‘I should have thought,’ he pronounced, in his most brittle voice with excessive clarity of enunciation, somewhat reminiscent of Dame Edith Evans as Lady Bracknell, ‘that my meaning was crystal-clear. Do not give such a report to a body whose recommendations are to be published.’

As always, he has completely missed the point. I explained that it is because the report is to be published that I am submitting the evidence. I, the Minister, am to be the judge of when to keep secrets, not the permanent officials.

I appeared to have silenced him completely. Then, after a rather long pause for thought, he enquired if he might make one more suggestion.

‘Only if it’s in plain English,’ I replied.

‘If you must do this damn silly thing,’ he said, ‘don’t do it in this damn silly way.’

February 2nd

On the way to Number Ten this morning Bernard showed me the agenda for Cabinet. To my horror, I was informed that Cabinet was due to discuss my proposal to close down the Land Registry – or what was described as my proposal! I’d never heard of it till that moment. It is a scheme to transfer residual functions to the Property Services Agency. The idea is to reduce the number of autonomous government departments, in which there has been a 9?% rise. Bernard told me I’d initialled it. God knows when – I suppose it must have been in a red box sometime over the last few weeks but I don’t recall it. I’ve been working on the Think-Tank report and nothing else for the last week or more. Anyway, I can’t remember every paper I struggle through at one or two a.m. – in fact, I can hardly remember any of them. There has to be a better system than this.

Bernard assured me that I didn’t really need to know much about the proposal because his information on the grapevine, through the Private Office network, was that the proposal would go through on the nod.

[Regrettably, this situation was not as uncommon as the reader might suppose. Because of both the pressure of time and the complexity of much legislation, Ministers frequently had to propose measures to Cabinet that they themselves either had not read or did not fully understand. Hence the distinction sometimes drawn between Ministerial policy, i.e. policies about which the Minister has strong personal views or commitments, and Ministry policy, i.e. most policy – Ed.]

February 3rd

Today was the blackest day so far. Perhaps not only the blackest day since I became a Minister, but the blackest day since I went into politics.

I am deeply depressed.

However, I feel I must record the events of the day, and I’ll do so in the order in which they occurred.

It appears that Sir Humphrey went to the usual weekly Permanent Secretaries’ meeting this morning. It seems that he was ticked off by a couple of his colleagues when he revealed that I had written the draft report for the Think-Tank.

Humphrey complained to Bernard about my behaviour, it seems, and Bernard – who seems to be the only one I can totally trust – told me. Apparently Sir Frederick Stewart (Perm. Sec. of the FCO) actually said to Humphrey that once you allow a Minister to write a draft report, the next thing you know they’ll be dictating policy.

Incredible!

It is true, of course. I have learned that he who drafts the document wins the day.

[This is the reason why it was common Civil Service practice at this time to write the minutes of a meeting BEFORE the meeting took place. This achieves two things. First, it helps the chairman or secretary to ensure that the discussion follows the lines agreed beforehand and that the right points are made by somebody. And second, as busy men generally cannot quite remember what was agreed at meetings, it is extremely useful and convenient to lay it down in advance. Only if the conclusions reached at a meeting are radically different or diametrically opposed to what has been previously written in the minutes will the officials have to rewrite them. Thus it is that pre-written minutes can dictate the results of many meetings, regardless of what may be said or agreed by those actually present – Ed.]

Sir Humphrey and Sir Frederick were discussing Humphrey’s plan (not mine, I may add!) for reducing the number of autonomous government departments, when they encountered Dr Donald Hughes,1 who overheard their conversation.

Hughes revealed that the Think-Tank recommendation accepted the idea of reducing the number of autonomous government departments. This news came as a profound shock to Sir Humphrey, because not all the Ministerial evidence has been taken – ours, for instance, has not!

However, it seems that they have reported unofficially, and clearly the report is not going to change now, no matter what we say. Dr Hughes explained to Sir Humphrey that the Central Policy Review Staff do not sully their elevated minds with anything as squalid as evidence from Ministers!

Sir Humphrey, at first, was not unhappy with Donald Hughes’s news. Naturally, as an experienced civil servant, a proposal to reduce and simplify the administration of government conjured up in Humphrey’s mind a picture of a large intake of new staff specifically to deal with the reductions.

However, this is not the plan at all. Humphrey informed me, at an urgently convened meeting at nine a.m. this morning [TautologyEd.] that Dr Donald Hughes had made these points:

That Jim Hacker is always seeking to reduce overmanning in the Civil Service.

That he is going to succeed, at last.

And that to facilitate this matter, the Treasury, the Home Office and the Civil Service Department have all proposed abolishing the Department of Administrative Affairs.

And that ‘the PM is smiling on the plan’ (his very words).

Appalling! My job’s at stake.

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