so Philo places next to the Divine Word (), Goodness (), as the Creative Potency (), and Power ( ), as the Ruling Potency ( ), proving this by a curious etymological derivation of the words for 'God' and 'Lord' ( ), apparently unconscious that the LXX., in direct contradiction, translated Jehovah by Lord (), and Elohim by God ()! These two potencies of goodness and power, Philo sees in the two Cherubim, and in the two 'Angels' which accompanied God (the Divine Word), when on his way to destroy the cities of the plain. But there were more than these two Potencies. In one place Philo enumerates six, according to the number of the cities of refuge. The Potencies issued from God as the beams from the light, as the waters from the spring, as the breath from a person; they were immanent in God, and yet independent beings. They were the ideal world, which in its impulse outwards, meeting matter, produced this material world of ours. They were also the angels of God, His messengers to man, the media through whom He reveled Himself. [1 At the same time there is a remarkable difference here between Philo and Rabbinism. Philo holds that the creation of the world was brought about by the Potencies, but the Law was given directly through Moses, and not by the mediation of angels. But this latter was certainly the view generally entertained in Palestine as expressed in the LXX. rendering of Deut. xxxii. 2, in the Targumim on that passage, and more fully still in Jos. Ant. xv. 5. 3, in the Midrashim and in the Talmud, where we are told (Mace. 24 a) that only the opening words, 'I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have no other gods but Me,' were spoken by God Himself. Comp. also Acts vii. 38, 53; Gal. iii. 19; Heb. ii. 2.] 3. The Logos. Viewed in its bearing on New Testament teaching, this part of Philo's system raises the most interesting questions. But it is just here that our difficulties are greatest. We can understand the Platonic conception of the Logos as the 'archetypal idea,' and that of the Stoics as the 'world-reason' pervading matter. Similarly, we can perceive, how the Apocrypha, especially the Book of Wisdom, following up the Old Testament typical truth concerning 'Wisdom' (as specially set forth in the Book of Proverbs) almost arrived so far as to present 'Wisdom' as a special 'Subsistence' (hypostatising it). More than this, in Talmudical writings, we find mention not only of the Shem, or 'Name,' [2 Hammejuchad, 'appropriatum;'
hammephorash, 'expositum,' 'separatum,' the 'tetragrammaton,' or four-lettered name, There was also a Shem with 'twelve,' and one with 'forty-two' letters (Kidd. 71 a).] but also of the Shekhinah,' God as manifest and present, which is sometimes also presented as the Ruach ha Qodesh, or Holy Spirit, [a Or Ruach ham Maqom, Ab. iii. 10, and frequently in the Talmud.] But in the Targumim we eet yet another expression, which, strange to say, never occurs in the Talmud. [1 Levy (Neuhebr. Worterb. i. p. 374 a.) seems to imply that in the Midrash the term dibbur occupies the same place and meaning. But with all deference I cannot agree with this opinion, nor do the passages quoted bear it out.] It is that of the Memra, Logos, or 'Word.' Not that the term is exclusively applied to the Divine Logos. [2 The 'word,' as spoken, is distinguished from the 'Word' as speaking, or revealing Himself. The former is generally designated by the term 'pithgama.' Thus in Gen. XV. 1, 'After these words (things) came the 'pithgama' of Jehovah to Abram in prophecy, saying, Fear not, Abram, My 'Memra' shall be thy strength, and thy very great reward.' Still, the term Memra, as applied not only to man, but also in reference to God, is not always the equivalent of 'the Logos.'] But it stands out as perhaps the most remarkable fact in this literature, that God, not as in His permanent manifestation, or manifest Presence, but as revealing Himself, is designated Memra. Altogether that term, as applied to God, occurs in the Targum Onkelos 179 times, in the so-called Jerusalem Targum 99 times, and in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 321 times. A critical analysis shows that in 82 instances in Onkelos, in 71 instances in the Jerusalem Targum, and in 213 instances in the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, the designation Memra is not only distinguished from God, but evidently refers to God as revealing Himself. [3 The various passages in the Targum of Onkelos, the Jerusalem, and the Pseudo-Jonathan Targum on the Pentateuch will be found enumerated and classified, as those in which it is a doubtful, a fair, or an unquestionable inference, that the word Memra is intended for God revealing Himself, in Appendix II: 'Philo and Rabbinic Theology.'] But what does this imply? The distinction between God and the Memra of Jehovah is marked in many passages. [4 As, for example, Gen. xxviii. 21, 'the Memra of Jehovah shall be my God.'] Similarly, the Memra of Jehovah is distinguished from the Shekhinah. [5 As, for example, Num. xxiii. 21, 'the Memra of Jehovah their God is their helper, and the Shekhinah of their King is in the midst of them.'] Nor is the term used instead of the sacred word Jehovah; [6 That term is often used by Onkelos. Besides, the expression itself is 'the Memra of Jehovah.'] nor for the well-known Old Testament expression 'the Angel of the Lord; [7 Onkelos only once (in Ex. iv. 24) paraphrases Jehovah by 'Malakha.'] nor yet for the Metatron of the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and of the Talmud. [8 Metatron, either = , or In the Talmud it is applied to the Angel of Jehovah (Ex. xxiii. 20), 'the Prince of the World,' 'the Prince of the Face' or 'of the Presence,' as they call him; he who sits in the innermost chamber before God, while the other angels only hear His commands from behind the veil (Chag. 15 a; 16 a; Toseft. ad Chull. 60 a; Jeb. 16 b). This Metatron of the Talmud and the Kabbalah is also the Adam Qadmon, or archetypal man.] Does it then represent an older tradition underlying all these? [9 Of deep interest is Onkelos' rendering of Deut. xxxiii. 27, where, instead of'underneath are the everlasting arms,' Onkelos has, 'and by His Memra was the world created,' exactly as in St John i. 10. Now this divergence of Onkelos from the Hebrew text seems unaccountable. Winer, whose inaugural dissertation, 'De Onkeloso ejusque paraph. Chald.' Lips. 1820, most modern writers have followed (with amplifications, chiefly from Luzzato's Philoxenus), makes no reference to this passage, nor do his successors, so far as I know. It is curious that, as our present Hebrew text of this verse consists of three words, so does the rendering of Onkelos, and that both end with the same word. Is the rendering of Onkelos then a paraphrase, or does it represent another reading? Another interesting passage is Deut. viii. 3. Its quotation by Christ in St. Matt. iv. 4 is deeply interesting, as read in the
light of the rendering of Onkelos, 'Not by bread alone is man sustained, but by every forthcoming Memra from before Jehovah shall man live.' Yet another rendering of Onkelos is significantly illustrative of 1 Cor. x. 1-4. He
