into action against a superior force, when he wishes to retire, certain things must happen: those of his men who are worse mounted will be captured, others through lack of skill in horsemanship will be thrown, and a third set be cut off owing to mere difficulties of ground; since it is impossible to find any large tract of country exactly what you would desire. If for no other reason, through sheer stress of numbers there will be collisions, and much damage done by kicks through mutual entanglement; whereas a pick of horse and men will be able to escape offhand,[15] especially if you have invention to create a scare in the minds of the pursuers by help of the moiety of troops who are out of action.[16] For this purpose false ambuscades will be of use.
[15] Or, 'by themselves,' reading {ex auton}, as L. Dind. suggests.
Cf. Polyb. x. 40. 6, or if as vulg. {ex auton} (sub. {kheiron},
Weiske), transl. 'to slip through their fingers.'
[16] Zeune and other commentators cf Liv. v. 38 (Diod. xiv. 114), but
the part played by the Roman subsidiarii at the battle of the
Allia, if indeed 'una salus fugientibus,' was scarcely happy.
Would not 'Hell.' VII. v. 26 be more to the point? The detachment
of cavalry and infantry placed by Epaminondas 'on certain crests,
to create an apprehension in the minds of the Athenians' in that
quarter of the field at Mantinea was a {mekhanema} of the kind
here contemplated.
Another serviceable expedient will be to discover on which side a friendly force may suddenly appear and without risk to itself put a drag on the wheels of the pursuer. Nay, it is self-evident, I think, that, as far as work and speed are concerned, it is the small body which will assert its superiority more rapidly over the larger, and not vice versa-not of course that the mere fact of being a small body will enable them to endure toil or give them wings; but simply it is easier to find five men than five hundred, who will take the requisite care and pains with their horses, and personally practise of their own accord the art of horsemanship.
But suppose the chance should occur of entering the lists against an equal number of the enemy's cavalry, according to my judgment it were no bad plan to split the squadron into divisions,[17] the first of which should be commanded by the squadron-leader, and the other by the ablest officer to be found. This second-officer will for the time being follow in rear of the leading division with the squadron leader; and by and by, when the antagonist is in near proximity, and when the word of command is passed, form squadron to the front and charge the hostile ranks [18]-a manouvre calculated, as I conceive, to bring the whole mass down upon the enemy with paralysing force, and to cause him some trouble to extricate himself. Ideally speaking, both divisions[19] will be backed by infantry kept in rear of the cavalry; these will suddenly disclose themselves, and rushing to close quarters, in all probability clench the nail of victory.[20] So at any rate it strikes me, seeing as I do the effects of what is unexpected- how, in the case of good things, the soul of man is filled to overflowing with joy, and again, in the case of things terrible, paralysed with amazement. In proof of what I say, let any one reflect on the stupor into which a body of men with all the weight of numerical advantage on their side will be betrayed by falling into an ambuscade; or again, on the exaggerated terror mutually inspired in belligerents during the first few days, of finding themselves posted in face of one another.
[17] Or, 'troops.'
[18] Possibly on flank. See Courier, p. 35, on Spanish cavalry
tactics.
[19] Lit. 'supposing both divisions to be backed by footmen,' etc.
[20] Or, 'achieve a much more decisive victory.' Cf. 'Cyrop.' III.
iii. 28.
To make these dispositions is not hard; the difficulty is to discover a body of men who will dash forward[21] and charge an enemy as above described intelligently and loyally, with an eager spirit and unfailing courage. That is a problem for a good cavalry general to solve. I mean an officer who must be competent to so assert himself in speech or action[22] that those under him will no longer hesitate. They will recognise of themselves that it is a good thing and a right to obey,[23] to follow their leader, to rush to close quarters with the foe. A desire will consume them to achieve some deed of glory and renown. A capacity will be given them patiently to abide by the resolution of their souls.
[21] {parelontas}, in reference to S. 18 above, {parelaunoi}, 'form
squadron to the front.'
[22] 'To be this, he must be able as an orator as well as a man of
action.' Cf. 'Mem.' II. ii. 11.
[23] Cf. Tennyson's 'The Charge of the Light Brigade':
Their's not to make reply, Their's not to reason why, Their's but to do and die.
To turn to another matter, take the case in which you have two armeis facing one another in battle order, or a pair of fortresses[24] belonging to rival powers, and in the space between all kinds of cavalry manouvres are enacted, wheelings and charges and retreats.[25] Under such circumstances the custom usually is for either party after wheeling to set off at a slow pace and to gallop full speed only in the middle of the course. But now suppose that a commander, after making feint[26] in this style, presently on wheeling quickens for the charge and quickens to retire-he will be able to hit the enemy far harder, and pull through absolutely without scathe himself most likely; through charging at full speed whilst in proximity to his own stronghold (or main body), and quickening to a gallop as he retires from the stronghold (or main body) of the enemy. If further, he could secretly contrive to leave behind four or five troopers, the bravest and best mounted of the squadron, it would give them an immense advantage in falling upon the enemy whilst wheeling to return to the charge.[27]
[24] Al. 'fields and farmsteads between.'
[25] Or, 'retirements,' see 'Horsemanship,' viii. 12; 'Cyrop.' V. iv.
8; 'Hell.' IV. ii. 6; 'Ages.' ii. 3.
[26] Or, 'having precluded in this fashion. See Theocr. xxii. 102:
{ton men anax ataraxen etosia khersi prodeiknus Pantothen},
'feinting on every side' (A. Lang). Al. 'having given due warning
of his intention.' Cf. Aristot. 'H. A.' ix. 37.
[27] Cf. Aristoph. 'Knights,' 244 (Demosthenes calls to the
hipparchs[?]):
{andres eggus . all' amunou, kapanastrephou palin}.
IX
To read these observations over a few times will be sufficient, but for giving them effect the officer will need perpetually to act as circumstances require.[1] He must take in the situation at a glance, and carry out unflinchingly whatever is expedient for the moment. To set down in writing everything that he must do, is not a whit more possible than to know the future as a whole.[2] But of all hints and suggestions the most important to my mind is this: whatever you determine to be right, with diligence endeavour to perform. For be it tillage of the soil, or trading, or seafaring, or the art of ruling, without pains applied to bring the matter to perfection, the best theories in the world, the most correct conclusions, will be fruitless.
[1] {pros to paratugkhanon}, lit. 'to meet emergencies.' Cf. Thuc. i.
122: 'For war, least of all things, conforms to prescribed rules;
it strikes out a path for itself when the moment comes' (Jowett).
[2] Or, 'is about as feasible as to foretell each contingency hid in
the womb of futurity.'
One thing I am prepared to insist on: it is clear to myself that by Heaven's help our total cavalry force might be much more quickly raised to the full quota of a thousand troopers,[3] and with far less friction to the mass of citizens, by the enrolment of two hundred foreign cavalry. Their acquisition will be doubly helpful, as intensifying the loyalty of the entire force and as kindling a mutual ambition to excel in manly virtue.
[3] See Schneid. ad loc.; Boeckh, 'P. E. A.' pp. 263, 264; Herod. vi.
112; Thuc. vi. 31; Aristoph. 'Knights,' 223; Aeschin. 'De F. L.'
334-337. See for this reform, Martin, op. cit. 343, 368.
