Not so ill (he answered), when truth and interest correspond, but when they are opposed, Socrates, I have no skill to make the worse appear the better argument.[29]
[29] See Plat. 'Apol.' 19-23 D; Aristoph. 'Clouds,' 114 foll.
Perhaps you have no skill, Ischomachus, to make black white or falsehood truth (said I).[30]
[30] Or, 'It may well be, Ischomachus, you cannot manufacture falsehood into truth.' Lit. 'Like enough you cannot make an untruth true.'
XII
But (I continued presently), perhaps I am preventing you from going, as you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?
To which he: By no means, Socrates. I should not think of going away until the gathering in the market is dispersed.[1]
[1] Lit. 'until the market is quite broken up,' i.e. after mid-day. See 'Anab.' I. viii. 1; II. i. 7; 'Mem.' I. i. 10. Cf. Herod. ii. 173; iii. 104; vii. 223.
Of course, of course (I answered), you are naturally most careful not to forfeit the title they have given you of 'honest gentleman';[2] and yet, I daresay, fifty things at home are asking your attention at this moment; only you undertook to meet your foreign friends, and rather than play them false you go on waiting.
[2] Lit. 'beautiful and good.'
Isch. Let me so far corect you, Socrates; in no case will the things you speak of be neglected, since I have stewards and bailiffs[3] on the farms.
[3] Cf. Becker, op. cit. p. 363.
Soc. And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff? Do you search about, until you light on some one with a natural turn for stewardship; and then try to purchase him?--as, I feel certain, happens when you want a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him. [4] Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?
[4] The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general, would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.
Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my 'alter ego,'[5] needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge.[6]
[5] Or, 'my other self.'
[6] Lit. 'to teach another what I know myself.'
Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?
Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.
Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.
Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?
Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.
Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.
Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application.[7]
[7] {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any rate with Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.
Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues.[8]
[8] For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, 'H. G.' viii. 599.
Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.
Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege?[9] Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
[9] Lit. 'what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signify the sort to me distinctly.'
Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent--I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.
Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?
Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.
Soc. What then?[10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?
[10] Or, 'What then--is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose that these are the sole people . . .'
Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection.[11] Your woeful lover[12] is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object.[13] No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes,[14] will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that he now endures in separation from the object of his passion.[15] Accordingly, I am in no great hurry to appoint a person of this sort to manage[16] my affairs; the very attempt to do so I regard as futile.
[11] See 'Mem.' I. iii. 8 foll.; II. vi. 22.
[12] {duserotes}. Cf. Thuc. vi. 13, 'a desperate craving' (Jowett).
[13] Cf. 'Symp.' iv. 21 foll.; 'Cyrop.' V. i. 7-18.
[14] Or, 'where demands of business present themselves, and something must be done.'
[15] Cf. Shakesp. 'Sonnets,' passim.
[16] Or, 'I never dream of appointing as superintendent.' See above, iv. 7.
Soc. Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain? Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and farming operations?
Isch. On the contrary, there are no people easier to train, none so susceptible of carefulness in these same matters. One needs only to point out to them that the pursuit is gainful, and their interest is aroused.
Soc. But for ordinary people? Given they are self-controlled to suit your bidding,[17] given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how will you lesson them in carefulness? how teach them growth in diligence to meet your wishes?
[17] Or, 'in matters such as you insist on.'
Isch. By a simple method, Socrates. When I see a man intent on carefulness, I praise and do my best to honour him. When, on the other hand, I see a man neglectful of his duties, I do not spare him: I try in every way, by word and deed, to wound him.
Soc. Come now, Ischomachus, kindly permit a turn in the discussion, which has hitherto concerned the persons being trained to carefulness themselves, and explain a point in reference to the training process. Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others more careful?
No more possible (he answered) than for a man who knows no music to make others musical.[18] If the
