[9] {epimeleia}. Cf. 'Cyrop.' V. iii. 47.
[10] Lit. 'or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment.' As at
the date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), which
permanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.
Courier, 'autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire,
tout le pays devient votre camp.'
Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the passage of rivers, defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to determine with precision[11] the exact number of the enemy he will care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to atack the foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed-the hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period.[12]
[11] See 'Anab.' II. v. 18; 'Cyrop.' III. iii. 47; IV. i. 18.
{tamieusasthai}, 'with the precision of a controller.'
[12] Cf. 'Hell.' II. iv. 6; VII. i. 16.
As to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning and plotting against them. For these in their turn, as a rule, are apt to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great distance from their own main body. But if after all it turns out that the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, God helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country, first making it your business to ascertain [13] his defences, the number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are distributed throughout the country. For there is no booty so splendid as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are especially prone to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar function. You will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to the scene of action.
[13] Or, 'having first studied.' Cf. 'Mem.' III. vi. 10.
VIII
It stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part of raw recruits or amateurs.[1]
[1] Cf. 'Cyrop.' I. v. 11; 'Mem.' III. vii. 7.
And this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to form your guerilla bands[2] must be so hardened and inured to the saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a campaign.[3] That a squadron (and I speak of horse and man alike) should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fashion suggests the idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male antagonists.
[2] Or, add, 'for buccaneers and free-lances you must be.'
[3] Lit. 'every toil a soldier can encounter.'
But reverse the picture. Suppose men and horses to have been taught and trained to leap trenches and scale dykes, to spring up banks, and plunge from heights without scathe, to gallop headlong at full speed adown a steep: they will tower over unpractised opponents as the birds of the air tower over creatures that crawl and walk.[4] Their feet are case-hardened by constant training, and, when it comes to tramping over rough ground, must differ from the uninitiated as the sound man from the lame. And so again, when it comes to charging and retiring, the onward-dashing gallop, the well-skilled, timely retreat, expert knowledge of the ground and scenery will assert superiority over inexpertness like that of eyesight over blindness.
[4] See 'Horse.' viii. 6; cf. 'Hunting,' xii. 2; 'Cyrop.' I. vi. 28
foll.
Nor should it be forgotten, that in order to be in thorough efficiency the horses must not only be well fed and in good condition, but at the same time so seasoned by toil that they will go through their work without the risk of becoming broken-winded. And lastly, as bits and saddle-cloths (to be efficient)[5] need to be attached by straps, a cavalry general should never be without a good supply, whereby at a trifling expense he may convert a number of nonplussed troopers into serviceable fighting men.[6]
[5] [{khresima}] L.D. For the {upomnema} itself cf. 'Cyrop.' VI. ii.
32.
[6] Or, 'thus at a trifling outlay he will be able to render so many
non-efficients useful.' Al. 'make the articles as good as new.'
But if any one is disposed to dwell on the amount of trouble it will cost him, if he is required to devote himself to horsemanship so assiduously, let him console himself with the reflection that the pains and labours undergone by any man in training for a gymnastic contest are far larger and more formidable than any which the severest training of the horseman will involve; and for this reason, that the greater part of gymnastic exercises are performed 'in the sweat of the brow,' while equestrian exercise is performed with pleasure. Indeed, there is no accomplishment which so nearly realises the aspiration of a man to have the wings of a bird than this of horsemanship.[7] But further, to a victory obtained in war attaches a far greater weight of glory than belongs to the noblest contest of the arena.[8] Of these the state indeed will share her meed of glory,[9] but in honour of victory in war the very gods are wont to crown whole states with happiness.[10] So that, for my part, I know not if there be aught else which has a higher claim to be practised than the arts of war.
[7] Cf. 'Cyrop.' IV. iii. 15; Herod. iv. 132; Plat. 'Rep.' v. 467 D.
[8] Cf. Eur. 'Autolycus,' fr. 1, trans. by J. A. Symonds, 'Greek
Poets,' 2nd series, p. 283.
[9] Cf. Plut. 'Pelop.' 34 (Clough, ii. p. 235): 'And yet who would
compare all the victories in the Pythian and Olympian games put
together, with one of these enterprises of Pelopidas, of which he
successfully performed so many?'
[10] 'To bind about the brows of states happiness as a coronal.'
And this, too, is worth noting: that the buccaneer by sea, the privateersman, through long practice in endurance, is able to live at the expense of far superior powers. Yes, and the life of the freebooter is no less natural and appropriate to landsmen-I do not say, to those who can till and gather in the fruit of their fields, but to those who find themselves deprived of sustenance; since there is no alternative-either men must till their fields or live on the tillage of others, otherwise how will they find the means either of living or of obtaining peace?[11]
[11] Cf. 'Econ.' v. 7.
Here, too, is a maxim to engrave upon the memory: in charging a superior force, never to leave a difficult tract of ground in the rear of your attack, since there is all the difference in the world between a stumble in flight and a stumble in pursuit.
There is another precaution which I feel called upon to note. Some generals,[12] in attacking a force which they imagine to be inferior to their own, will advance with a ridiculously insufficient force,[13] so that it is the merest accident if they do not experience the injury they were minded to inflict. Conversely, in attacking any enemy whose superiority is a well-known fact, they will bring the whole of their force into action.
[12] Or, 'one knows of generals,' e.g. Iphicrates at Oneion, 369 B.C.
Cf. 'Hell.' VI. v. 51.
[13] Lit. 'an absolutely weak force.'
Now, my maxim would be precisely converse: if you attack with a prospect of superiority, do not grudge employing all the power at your command; excess of victory[14] never yet caused any conqueror one pang of remorse.
[14] Or, 'a great and decided victory.' Cf. 'Hiero,' ii. 16.
But in any attempt to attack superior forces, in full certainty that, do what you can, you must eventually retire, it is far better, say I, under these circumstances to bring a fraction only of your whole force into action, which fraction should be the pick and flower of the troops at your command, both horses and men. A body of that size and quality will be able to strike a blow and to fall back with greater security. Whereas, if a general brings all his troops
