speech, proclaiming the referendum, is printed in ‘Anschlu?’ 1938, 221–2. See also Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebucher 1937/38, Hamburg, 1949, 121–3, entries for 9–10 March 1938.
65. Below, 89; see also Domarus, 818, for Hitler’s post facto comments to Ward Price, a journalist on the Daily Mail who had interviewed him a number of times in earlier years, in Linz on 12 March, that he had acted because of Schuschnigg’s betrayal, which he had at first not believed. Hitler told the Reichstag on 18 March that he thought the rumours of the referendum were ‘fantastic’ and ‘incredible’ (Domarus, 829).
66. Tb Irving, 97 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 102–3.
67. Tb Irving, 97–8 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 103, 105.
68. Helmut Michels, Ideologie und Propaganda. Die Rolle von Joseph Goebbels in der nationalsozialistischen Au?enpolitik bis 1939, Frankfurt am Main etc., 1992, 380.
69. Tb Irving, 98 (10 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; see also David Irving, Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich, London, 1996, 242–3; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 68–9.
70. Kube, 244.
71. Jan?en/Tobias, 175–6.
72. Tb Irving, 99 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105.
73. IMG, x.566; Keitel, 178 and n.27; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 51–5.
74. Tb Irving, 99–100 (11 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 105; Tb Reuth, 1212–13 (11 March 1938); Irving, Goebbels, 243.
75. Tb Reuth, 1213 (11 March 1938).
76. Tb Irving, 101 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/1992, 106.
77. Papen, 427; Kube, 244 n.87. The dramatic events of 11 March are meticulously described in Ulrich Eichstadt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler. Geschichte des Anschlusses Osterreichs 1933– 1938, Wiesbaden, 1955, 378–422.
78. ADAP, D. I, 468–70, no.352 (quotation, 469).
79. IMG, xxxiv, 336–7, Doc.102–C; Domarus, 809.
80. Papen, 428.
81. IMG, ix. 333; trans. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 12 vols., Nuremberg, 1946–9, xii.735.
82. IMG, ix. 333. See Papen, 438: ‘The course of events in the Reich Chancellery on March 11, 1938, revealed the extent to which Goering had become the dominating personality among those who advocated the “total” solution.’
83. IMG, xvi.131–2; Tb Irving, 101–2 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92,106; Toland, 444; Pauley, 208.
84. IMG, xxxi.355–6, 358, 361, Doc. 2949–PS; Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, ed. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Washington, 1946–8, v.629–31, 635; Tb Irving, 101–3 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 106–7. Goebbels does not mention the demand to withdraw the plebiscite, and has Goring reporting that all demands were met, then posing a further — and almost identical — ultimatum for half an hour later. His own entry appears garbled.
85. Pauley, 208.
86. NCA, v.970, 982, D0C.3254–PS; see also IMG, xvi.199 (testimony of Michael Skubl, pointing out Sey?’s embarrassed stance, and the impression he gave of being led rather than leading).
87. Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
88. See Below, 89, who was told on returning to the Reich Chancellery on the early evening of 11 March that the next day ‘Austria will be coordinated’.
89. DBFP, Series 3,1, 13, Doc. 25.
90. Geyl, 189.
91. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
92. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938).
93. Below, 89–90.
94. Shirer, Berlin Diary 82–3.
95. Pauley, 211. The Nazi Party in Austria had by this time around 164,000 members, more than twice as many as in 1933, when the NSDAP had been outlawed. With the Party proscribed, and in the absence of free elections, the level of its overall support in the population on the eve of the Anschlu? can only be estimated. But in 1932, in regional elections, the NSDAP had already won around a fifth of the vote. See Gerhard Botz, ‘Austria’, in Detlef Muhlberger (ed.), The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements, London/New York/Sydney, 1987, 242–80, here 251. Assuming more than a doubling by 1938, in line with the level of increase in Party membership, it could be guessed that Nazi supporters (of differing levels of commitment) formed at least two-fifths of the population by the time the Anschlu? crisis broke. Gerhard Botz’s estimate of 25–35 Per cent of the population who were enthusiasts for the Anschlu? in 1938 may be too low (Gerhard Botz, Der 13.Marz 38 und die Anschlu?-Bewegung. Selbstaufgabe, Okkupation und Selbstfindung Osterreichs 1918– 1945, Vienna, 1978, 27).
96. Tb Reuth, 1214 (12 March 1938); Pauley, 213; text in Domarus, 81 n.120.
97. TWC, xii.729.
98. Pauley, 213; Kube, 246; Tb Irving, 103 (12 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Eichstadt, 411.
99. Keitel, 178; Papen, 430. Jodl had found Brauchitsch on the night of 11 March ‘in a completely desolate mood’ (‘in einer vollkommen desolaten Stimmung’), fearing international repercussions (IMG, xv.442; Keitel, 178, n.27).
100. IMG, xxxi.369, Doc. 2949–PS; Domarus, 813; and see Tb Spiegel, 107, for Goebbels’s reaction.
101. Domarus, 811.
102. Shirer, 83.
103. Pauley, 214; Toland, 450.
104. Keitel, 179.
105. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107; Domarus, 814 (‘Freundschaftsbesuch’ in DNB-Meldung, 12 March 1938). The official version had German troops crossing the border at 8a.m. (Domarus, 814).
106. Domarus, 814, has Hitler landing at 10a.m.; Keitel, 179 has a 6a.m. departure from Berlin; Below, 91, has Hitler leaving at 8 and landing at 10.
107. Below, 91; Keitel, 179. For Bock, see the sketches by Horst Muhleisen, ‘Fedor von Bock — Soldat ohne Fortune’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die Militarelite des Dritten Ketches, Berlin/Frankfurt am Main, 1995, 6–82, and Samuel W. Mitcham Jr, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock’, in Gerd R. Ueberschar (ed.), Hitlers militarische Elite. Von den Anfangen des Regimes bis Kriegsbeginn, Darmstadt, 1998, 37–44; and Generalfeldmarshall Fedor von Bock. The War Diary, 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 16–17.
108. Tb Irving, 104 (13 March 1938); Tb Spiegel, 31/92, 107. See Papen, 438, for Hitler’s orders for draft legislation to be prepared to make him head of both states in
