Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

11. Weinberg II, 278–9.

12. Weinberg II, 122; Martens, 122.

13. Borthwick Institute, York, Papers of 1st Earl of Halifax, 410.3.6, ‘Conversation with Herr Hitler — 19th November 1937’, Fols.13, 16; 410.3.3 (vi), ‘Lord Halifax’s Diary. Visit of the Lord President to Germany, 17th to 21st November, 1937’, Fol.9; Confidential Memo., Fol.4. Hitler, Halifax noted in his diary (Fol. 12), struck him ‘as very sincere, and as believing everything he said’. Halifax’s notes made in the train en route from Berlin to Calais on 21 November (Fol.1) stated: ‘Unless I am wholly deceived, the Germans, speaking generally, from Hitler to the man in the street, do want friendly relations with Great Britain. There are no doubt many who don’t: and the leading men may be deliberately throwing dust in our eyes. But I don’t think so…’ See also The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days, London, 1957, 187.

14. Weinberg II, 288.

15. Akten zur Deutschen Auswartigen Politik 1918–1945 (= ADAP) D, I, N0.80, 106; DGFP, D, I, 80, 129–31; TBJG, 1/3, 369 (15 December 1937); Weinberg II, 287–8; Kube, 241.

16. Weinberg II, 289.

17. Kube, 216.

18. See Kube, 212–14.

19. See Kube, 235–6 for Goring’s emphasis on political and military, not just economic motives for Anschlu?.

20. Stefan Martens, ‘Die Rolle Hermann Gorings in der deutschen Au?enpolitik’, in Franz Knipping and Klaus- Jurgen Muller (eds.), Machtbewu?tsein in Deutschland am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Paderborn, 1984, 75–92, here 80; Kube, 216, 224ff.

21. Kube, 225–7, 229–30, Schmidt, 352–3.

22. Kube, 232, 236–7.

23. Franz von Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 401.

24. Papen, 401; and see Kube, 238–9.

25. Kube, 240. Halifax had been ‘immensely entertained’ at meeting Goring, whose personality he found ‘frankly attractive’, like a combination of ‘film star, great landowner… Prime Minister, party-manager, head gamekeeper…’ (Borthwick Institute, Halifax Papers, 410.3.3 (vi), Fol.21, Diary of Halifax’s visit to Germany; an abbreviated version of his meeting with Goring is in Halifax, 190–91).

26. Martens, Goring, 122.

27. TBJG, 1/3.369 (15 December 1937). ‘Papen unfolds a plan to bring down Schuschnigg,’ Goebbels recorded. ‘The cat doesn’t leave the mouse alone. But that’s good. Schuschnigg is getting too strong and cheeky (frech)’.

28. Papen, 408–9; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971). Kurt Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, London, 1947, 18, dates Papen’s approach to early 1938. But in his subsequent interview, he makes clear that the invitation to Berchtesgaden, passed on by Papen in January, followed an earlier approach.

29. Papen, 409–10.

30. Papen, 412; Weinberg II, 289–91. On 26 January, Papen told Schmidt that Hitler would like Schuschnigg to come to Berchtesgaden on 15 February (Papen, 410). When, precisely, the date for the meeting was altered is unclear. But Papen was sent to Vienna to confirm it on 5 February, the day after he had been dismissed as ambassador to Vienna. Papen claimed he had again recommended the meeting, after initially suggesting one at the time that the Austrian police confiscated the papers of Gauleiter Tavs — revealing the plans for actions to provoke German intervention — at the raid on the Vienna party headquarters (Papen, 408–9). The raid took place on 25 January (Pauley, 195–6; Weinberg II, 288). Papen had then issued an invitation to Schuschnigg, endorsed by Hitler, on 27 January (Pauley, 195). This was the invitation to the rearranged meeting, which Papen implausibly claimed Hitler had forgotten and had to be reminded of (Papen, 408). The original invitation, again at Papen’s suggestion and with Hitler’s approval, had been agreed to by the Austrian chancellor on 8 January (Weinberg II, 289).

31. Pauley, 196; Weinberg II, 288.

32. Weinberg II, 278, 290; Papen, 413.

33. Weinberg II, 290.

34. Keppler’s report to Hitler, describing the terms agreed on 2 February between Schuschnigg and Sey?- Inquart, is in ‘Anschlu?’ 1938. Eine Dokumentation, ed. Dokumentationsarchiv des osterreichischen Widerstandes, Vienna, 1988, 149–50. See also Papen, 411–12, 420; Weinberg II, 292.

35. Papen, 418, 420.

36. Papen, 413. However, according to his later testimony, Schuschnigg, aware that the Blomberg–Fritsch affair had created serious tension between Hitler and the army, had mistakenly taken the news that three generals would be in attendance as an indication that they would be exerting a restraining influence (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, John Toland Collection, Tape 53, Side B (Toland interview with Kurt Schuschnigg, 11 September 1971)).

37. Below, 84.

38. Papen, 413. Below, 84 for Hitler’s tension at the visit.

39. Kurt Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem in Rot-Wei?-Rot, Zurich, 1946, 38.

40. Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 40–2.

41. Papen, 414–17. For the terms, see DGFP, D, I, No.294–5, 513–17; see also Gehl, 174.

42. Papen, 420. Schuschnigg was given three days to comply (Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49; Papen, 420; Below, 85). Hitler had retired to the Obersalzberg to prepare his speech (Below, 83).

43. Below, 85; Papen, 415.

44. Keitel, 177; Papen, 417.

45. Papen, 418–19; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 49.

46. Papen, 420; Domarus, 790; Schuschnigg, Ein Requiem, 51–2.

47. Keitel, 178 and n.26. Jodl and Canaris were involved with Keitel in setting up the manoeuvres. See IMG, xxviii.367 (D0C.1780–PS, Jodl-Tagebuch), entry for 13 February 1938.

48. Keitel, 178.

49. Below, 85.

50. Tb Reuth, 1208 (16 February 1938).

51. Below, 85; Tb Reuth, 1209 (16 February 1938).

52. Der unbekannte Dr Goebbels. Die geheimen Tagebucher 1938, ed. David Irving (= Tb Irving), London, 1995, 53 (17 February 1938); Der Spiegel (= Tb Spiegel), 31/1992, 102.

53. Below, 86.

54. Domarus, 803.

55. ADAP, D, I, Dok.328, p.450; Kube, 243; Pauley, 198.

56. Papen, 403–4; Pauley, 194–201; also Weinberg II, 288–90.

57. Domarus, 801. The speech had been toned down somewhat from its draft (Pauley, 203).

58. Pauley, 202–4.

59. Papen, 422–3; John Toland, Adolf Hitler, London, 1977, 438–9.

60. Weinberg II, 294.

61. Domarus, 804.

62. Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission. Berlin, 1937–1939, London, 1940, 116–17.

63. Pauley, 205. Hitler had demanded a plebiscite in his meeting with Henderson on 3 March — though, of course, only on his terms (Henderson, 116–17).

64. Pauley, 206; Dieter Wagner and Gerhard Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer. The Nazi Annexation of Austria, 1938, London, 1971, 15–19, 25–6. The relevant section of Schuschnigg’s