continuation of the telegram of 13 September referred to above.
11 Telegram from Puzanov and others to Brezhnev, ibid., p. 53.
12 Ibid., p. 55.
13 Ryurikov kept a diary on behalf of his ambassador, which is at Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan, pp. 59–62. This account of the shoot-out comes from the diary entry for 19 September, supplemented by interview with Ryurikov in Moscow on 24 July 2009 and 9 March 2010. According to Ryurikov, copies of his diary were sent to a number of departments in Moscow. See also Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 173.
14 Interview with Taraki’s wife in D. Gai and V. Snegirev, Vtorzhenie (Moscow, 1991), p. 45.
15 V. Ablazov, Afganistan chetvertaya voina (Kiev, 2002), pp. 163–8.
16 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 156.
17 Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, p. 44.
18 Ibid., p. 42.
19 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, pp. 167–9.
20 Ibid., pp. 176–80. Kurilov’s account has been much shortened. General Bogdanov believes that Kurilov was carried away by his imagination. In his book The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York, 2009), Gregory Feifer reports Gulabzoi’s insistence that he did not leave Kabul in a box.
21 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 181.
22 Mitrokhin, The KGB in Afghanistan, p. 71.
23 This account is based on the sometimes contradictory depositions of Ekbal, Vadud, and Jandad during the investigation into Taraki’s death which was conducted after Amin was overthrown. See Ablazov, Afganistan chetvertaya voina, pp. 149–56.
24 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, pp. 185–6.
25 Ye. Chazov, Zdorovie i Vlast (Moscow, 1992), p. 182. Chazov is reporting what he was told by Andropov.
26 The views of Gorelov, Zaplatin, and Tabeev are recorded in Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, pp. 71–7.
27 G. Dorronosoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York, 2005), pp. 96–7; Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 189.
28 A. Volkov, ‘40-aya Armia: Istoria sozdania, sostav, izmenenie struktury’ (www.rsva-ural.ru/library/?id63).
29 Lyakhovski implies as much in Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 213, though the facsimile of Chernenko’s note which he reproduces on p. 214 indicates that Grishin, Kirilienko, Pelshe, Tikhonov, and Ponomarev were also present.
30 R. Gates, From the Shadows (New York, 1996), p. 132.
31 Dorronosoro, Revolution Unending, p. 310.
32 S. Coll, Ghost Wars (London, 2005), p. 48.
33 This account of Andropov’s paper is based on notes taken by A. Dobrynin provided to the Cold War International History Project by Odd Arne Westad.
34 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 215; facsimile on p. 214.
35 Quoted in Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, pp. 218–20.
36 A. Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51: Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2007, p. 27.
37 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 1995, Chapter II.
4: The Storming of the Palace
1 A. Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51: Inside the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Seizure of Kabul, December 1979, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, January 2007, pp. 30 and 32.
2 Yevgeni Kiselev, interview, Moscow, 24 March 2010.
3 Figures from http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/ _« ».
4 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afgha nistan.
5 A. Savinkin, Afganskie uroki: Vyvody dlya budushchego v svete ideinogo nasledia A. E. Snegareva (Moscow, 2003), p. 755.
6 L. Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy: zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvadki (Moscow, 2002), p. 195.
7 Directive No. 312/12/001, signed by Ustinov and Ogarkov and despatched on 24 December. See A. Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana (Moscow, 2004), p. 252.
8 Order No. 312/1/030, 25.12.79, is referred to ibid., p 258; it is quoted in full there in Chapter 2.
9 D. Gai and V. Snegirev, Vtorzhenie (Moscow, 1991), p. 107.
10 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2009, p. 331; V. Korolev, ‘Uroki Voiny v Afganistane 1979–1989’ (http://www.sdrvdv.org/node/159).
11 FCO File FSA 020/9: Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, Folio 2: Kabul telegram to FCO of 27 December 1979.
12 Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, pp. 106–7.
13 Article on the history of the 56th Guards Independent Airborne Assault Brigade (http://www.andjusev.narod.ru/a/56_DSCHB.htm).
14 Sergei Morozov, interview, Moscow, 31 May 2007.
15 B. Gromov, Ogranichenny kontingent (Moscow, 1994) (http://www.rsva.ru/biblio/prose_af/li mited_contingent/index.shtml).
16 I. Tukharinov, Sekretny komandarm (http://www.rsva.ru/biblio/prose_af/secret_c om/index.shtml).
17 Gromov, Ogranichenny kontingent.
18 Many accounts wrongly say that Amin moved to the nearby Dar-ul Aman Palace, which was built by Amanullah.
19 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 246.
20 L. Grau, The Take-down of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main, Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2 October 2002.
21 Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51, p. 63.
22 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 249.
23 Ibid., pp. 249 and 253.
24 Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51, pp. 49 and 52.
25 Alexander Lyakhovski, conversation, 18 September 2007.
26 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, pp. 242 and 253–382.
27 There is a brief note on Colonel Kuznechkov in T. Popova, Pomyani nas, Rossia, Leningrad Committee of Mothers, 1991, which contains photographs and notes on the soldiers
