135. TBJG, 1/8, 229 (20 July 1940).
136. William L. Shirer, This is Berlin. Reporting from Nazi Germany 1938–40, London, 1999, 35.
137. Shirer, Berlin Diary, 357.
138. Domarus, 1558.
139. Domarus, 1558 (text of the speech, 1540–59).
140. Below, 242; CD, 277 (19 July 1940); Domarus, 1560.
141. Lukacs, Duel, 193ff.
142. CP, 381.
143. TBJG, 1/8, 231 (21 July 1940).
144. For the following: Halder KTB, ii.30–33 (22 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 230–32; Klee, Dokumente, 245–6. And see DRZW, ii.370.
145. For continued considerations of the need to discuss terms with Hitler, see John Charmley, Churchill: the End of Glory. A Political Biography, London/New York, 1993, 422–32; and Lukacs, Duel, 97ff. Ribbentrop’s plan to engage the Duke of Windsor, then in Portugal, as a go-between to groups in Britain prepared to entertain peace, presumably with the aim of bringing the Duke back to the throne at the expense of his brother, George VI, ended with the departure of the Windsors on 1 August to the Bahamas, where the Duke, from Churchill’s standpoint out of harm’s way, took up the position as Governor. (Hillgruber, Strategie, 153–4; Walter Schellenberg, Schellenberg, Mayflower edn, 1965, 67–80.)
146. Halder KTB, ii.30–33 trans. Halder Diary, 230–32 (22 July 1940). According to Below, Hitler had commented at the beginning of July that he wanted to avoid war with England because a showdown with Russia was unavoidable (Below, 236). A month earlier than this, on 2 June, he was reported to have remarked in conversation with von Rundstedt that with England, he imagined, now ready for peace he could start to settle the account with Bolshevism (Warlimont, 113; Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, Durham NC, 1960, 175–6).
147. Speer, 188.
148. See Hitler’s reported comments to Rundstedt and Jodl about the attack on Bolshevism (Warlimont, 111, 113). And see Bernd Stegemann, ‘Hitlers Kriegsziele im ersten Kriegsjahr 1939/40. Ein Beitrag zur Quellenkritik’, Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 27 (1980), 93–105, here especially 99.
149. Halder KTB, i.358 (16 June 1940); 372 (25 June 1940); DRZW, iv.9; Carr, Poland, 115.
150. Halder KTB, ii.6 and n.I (3 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 220–21. Halder had already spoken about preparations to a small number of his planning staff in mid-June (Dirks/Jan?en, 131).
151. TBJG, 1/8, 232 (22 July 1940).
152. TBJG, 1/8, 234 (24 July 1940); Domarus, 1562.
153. Kubizek, 287–90.
154. Halder KTB, ii.43 (30 July 1940).
155. DRZW, ii.371.
156. Halder KTB, ii.45–6 (30 July 1940).
157. IfZ, ZS 678, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, ‘Hitler, eine militarische Fuhrerpersonlichkeit?, Summer, 1946, Fol.5: ‘Das Heer hatte von den Absichten des Fuhrers schon erfahren, als diese noch im Stadium der Erwagung waren. Es wurde deshalb ein Operationsplan entworfen, noch ehe der Befehl dazu erging.’ IfZ, ZS 97, Major-General Bernhard v. Lo?berg, Fol. 10 (Letter of Lo?berg, 7 September 1956). Lo?berg also pointed out (Fol.15, letter of 16 September 1956) that a further feasibility study (by Major-General Marcks, see Jacobsen, 1939–1945, 164–7) from the OKH General Staff was already submitted by 5 August, although Hitler had only spoken to Jodl for the first time about the Russian campaign on 29 July. And already by 20 August, operational plans were so far advanced that General Quarter-Master Eduard Wagner was in a position to report to Halder on planning for troop supplies (Eduard Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeister s des Heeres General der Artillerie Eduard Wagner, ed. Elisabeth Wagner, Munich/Vienna, 1963, 261–3, especially 263). According to Jodl, in a further post-war statement (IfZ, MA 1564–1 Nuremberg Document NOKW-065, a ten-page statement by Jodl, dated 26 September 1946, here pp.9–10 (Frames 0654–5)), Hitler was concerned about the Russian threat to the Romanian oil-fields. However, the feasibility studies over the next weeks completely ruled out any early move. Preparations could not be completed in under four months and by that time it would be winter when, Jodl’s staff reckoned, military operations in the east would be impossible. For the time being, the idea of an attack on the Soviet Union was shelved. But Warlimont was commissioned in August with working out improvements aimed at speeding up troop concentration in the east. Then in November, Hitler passed on to Jodl the order that all sections of the Wehrmacht should start planning for an operation against Russia. (See also Lukacs, Duel, 213–14.) As Lo?berg pointed out, the later operational plans bore a strong resemblance to the feasibility studies of summer 1940 for what he had dubbed — after his small son — ‘Operation Fritz’ and was later renamed ‘Barbarossa’. (IfZ, ZS 97, Fols.10–11, 14–15.)
158. According to Warlimont’s later account, Jodl checked the doors and windows were closed before telling them that Hitler had decided to rid the world of Bolshevism ‘once and for all’ by a surprise attack on Russia the following May (Warlimont, 111).
159. Warlimont, 111–12.
160. Warlimont, 112. See also Lukacs, Duel, 214.
161. Halder KTB, ii.46–50 (31 July 1940); trans. Halder Diary, 241–5.
162. Halder KTB, ii.6 (3 July 1940).
163. Hillgruber, Strategie, 213–14.
164. Weisungen, 75–6.
165. DRZW, ii.378, 382. Below, 244, has fighters in action from the 8th.
166. Below, 244. Churchill, ii.Ch.XVI, provides a graphic description of the ‘Battle of Britain’.
167. DRZW, ii.386 (and, for Goring’s directive of 2 August 1940, aimed initially at destroying the British fighter-arm in the London area before major attacks on the capital, 380 and nn.50–51).
168. Steinert, 367 and n.160.
169. Below, 244.
170. Domarus, 1580.
171. Below, 244. For the ‘Blitz’, see Churchill, ii. Ch.XVII-XVIII.
172. Hillgruber, Strategie, 174.
173. Halder KTB, ii.128–9 (7 October 1940); Hillgruber, Strategie, 177.
174. Hillgruber, Strategie, 175–6.
175. Halder KTB, ii.98–100 (14 September 1940); DRZW, ii.389.
176. Below, 246.
177. Domarus, 1585.
178. DRZW, ii.396; Below, 245. The city centre of Coventry (including the cathedral) was destroyed. The dead numbered 380, the injured 865. Twelve armaments factories were also damaged, though not put out of production. British decoding of German signals had forewarned the RAF of a major attack on cities in the Midlands and had even indicated Coventry as the main target. However, the air-defence of Coventry was woeful. Almost all the fleet of over 500 German bombers reached the target. Only one plane was certainly brought down (Oxford Companion, 275; Churchill, ii.332–3).
179. Klee, Unternehmen, 205; Domarus, 1586 n.505; Jacobsen, 1939–1945, 172; and see Hillgruber, Strategie, 175–6.
