“an amazingly successful war effort, which puts to shame all the predictions about the softness and lack of fibre of our people.” But the Roosevelt administration’s strategy for postwar Europe was ill-conceived, and there was cause for concern that war veterans, when they returned, would find their country a changed and perhaps unsettling place.
Without specifying the details, Kennan portrayed the American approach to the European Advisory Commission as “shallow and often unrealistic.” Washington was proceeding “not from what Europe is, but from what we would wish it to be.” It assumed extreme territorial changes without anticipating the tensions these would create. It was proposing a new international organization, along the lines of the old League of Nations, which would freeze that settlement in place. The resulting repression would “force the vanquished peoples to new feats of inventiveness and organization,” until finally they reached the point at which they could sell their collaboration “to the highest bidder among the erstwhile victors.” It would be, in short, the post–World War I settlement all over again.
Meanwhile the men fighting the war would have to compete for jobs after it, with workers “spoiled by high wages” secured through collective bargaining. Veterans who had faced death on meager pay would have little sympathy for labor unions. When combined with growing racial tensions and increasing juvenile delinquency, it would be “a miracle if we could survive this crisis without violence and disorder.” Americans should not think “that we can avoid at home the appearance of those same forces of ugliness and cruelty and timidity and intolerance which we are now fighting abroad.” This was the clearest expression yet of an idea Kennan had been wrestling with—at times with erratic results—since the late 1930s: that there were no distinct boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs. Americans could not insulate themselves from forces that had disrupted other societies. How they handled these would largely determine what the United States could do in the postwar world.5
On June 15 George deposited his baggage at the airlines office in Lisbon, sat with Annelise for an hour at an outdoor cafe watching Portuguese passersby, and then drove with her to the airport, where “we said another of those tearing watime goodbyes” that had become so familiar. “Don’t worry about me,” she wrote of this latest separation while he was still en route, “because I am feeling quite different about it.” (George had arranged, this time, for Annelise and the children to follow him to his new post.) “But even so, I don’t like it and never will.” Getting to Moscow was more difficult than it had been in peacetime: George’s trip required a circuitous routing across the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the southern U.S.S.R. by whatever air transport was available. It took two weeks, giving him time to read more Gibbon, to keep a detailed diary, and to reflect on the Americans— and Russians—he met along the way.6
The journey provided Kennan’s first close look at the U.S. military, and he liked what he saw. On the flight from Gibraltar to Algiers, “I sat proudly side by side with the pilot.” He had never before been on an operational mission, “and I could not have been more pleased.” The next day he found Naples full of “slouching, impassive young American kids” who were running it “pretty damned well.” An Army Air Force general four years younger than he seemed “as efficient as any officer I ever saw.” Kennan spent the night in an Army tent, then used the next morning to reread Gibbon’s account of the Byzantine general Belisarius’s conquest of Naples in A.D. 536. It was a rare opportunity for historical comparison “which only the fortunes of war and the settings of antiquity can provide.”
Most of the Americans with whom he lunched that day, Kennan discovered, agreed with the great historian’s warning that there was nothing “more averse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations in opposition to their inclination and interest.”7 For the moment, this was reassuring. If there was anything “more hopeful than the skill with which our military men pursue the responsibilities of conquest, it is the alacrity with which they again drop them, once their possession is no longer in dispute.” Empires were not their avocation.
The Germans were still much on Kennan’s mind. Prisoners of war, he learned, had been claiming that the Americans were destroying Europe’s cultural values and turning it over to Bolshevism, “that we understand nothing of the continent, and have no plan for its future.” The charge sat strangely, Kennan thought, against discoveries “of SS torture instruments, of bodies without fingernails or toenails, of tons of high explosives hidden in the German Embassy.” But even if accurate, “the fault is still with the Germans for having provoked our intervention.”
We are bound to come over here every time anyone threatens the security of England; and if continental peoples do not wish to bring down upon their heads this dread plague of ununderstanding Americans, they must learn to leave the English alone. Let the Germans take a lesson from this, and not repeat their folly.
This thought too would stick with Kennan: that the national security of the United States was inseparable from the balance of power in Europe. Beyond that, though, the Americans were novices. “The French know exactly what they want, and are quite unreasonable about it. We are the soul of reasonableness and have only the dimmest idea of what we are after.”
No one could say the same of the Soviet Union. “Whoever would understand Russia today should study . . . the great mass of women of the educated officer class,” Kennan concluded after meeting one of them in Naples. For such women, “work is not a decoration to private life but a stern duty to the state. And independent thought is, as in Nazi Germany, a form of self-corruption, unnecessary, dangerous, immoral.” Nor was the tendency confined to women: it was what Bolshevism had done to Russia. Kennan thought it “the most terrifying and discouraging difference from our own mentality.”8
The next few days, which involved stops in Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran, exposed Kennan for the first time to the Middle East. Overwhelmed by its heat, dust, and languor, repelled by the “religious bigotry” that—in contrast to the Russians—kept the feminine half of society under “indefinite house arrest,” he found little in the region to recommend it. The trip left Kennan with an aversion to what would later be called the “third world” that he did little, in his own later life, to overcome.9
In Baghdad, Kennan stayed with Loy Henderson, exiled there by Roosevelt, Henderson believed, for his anti- Soviet views. Stuck in the legation because it was too hot to go out during the day and too dangerous at night, Kennan persuaded himself that the very bleakness of the place might someday tempt Americans into trying to fix it: “If trees once grew here, could they not grow again? If rains once fell, could they not again be attracted from the inexhaustible resources of nature? Could not climate be altered, disease eradicated?” His countrymen would do better to return, “like disappointed but dutiful children, to the sad deficiencies and problems of their native land.”10
Kennan flew from Tehran to Moscow by way of Baku and Stalingrad on July 1, 1944. In the latter city, everything except the airport seemed to have been destroyed. Lunch was served in a dining hall with few chairs and only one glass, but everyone was good-natured about it: “How deeply one sympathizes with the Russians when one encounters the realities of the lives of the people and not the propagandistic preten[s]ions of their government.” On the final leg into Moscow, “I sat glued to the window, moved and fascinated to see before me again this great, fertile, mysterious country which I had spent so many years trying to understand.” Harriman had a car waiting at the airport, insisted on putting Kennan up at Spaso House, “and with that a new life began.”11
II.
Kennan found the Soviet Union less wracked by fear than it had been when he left it in 1937. Stalin’s purges had long since ended. Hitler’s attack and the brutality that followed had “pulled regime and people together, in a process for which the former, at any rate, can be highly thankful.” Soviet diplomats, to be sure, were still uneasy at
