158. Carl Zuckmayer, Als wars ein Stuck von mir. Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main (1966), 1971, 61.
159. George Clare, Last Waltz in Vienna. The Destruction of a Family, 1842– 1941, Pan Books edn, London, 1982, 177–8.
160. Botz, Wien, 55; Gedye, 300–302; Wagner and Tomkowitz, 160–61.
161. Gedye, 305, 307, 313.
162. See Hans Safrian, Eichmann und seine Gehilfen, Frankfurt am Main, 1995, ch.1, especially 36ff.; Wildt, 52–4.
163. Jan?en/Tobias, 190–94, quotation 194.
164. Cit. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’. 130–31; and see Auerbach in Knipping and Muller, 278.
165. See Karl Stadler, Osterreich 1938–1945 im Spiegel der NS- Akten, Vienna/Munich, 1966, ch.2; Botz, Wien, 355–64, 475–82; Tim Kirk, Nazism and the Working Class in Austria. Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the National Community, Cambridge, 1996, ch.2.
166. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 124–32.
167. The German minority had indeed suffered some forms of economic and bureaucratic discrimination at the hands of the Czechs, though seldom of a serious nature before the Nazi takeover of power in Germany had given a new edge to ethnic tensions — mainly stirred up by the Sudeten Germans. Even then, Nazi propaganda within and outside the Sudetenland contrived to exaggerate the alleged maltreatment of the German population. See Ronald M. Smelser, The Sudeten Problem 1933–1938. Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, Folkestone, 1975, 8–9, 214ff.; and, especially, the contemporary observations on the nature and degree of the discrimination against the German minority — described as ‘easily the most privileged in the whole of Europe’ — in Gedye, 396: ‘At no time politically persecuted, always arrogantly conscious of the backing of Germany’s sixty-six millions, its real grounds of complaint were limited to certain economic disabilities — which were in part politically necessary because of German disloyalty to the Republic — and to petty officiousness practised by some of the local Czech officials… Their minor grievances had been continually exaggerated, inflated, and trumpeted abroad by the German propaganda machine because they were an instrument to forward the German plans for hegemony in Eastern Europe.’
168. Helmut Groscurth, Tagebucher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938– 1940, ed. Helmut Krausnick and Harold C. Deutsch, Stuttgart, 1970, 111–12 (4 September 1938).
169. Wiedemann, 171.
170. IMG, xxxiv.732–47, Doc.175–C.
171. IMG, xxxiv.745–7. See also ADAP, D, VII, 547ff The term ‘living space’ was not understood by Beck and the army leadership in the same way that Hitler deployed it. But the vagueness of the concept meant such dangerous overlaps were possible. See Muller, Heer, 250 and n.215.
172. See Timothy W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939, Opladen, 1975, ch.XII.
173. Muller, Beck, 521; Klaus-Jurgen Muller, ‘The Structure and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition in Germany up to 1940’, in H. W. Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich, London, 1985, 132–78, here 159.
174. See Kube, Ch.VII.
175. See Hans Bernd Gisevius, To the Bitter End, Cambridge, Mass., 1947, 275– 326; Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten… Die Wilhelmstra?e in Frieden und Krieg. Erlebnisse, Begegnungen und Eindrucke 1918–1945, Stuttgart, 1950, 232–57; Muller, in Koch, Aspects, 156ff.; Hans Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler. An Assessment, London, 1970, 56–63; and, especially, Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War, Minneapolis, 1968, ch.1; and Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand-Staatsstreich-Attentat. Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, (1969), 4th edn, Munich/Zurich, 1985, ch.IV.
176. For Beck, see above all Muller, Beck, ch.6. Muller’s interpretation of Beck gave rise to strong criticism from Peter Hoffmann, ‘Generaloberst Ludwig Becks militarpolitisches Denken’, HZ, 234 (1982), 101–21, who saw in Muller’s treatment an undue emphasis on opportunism at the expense of stress on ethical motivation; and a sharp riposte from Klaus-Jurgen Muller, ‘Militarpolitik nicht Militaropposition!’, HZ, 235 (1982), 355–71. For Canaris, see Heinz Hohne, Canaris — Patriot im Zwielicht, Munich, 1976.
177. On Weizsacker, see Rainer A. Blasius, Fur Gro?deutschland — gegen den gro?en Krieg. Staatssekretar Ernst Freiherr von Weizsacker in den Krisen um die Tschechoslowakei und Polen 1938/39, Cologne/Vienna, 1981; and Rainer A. Blasius, ‘Weizsacker kontra Ribbentrop: “Munchen” statt des gro?en Krieges’, in Knipping and Muller, 93–118. As with Beck, Weizsacker’s motives have been differently interpreted. Leonidas E. Hill, the editor of Weizsacker’s papers, underlines the State Secretary’s emphasis on a peaceful evolution to Germany’s position as a world power (Leonidas E. Hill, ‘Alternative Politik des Auswartigen Amtes bis zum 1. September 1939’, in Jurgen Schmadeke and Peter Steinbach (eds.), Der Wider stand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, Munich/Zurich, 1985, 664–90, here 669–78). Blasius, in contrast, stresses Weizsacker’s affinity with Hitler’s expansionist aims, though growing opposition to a war which he is certain will bring catastrophe on Germany.
178. See Ritter, ch.10; Klemens von Klemperer, German Resistance against Hitler. The Search for Allies Abroad, 1938–1945, Oxford, 1992, 86–101; Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War. Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, London, 1992, 86–7, 102–3, 122ff.
179. A term used by the Regierungsprasident of Niederbayern and the Oberpfalz in his report of 8 September 1938, GStA, MA 106673. The SD’s annual report for 1938 also spoke of a ‘war psychosis’ (Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938– 45, 17 vols, ed. Heinz Boberach, Herrsching, 1984 (=MadR), ii.72–3).
180. See Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’ 132–9; and Auerbach, in Knipping and Muller, 28off.
181. Bloch, 175.
182. Weizsacker-Papiere, 136; ADAP, D, II, No. 374, 473; Blasius, in Knipping, 101.
183. Henderson thought another crisis like that on 21 May would push him over the edge (DBFP, Series 3, II, Appendix 1, 649, 651, 653, and Doc.823, 284).
184. Tb Irving, 123 (20 March 1938).
185. IMG, xxviii.372.
186. Weinberg II, 318; see also 366–70; Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘The May Crisis, 1938’, JMH, 29 (1957), 213–25, especially 225; and Donald Cameron Watt, ‘Hitler’s visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler’s Response to External Stimuli’, JCH, 9 (1974), 23–32 (and Weinberg’s criticism of Watt’s interpretation, in Weinberg II, 366 n.210).
187. See, for this term — derived from the analysis of Nazi rule by Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, London, 1942 (see his comments on 296, 382–3) — Peter Huttenberger, ‘Nationalsozialistische Polykratie’, GG, 2 (1976), 417–42.
188. Muller, Heer, 327; Muller, Beck, 350–51.
189. Klaus-Jurgen Muller, Armee, Politik und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1933– 1945, Paderborn, 1979, 43–4.
190. Even reports from oppositional sources made plain that, while opinion was divided on the likelihood and the outcome of war, extensive nazified sections of the population remained firmly behind Hitler. (See DBS, v.684–90, report for July 1938, drawn up on 24 August 1938.)
