Ibid., 31. But a related point can be made about Bayesian filtering as well, since many of the tools are themselves open source or free software. DSPAM, for example, is licensed under the GPL.
This is being charitable. Zdziarski is much more critical of 'vigilantes who don't adhere to any form of proper procedure before blacklisting networks.' Ibid., 28.
See Arik Hesseldahl, U.S. Congress Makes No Progress on Spam , December 26, 2003, available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/11/26/cx_ah_1126tentech.html (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6nRm2gD). Also Todd Bishop, Software Notebook: Is Gates' prediction on spam a bust? Seattle Post-Intelligencer (1/23/06). Estimates of success here differ dramatically. Microsoft estimates it blocks 95 percent of spam from reaching e-mail inboxes.
Jonathan Zdziarski, Ending Spam: Bayesian Content Filtering and the Art of Statistical Language Classification (San Francisco: No Starch Press, 2005) 23.
See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, Public Law 108-187 (2003). For a review of European leg islation, see D. I. Cojocarasu, Anti-spam Legislation Between Privacy and Commercial Interest: An Overview of the European Union Legislation Regarding the E-mail Spam (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2006). In my view, we define spam as 'unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail.' Each element is necessary. Unsolicited, meaning there is no agreement to receive such e-mail. If there is an agreement, the requirements would be removed. Bulk meaning it would not be intended to regulate circulations to friends or within small groups. Cf. Sonia Arrison, 'Canning Spam: An Economic Solution to Unwanted Email' 9 (Pacific Research Institute, Feb. 2004). Commercial meaning it would not regulate social or political e-mail. And e-mail, meaning maybe more than e-mail — perhaps, for example, including blog spam.
In my view, Congress should be permitted to discriminate in favor of political speech, and should thus be permitted to exempt political speech from any 'spam' regulation. This is not only because of the special value in this speech, but also, and more importantly, because abuse with political speech is more naturally regulated. If I am trying to win your vote, I'm not likely to annoy you with spam. But if I'm trying to sell you Viagra, whether I annoy you or not won't matter much to me.
This was the law in many states before the federal CAN-SPAM Act preempted this state law. But as those laws didn't have the enforcement remedy I propose here, they are not directly relevant to the argument I am making here. See 'Subject Line Labeling as a Weapon Against Spam,' A CAN-SPAM Act Report of Congress (FTC June 2005). This solution is just one instance of a general form which aims to shift the burden of revealing information to the sender. For a much more sophisticated proposal, see Theodore Loder, Marshall Van Alstyne, and Rick Wash (2006) 'An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication', Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy Vol. 6, No. 1, Article 2, available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol6/iss1/art2 (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6nU3t5t).
See Spammer-X, Jeffrey Polsuns and Stu Sjouwerman, Inside the Spam Cartel: Trade Secrets from the Dark Side (New York: Syngress Publishing, 2004).
R. Polk Wagner, 'On Software Regulation,' Southern California Law Review 78 (2005): 457, 516.
Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity , xiii–xvi.
Yochai Benkler, 'Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,' University of Colorado Law Review 71 (2000): 1203, 1249.
See, e.g., United States v. Dunifer, 219 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). (FCC closure of pirate radio station Free Radio Berkeley); United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24899 (D.N.Y. 2004); United States v. Szoka, 260 F3d 516 (6th Cir. 2001). See 47 CFR 73.277 (1998).
47 USCA 81–119 (1927) (repealed by the Communications Act of 1934).
