for Hitler’s reported comments in The Times, 13 September 1937, on the colonial question.
200. Domarus, 690.
201. Domarus, 705–6.
202. Domarus, 765. For Hitler’s plans for Berlin, see Speer, 87–90; Thies, Architekt, 95–8. The metaphor of a ‘thousand-year Reich’ was a play on the chiliastic religious traditions of the coming heavenly Reich associated with millenarian mystics such as Joachim di Fiore. Wolfgang Benz, Hermann Graml, and Hermann Wei? (eds.), Enzyklopadie des Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart, 1997, 435, 757; Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Berlin, 1998, 607.
203. Domarus, 715–32, here 717.
204. For Hitler’s use of the term in this speech, see Domarus, 730.
205. Domarus, 728, 731.
206. Schroeder, 78–9.
207. TBJG, I/3, 45 (16 February 1937).
208. See Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933– 1945, Oxford, 1983, 216.
209. On the struggle over denominational schools, see, especially, Franz Sonnenberger, ‘Der neue “Kulturkampf”. Die Gemeinschaftsschule und ihre historischen Voraussetzungen’, in Martin Broszat, Elke Frohlich, and Anton Grossmann (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.3, Herrschaft und Gesellschaft im Konflikt, Munich/Vienna, 1981, 235–327; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 209ff.
210. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, ch.5; John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933–1945, London, 1968, 206—13; Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler’s Power, Princeton, 1969, especially ch.5 and 8; Elke Frohlich, ‘Der Pfarrer von Mombris’, in Martin Broszat and Elke Frohlich (eds.), Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol.6, Die Herausforderung des Einzelnen. Geschichten uber Widerstand und Verfolgung, Munich/Vienna, 1983, 52—75.
211. For the trials and the orchestrated campaign of defamation against the Catholic clergy, see Hans Gunter Hockerts, Die Sittlichkeitsprozesse gegen katholische Ordensangehorige und Priester 1936/1937, Mainz, 1971. The trials and publicity were often counter-productive in strongly Catholic regions. See Kershaw, Popular Opinion, 196.
212. TBJG, I/3, 5 (5 January 1937), 10 (14 January 1937), 37—8 (9 February 1937).
213. See Conway, 206—7, where the reasons for Hitler’s decision are regarded as unclear. Goebbels’s diary entries indicate that he, not Hitler, took the initiative, and that Hitler eagerly seized upon the suggestion for elections as a way out of the problem, to end the damaging discord. It proved a miscalculation. See Conway, 206– 13.
214. TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937). Hitler indicated again to Goebbels in June that he was considering the separation of Church and State. Goebbels added that the clergy would do well not to provoke the Fuhrer any further (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). However, Hitler was concerned that in the event of a separation of church and state Protestantism would then be destroyed and provide no counter-weight against the Vatican (TBJG, I/3, 359 (7 December 1937). See Hans Gunter Hockerts, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik im neuen Licht der Goebbels-Tagebucher’, APZ, 30 July 1983, B30, 23–8, here 29.
215. TBJG, I/3, 77 (13 March 1937).
216. TBJG, I/3, 97, 105 (2 April 1937, 10 April 1937).
217. TBJG, I/3, 129, 143, 156–7, 162 (1 May 1937, 12 May 1937, 29 May 1937, 2 June 1937).
218. TBJG, I/3, 119 (21 April 1937).
219. Conway, 209. ‘We’ve got the swine and won’t let him go again,’ noted Goebbels (TBJG, I/3, 195 (4 July 1937); see also 194, 196, 198 (3 July 1937, 6 July 1937, 10 July 1937)). Hitler’s order for the detention of Niemoller (Conway, 209) was almost certainly sanction for actions requested by the Gestapo. Niemoller’s fundamental opposition to Nazism had undergone a pronounced course of development since his initial enthusiasm in 1933. For most Protestant clergy, opposition on church matters was compatible with conformity — often enthusiastic approval — in other areas of Nazi policy. See the contributions by Gunther van Norden, ‘Widerstand in den Kirchen’, and Helmut Gollwitzer, ‘Aus der Bekennenden Kirche’, in Lowenthal and Muhlen, Widerstand und Verweigerung 111–28, 129–39; the critical assessment by Shelley Baranowski, The Confessing Church, Conservative Elites, and the Nazi State, Lewiston/Queenston, 1986; and, for the penetration of the thinking even of prominent Protestant theologians by Nazi ideas, Robert P. Ericksen, Theologians under Hitler, New Haven/London, 1985.
220. TBJG, I/3, 258 (8 September 1937).
221. In the event, the exclusion was carried out by police decrees since a law would have drawn too much public attention. TBJG, I/3, 354 (3 December 1937).
222. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).
223. Hildegard von Kotze and Helmut Krausnick (eds.), ‘Es spricht der Fuhrer’. 7 exemplarische Hitler-Reden, Gutersloh, 1966, 147–8.
224. David Bankier, ‘Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 3 (1988), 1–20, here 15.
225. Domarus, 727–30; Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich, Dusseldorf, 1972, 173; Saul Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews. The Years of Persecution, 1933– 39, London, 1997, 184–5.
226. Otto Dov Kulka, ‘“Public Opinion” in National Socialist Germany and the “Jewish Question”’, Zion, 40 (1975), 186–290 (text in Hebrew, abstract in English, documentation in German), 272–3. And see Michael Wildt, Die Judenpolitik des SD 1935 bis 1938. Eine Dokumentation, Munich, 1995; and Lutz Hachmeister, Der Gegenforscher. Die Karriere des SS-Fuhrers Alfred Six, Munich, 1998, ch.V. The SD had originally been established under the direction of Reinhard Heydrich in 1931 to carry out surveillance on the Nazi Party’s political opponents. Much of this was undertaken by the Gestapo after 1933, when the SD’s main role increasingly centred upon the gathering of information and production of reports on ideological ‘enemies’ (such as the Churches), the ‘Jewish Question’, and soundings of opinion.
227. Kulka, 274. See also BA, R58/991, Fols.71a-c, Vermerk of SD Abt. II 112, 7 April 1937. The SD’s work was assisted by volunteers, such as the expert in Hebrew — a long-standing party member — who, while in Leipzig, had on his own initiative put together a register of all ‘full–, three-quarter, half–, and quarter-Jews’ in the area and now proposed to do the same for Upper Silesia, then for the whole of Silesia. He also offered to teach Hebrew to SD members. It was recommended that the SD should make use of his offer. BA, R58/991, Fol.46. See also Friedlander, 197ff.
228. The numbers of Jews emigrating from Germany had, in fact, not fluctuated massively since the first massive wave of emigration in 1933, despite the varying intensity of Nazi persecution. In 1937, there was even a decline compared with the rate of the previous year. By the Nazis’ own standards, emigration pressure had not been adequate; more than two-thirds of the Jewish population of 1933 still remained in Germany. According to the statistics of the Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden, the organization established in 1933 to coordinate and represent Jewish interests in the ever-worsening conditions, 37,000 Jews fled the country in 1933, 23,000 in 1934, 21,000 in 1935, 25,000 in 1936, and 23,000 in 1937. Werner Rosenstock, ‘Exodus 1933–1939. A Survey of Jewish Emigration from Germany’, LBYB, 1 (1956), 373–90, here 377; Herbert A. Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration from Germany. Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (I)’, LBYB, 25 (1980), 313–61, here 326, 330–32.
229. Adam, 172–4.
230. Karl A. Schleunes, The Twisted Road to Auschwitz. Nazi Policy toward German Jews,
