Code 2.0

Charles Fried, 'Book Review: Perfect Freedom or Perfect Control?,' Harvard Law Review 114 (2000): 606.

23.

Paul Schiff Berman, 'Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to `Private' Regulation,' University of Colorado Law Review 71 (2000): 1263, 1269.

24.

A. Michael Froomkin, 'The Collision of Trademarks, Domain Names, and Due Process in Cyberspace,' Communications of the ACM 44 (2001): 91. See also Jonathan Weinberg, 'ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy,' Duke Law Journal 50 (2000): 187.

25.

Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, available at http://icann.org/index.html (cached: http://cache.codev2.cc/Link_107.pdf).

26.

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, dissenting).

27.

See Wikipedia, 'Duke Cunningham,' available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Randy_%22Duke %22_Cunningham (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6nriPtV).

28.

The average term for a Supreme Court justice is 15 years. See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/institution.pdf (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6ntfdHN). The average term for a Senator in the 109th Congress was 12.1 years, and for a member of the House, 9.3 years. See . The figures for campaign spending are derived from http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22007.pdf (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6nwR1Lk).

29.

Ernest F. Hollings, 'Stop the Money Chase,' Washington Post, Page B07, Feb. 19, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021701847.html (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6o12DI6).

30.

Peter Francia and Paul Herrnson, 'The Impact of Public Finance Laws on Fundraising in State Legislative Elections,' 31 American Politics Research 5 (September 2003), confirms Hollings's numbers.

Chapter Seventeen Notes

1.

Deborah Hellman, in 'The Importance of Appearing Principled' (Arizona Law Review 37 [1995]: 1107), describes the illegitimacy costs that courts incur when they overrule precedents for apparently political reasons.

2.

Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 16–32; Guido Calabresi, 'The Supreme Court, 1990 Term — Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores),' Harvard Law Review 105 (1991): 80, 83, 103–7, 119–20.

3.

Or come close to doing so; see Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (Cam bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 300–301.

4.

I am grateful to Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger for demonstrating this point to me. Hal Abelson points out that the components would have to be verifiable if they were not themselves open. Otherwise, components could function as Trojan Horses — pretending to be one thing while in reality being something else.

5.

See Mark A. Lemley and David W. O'Brien, 'Encouraging Software Reuse,' Stanford Law Review 49 (1997): 255. See also, e.g., James Boyle, 'A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net,' available at http://www.law.duke.edu/boylesite/intprop.htm (cached: http://www.webcitation.org/5J6o37Kq0).

6.

For an extraordinary account of the damage done by copyright law to software devel opment, see Mark