1933–1939, Urbana/Chicago/London, 1970, 159–60.
231. Hermann Graml, Reichskristallnacht. Antisemitismus und Judenverfolgung im Dritten Reich, Munich, 1988, 167.
232. Adam, 174ff.
233. See Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung, Munich, 1969, 432–3.
234. TBJG, I/3, 26 (28 January 1937). He spoke again in late February of his expectation that the showdown would follow in five or six years’ time (TBJG, I/3, 55 (23 February 1937)).
235. TBJG, I/3, 25–6 (28 January 1937). Frick came back to his notions of Reich Reform, but, despite Blomberg’s support, found no favour with Hitler. Frick had raised the issue in connection with a law of 26 January 1937 to regulate the regional government and administration of Greater Hamburg, which he saw as a step to more comprehensive Reich Reform (Gunter Neliba, Wilhelm Frick. Der Legalist des Unrechtsstaates: Eine politische Biographie, Paderborn etc., 1992, 149).
236. TBJG, I/3, 158–9 (31 May 1937); Domarus, 696–7. According to Goebbels, Hitler was sorely disappointed in Raeder and Blomberg, who would have been satisfied with diplomatic protests (TBJG, I/3, 162 (2 June 1937)). Naval intelligence, which only reported the incident to Hitler at lunchtime on 30 May, though the news had come in on the Saturday evening, was seen as having failed miserably. Goebbels thought that Raeder would not be long in office (TBJG, I/3, 158 (31 May 1937), 162 (2 June 1937)). The American journalist William Shirer was informed that Hitler had been ‘screaming with rage all day’ and wanted to declare war on Spain (Shirer, 63). Goebbels — possibly echoing Hitler’s own opinion — expressed the view soon afterwards that Blomberg was weak and ‘a puppet in the hands of his officers’. Hitler’s own anger at Wehrmacht officers wanting to intervene in police matters, ‘where they understood not the slightest thing’, was also mentioned in the same entry (TBJG, I/3, 181 (22 June 1937)). By September, Goring, too, was expressing anger at the Wehrmacht leadership, which Goebbels saw on the way to becoming a ‘state within a state’ (TBJG, I/3, 257 (8 September 1937)). See also Goebbels’s comments along the same lines, TBJG, I/3, 316, 322 (28 October 1937, 2 November 1937), after Hitler, in a rage, had criticized monarchical tendencies in the Wehrmacht.
237. TBJG, I/3, 211 (24 July 1937).
238. TBJG, I/3, 221 (1 August 1937).
239. TBJG, I/3, 370 (15 December 1937), for the view that the Russian threat was at least partially removed through the Japanese victory over China.
240. TBJG, I/3, 198 (10 July 1937).
241. TBJG, I/3, 378 (22 December 1937); see also 385 (28 December 1937).
242. TBJG, I/3, 351 (30 November 1937).
243. See Wright and Stafford, ‘Hitler, Britain, and the Ho?bach Memorandum’, 100 and 120 n.167.
244. TBJG, I/3, 200 (13 July 1937). See also Goebbels’s own comments (p.252) on 3 September 1937.
245. TBJG, I/3, 177 (18 June 1937). Goebbels was still sceptical after the effusive expressions of mutual friendship following Mussolini’s state visit in September (TBJG, I/3, 283 (29 October 1937), 285 (1 October 1937)).
246. Schneider, Nr.42, 8, where the elaborate organization of the receptions for Mussolini in Munich and Berlin is also described.
247. Domarus, 737; Hauner, Hitler, 121.
248. TBJG, I/3, 281 (28 September 1937). See also 282–3 (29 November 1937), 2.84–5 (1 October 1937).
249. Joseph Goebbels. Tagebucher 1924–1945, 5 vols., ed. Ralf Georg Reuth, Munich, 1992 (Tb Reuth), iii.1100, n.88. See Norbert Schausberger, ‘Osterreich und die nationalsozialistische Anschlu?-Politik’, in Funke, 728–56, here 744–8.
250. Schausberger, ‘Osterreich’, 746.
251. Schausberger, ‘Osterreich’, 744; Geyl, 157.
252. TBJG, I/3, 201 (13 July 1937).
253. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
254. TBJG, I/3, 266 (14 September 1937). In October, Hitler hinted to the Aga Khan that Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, and the Corridor figured in German revisionism (Schmidt, 382).
255. TBJG, I/3, 369 (15 December 1937).
256. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Starting World War II, 1937–1939, Chicago/London, 1980 (= Weinberg II), 289, and 287, where it is pointed out that foreign visitors were also starting to expect action against Austria in the near future. The economic gains from the seizure of assets in Austria were an attractive proposition with the German armaments economy under strain (Schausberger, in Funke, 744–8; and the fuller account in Norbert Schausberger, Der Griff nach Osterreich. Der Anschlu?, Vienna/Munich, 1978, ch.6).
257. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
258. TBJG, I/3, 223 (3 August 1937).
259. Wright/Stafford, 102.
260. TBJG, I/3, 307 (20 October 1937). ‘This temporary state must disappear,’ (Dieser Saisonstaat mu? weg) he had entered in his diary the previous day (306 (19 October 1937)).
261. TBJG, I/3, 327 (6 November 1937).
262. Jost Dulffer, Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920– 1939, Dusseldorf, 1973, 446–7.
263. Kube, 195. Klaus-Jurgen Muller, in his Das Heer und Hitler. Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime 1933–1940, (1969), 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1988, 243; and General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente zur politisch-militarischen Vorstellungswelt und Tatigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933–1938, Boppard am Rhein, 1980, 249, has Hitler summoning the meeting.
264. Friedrich Ho?bach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, Wolfenbuttel/Hanover, 1949, 219; Wright/Stafford, 82, for the second part of the meeting dealing with rearmament questions. Following the discussion of the raw materials issue, new allocations to the navy were agreed. Instead of 45,000 tons of steel, the navy would receive its full complement of 75,000 tons. (Dulffer, Marine, 447; Ho?bach, 219; Weinberg II, 41; Wright/Stafford, 123 n.200 on Hitler speaking from notes.)
265. Walter Bu?mann, ‘Zur Entstehung und Uberlieferung der “Ho?bach-Niederschrift”’, VfZ, 16 (1968), 373–84, here 377; Wright/Stafford, 82.
266. IMG, xxv, 402–13, Doc. 386-PS. Ho?bach, 217–20, relates how he made the notes on the meeting. And see Muller, Heer, 243ff.; Muller, Beck, 249ff.; Dulffer, Marine, 448–51; Hermann Gakenholz, ‘Reichskanzlei 5. November 1937’, in Richard Dietrich and Gerhard Oestreich (eds.), Forschungen zu Staat und Verfassung. Festgabe fur Fritz Hartung, Berlin, 1958, 459–74. Bu?mann, Wright/Stafford, and Bradley F. Smith, ‘Die Uberlieferung der Ho?bach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 329–36, have removed any doubts about the authenticity of the document.
267. See Wright/Stafford, 84.
268. See Weinberg II, 39 n.74 for the generally understood notion that Austria would be taken over from the outside, and Papen’s comments to a Hungarian minister in Vienna in May that both Austria and Czechoslovakia would disappear. Hitler’s view that little was to be gained at that time by a rapprochement with Britain, and his strong preference for close ties with Italy, figured in the confidential reports on press briefings by Georg Dertinger and Dr Hans Joachim Kausch. See Wright/Stafford, 91–5.
269. Wright/Stafford, 82–4.
270. Ho?bach, 219; Muller, Heer, 244; Wright/Stafford, 85.
