Afgantsy

from Leningrad who died in the war. Kuznechkov was the first.

28 The story about the KGB cook is repeated in, among other places, V. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB: Myth & Reality (London, 1990), p. 315. Kuzichkin’s account of events in Afghanistan is inaccurate, but he claims to have heard the story from Talybov personally. See also V. Kryuchkov, Lichnoe delo, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1996), Vol. 1, p. 206.

29 Alexander Shkirando, interview, Moscow, 27 July 2007.

30 Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51, p. 454.

31 Ibid., p. 67.

32 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 288.

33 V. Snegirev, Ryzhy (Moscow, 2000), p. 145.

34 Other versions are that he was killed by a grenade splinter, or even by his own guards: Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51, p. 62.

35 In Lyakhovski’s successive accounts, the casualty figures vary. In his Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, pp. 285 and 295, he gives slightly higher figures for the Soviet casualties than those in Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51, p. 64. I have taken the latter figures.

36 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 2004, p. 285.

37 Galina Ivanov, interview, Moscow, 14 March 2010.

38 S. Balenko, SpetsNaz GRU v Afganistane (Moscow, 2010), p. 69. Since the early 1990s, when the veil of secrecy on the storming of the palace began to be lifted, there have been a number of more or less coherent reconstructions of these confused events. One of the most lucid is Lester Grau’s 2003 article, ‘The Takedown of Kabul: An Effective Coup de Main’ (http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/downloa d/csipubs/Block/chp9_Block_by.pdf). This is based on the testimony of eyewitnesses and the technical analysis of the Russian general staff. Map 3 is based on the detailed map in Mr Grau’s article.

39 The cat features in Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, 1995, and in General Drozdov’s account of the storming of the palace in Balenko, SpetsNaz GRU v Afganistane, p. 66.

5: Aftermath

1 A. Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana (Moscow, 2004), pp. 308–9.

2 Dr Lutfullah Latif, interview, London, 18 July 2008.

3 A. Kalinovsky, ‘A Long Goodbye: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1980–1992’, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2009, quoting C. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way (New York, 2006), p. 407.

4 A. Greshnov, Afganistan: Zalozhniki vremeni (Moscow, 2006), pp. 44, 134, and 136.

5 There are many accounts of this embarrassing moment. See, for example, Rasskazy ob operatsiakh—Baikal (http://antiterror.ru/to_profs/tales/71898035).

6 Greshnov, Afganistan: Zalozhniki vremeni, p. 42.

7 A. Sukhoparov, ‘Afganski sindrom’ (www.russia-today.ru/2009/no_02/02_world_02.html).

8 A. Belofastov and A. Rebrik (eds.), Mushavery (Moscow, 2005), p. 44.

9 The Americans lost twenty-four soldiers dead and 325 wounded. The Panamanian military lost about 205 dead. US military estimates of civilian casualties range from 200 to 1,000. Other estimates range from 2,000 to 5,000 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Stat es_invasion_of_Panama).

10 Dmitri Ryurikov, interview, Moscow, 24 July 2009.

11 The Bonner and Sakharov texts are at www.hro.org- editions-karta.

12 M. Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London, 1995), pp. 139–54.

13 Lyakhovski, Tragedia i doblest Afgana, p.19; interview with Oleg Bogomolov, Moscow, May 2007.

14 Information from Dr Galina Yemelyanova, a former scholar from the institute, 6 June 2009.

15 Information from Sir Christopher Mallaby, who was serving in the Foreign Office at the time.

16 A. Chernyaev, Sovmestny iskhod: Dnevnik dvukh epokh 1972–1991 gody (Moscow, 2008), diary entries for 30 December 1979, 5 February 1980, and 9 February 1980, pp. 386, 391, and 392.

17 A. Savinkin, Afganskie uroki: Vyvody dlya budushchego v svete ideinogo nasledia A. E. Snegareva (Moscow, 2003), p. 728.

18 S. Coll, Ghost Wars (London, 2005), pp. 132–3.

19 D. MacEachin, ‘Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan’, Center for the Study of Intelligence (https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and- monographs/).

20 Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 132–3.

21 FCO File FSA 020/2, Folio 74e: Howell Minute of 28 November 1979.

22 Alexander Maiorov, who was the Chief Soviet Military Adviser in Afghanistan in 1980–81, says that Ustinov, the Defence Minister, spoke of both objectives. There is no evidence that Ustinov was talking about concrete plans rather than vague aspirations: A. Maiorov, Pravda ob afganskoi voine (Moscow, 1996), pp. 50 and 269; R. Gates, From the Shadows (New York, 1996), p. 148; FCO File FS 021/6: letter of 28 September from South Asia Department to High Commission in Islamabad.

23 ‘Grain Becomes a Weapon’, Time, 21 January 1980.

24 FCO File EN021/1/1980, Folio 103: Washington Tel 137 of 9 January 1980 to FCO.

25 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carter_Doctrine.

26 G. Dorronosoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present (New York, 2005), p. 192, fn.

27 Z. Brzezinski, ‘Reflections on Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan’, 26 December 1979 (http://www.cnn.com/SPE CIALS/cold.war/episodes/20/documents/brez.carter/).

28 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 44; Brzezinski interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, 15–21 January 1998 (http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.ht ml).

29 Daily Telegraph, 14 January 1985.

30 J. Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago, 2006), pp. 488–90.

31 Memorandum of 6 December 1984, quoted in Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 102. The point about the politicisation of American support for the mujahedin was made to me by Artemy Kalinovsky.

32 They base themselves primarily on Brzezinski’s interview with Le Nouvel Observateur in January 1998.

33 A. Lyakhovski, Cold War International History Working Paper No. 51: Inside the Soviet