Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

138); and Schmidt, 511–14. Schmidt, 511, conveys the misleading impression that he was present throughout the talks. In fact, another German interpreter was used on this occasion since Schmidt did not command fluent Spanish. Schmidt was in the party at Hendaye, however, and almost certainly drew up the (incomplete) record of the discussion for the Foreign Office. He was, therefore, thoroughly versed in the course of the talks, and his account accords well with the contemporary notes of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres. On the meeting, see, especially, Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the Myth of Hendaye 1940’, Contemporary European History, 1 (1992), 1–16, here 9–10; and Preston, Franco, 394–400. The misleading impression given by Schmidt is pointed out in David Wingeate Pike, ‘Franco and the Axis Stigma’, JCH, 17 (1982), 369–406, here 377–9.

274. See Samuel Hoare, Ambassador on Special Mission, London, 1946, 92–5, for the general view in diplomatic circles that Spanish claims on north Africa had been the major stumbling-block in the discussions.

275. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 10 and n.32 (the reported comment of the Spanish interpreter, Baron de las Torres, on 26 October 1940).

276. Cit. Preston, ‘Hendaye’, 12.

277. Schmidt, 514; Bloch, 311–12.

278. CP, 401–2.

279. Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 272. Halder was noting comments passed on by Hitler’s Army adjutant, Gerhard Engel.

280. Schmidt, 514–16.

281. Francois Delpla, Montoire. Les premiers jours de la collaboration, Paris, 1996, ch.16, and Delpla, Hitler, 337–8, places a more positive gloss on the outcome of the talks, from Hitler’s point of view, especially in terms of the propaganda impression intended to be conveyed abroad that Germany was indomitable on the continent of Europe.

282. Staatsmanner, i.49; Halder KTB, ii.157–8 (1 November 1940); CP, 401; and see Jackel, Frankreich, 121.

283. Schmidt, 516; Below, 249. Hitler’s disappointment was implicit in the comments passed on by Engel and noted by Halder. (Halder KTB, ii.158 (1 November 1940).)

284. Below, 250.

285. Schmidt, 516–17; Engel, 88 (28 October 1940).

286. CP, 399–404; Schmidt, 517.

287. CP, 402.

288. Engel, 89–90 (4 November 1940), and n.272.

289. Carr, Poland, 98–9, 118–19; Martin van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941. The Balkan Clue, Cambridge, 1973, 69–72; and see Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia 1941, London, 1975, Ch.VI-VII.

290. Weisungen, 81, Directive No.18, Section 5 (12 November 1940).

291. Carr, Poland, 120.

292. Weizsdcker-Papiere, 224 (15 November 1940). The Molotov visit is well described in Read and Fisher, Deadly Embrace, ch.46, 510ff. The following account draws on Schmidt, 526–36, and the official texts of the discussions: Staatsmanner I, 166–93; ADAP, D, XI.1, 455–61, 462–72, Nos.326, 328.

293. Carr, Poland, 121.

294. Staatsmanner I, 193; ADAP, D, XI.1, 472–8, No.329.

295. ADAP, D, XI.2, 597–8, No.404; Carr, Poland, 121; Weinberg III, 201; Bloch, 316.

296. Bloch, 316.

297. Hillgruber, Strategie, 356 and n.21 (Engel communication of 10 April 1964).

298. Engel, 91 (15 November 1940).

299. Below, 253.

300. Fedor von Bock, The War Diary 1939–1945, ed. Klaus Gerbet, Atglen PA, 1996, 193–4 (3 December 1940); Hillgruber, Strategie, 361 n.50. The translation of part of the passage from Bock’s diary — ‘zumal ein wirksames Eingreifen Amerikas dann durch Japan, das nun den Rucken frei hat, erschwert wird’ (‘especially since an effective intervention by America would be complicated by Japan, which would keep our rear free’) — mistakenly implies that the implication of eliminating the Soviet Union would be that Germany’s, not Japan’s, rear would be unexposed.

301. Halder KTB, ii.209–14 (5 December 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 292–8. Hitler amended the operational plan when Jodl presented it to him on 17 December in one significant element. He insisted that strong mobile units from the centre of the front swing northwards from the Warsaw region to ensure the destruction of Soviet forces in the north and subsequently occupy Leningrad and Kronstadt. Only thereafter were operations aimed at Moscow to be undertaken. (Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab), ed. Percy Ernst Schramm (=KTB OKW) Bd.I: 1. August 1940–31. Dezember 1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1965, 233.)

302. Halder KTB, ii.227–8 (13 December 1940).

303. KTB OKW, i.996; Hillgruber, Strategie, 363.

304. Weisungen, 96 (18 December 1940).

305. The Army High Command had until December 1940 used the code-name ‘Otto’ for its operational plan for the east (Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940)). The Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab, however, had used the designation ‘Fritz’, coined by Lo?berg, who (see above n.157) named the operation after his son, for its own campaign-plan. The latter term was then given by Jodl to the draft directive No.21 for the ‘eastern operations’ on 12 December 1940, before being altered to ‘Barbarossa’ five days later. (KTB OKW, i.226, 233. And see B. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, Cambridge, Mass., 1973, 16–18; Barry A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia 1939–1941, Oxford, 1973, 79, 82, 258; Dirks/Jan?en, ch.9). Confusingly, ‘Otto-Programm’ was also used by the Army for the programme to develop rail and roads in the east (Halder KTB, ii.133 n.3, 210 n.6, 381).

306. KTB OKW, i.257–8; Hillgruber, Strategie, 364– 5.

307. Below, 259.

308. Halder KTB, ii.283; trans. Halder Diary, 320 (17 February 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 365.

CHAPTER 8: DESIGNING A ‘WAR OF ANNIHILATION’

1. Below, 252, 254. He probably exaggerates (259, 279–80) the extent of reservation about the attack on the USSR. See Irving, HW, 181–2, and Irving, Goring, 307–9, for Goring’s initial objections (in November 1940) on economic, not moral, grounds — emphasizing Germany’s dependence on Soviet grain and oil — but rapid capitulation to Hitler’s arguments. Goring’s preferred strategy would have been, acting together with the Italians and Spanish, to force the British out of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and to occupy North Africa and the Balkans.

2. IfZ, F37/3 (1940–41), Kreisleitertagung am 28.11.1940, quotations Fols.290–91 (pp.18–19 of speech). In the earlier part of his speech, Himmler had stated (Fol.277) that Hitler was not interested in destroying the English people and their Empire (‘Dem Fuhrer lag nichts an der Vernichtung des englischen Volkes und Imperiums’), but that the British had refused his offers of peace. The Fuhrer would prefer not to undertake a landing in England, but would do so the following spring if the last resistance was not broken. He saw