265. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 442, No.384.
266. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 443, No.384.
267. Domarus, 1424; DGFP, D, 8, 443, No.384.
268. Domarus, 1425; DGFP, D, 8, 444, N0.384.
269. This echoed the comments he had made several weeks earlier, immediately after returning from Poland, on 27 September (Halder KTB, i. 88 (27 September 1939)).
270. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 445, No.384. See also Hillgruber, Strategie, 28–9.
271. Domarus, 1425, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 444–5, No.384.
272. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 445–6, No.384.
273. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 446, N0.384.
274. LB Darmstadt, 287.
275. Domarus, 1426; DGFP, D, 8, 446, N0.384.
276. Domarus, 1427; DGFP, D, 8, 446, No.384.
277. Halder KTB, i.132 (23 November 1939), for Hitler’s reference to the ‘Geist von Zossen’; IMG, xx.628 (statement of von Brauchitsch, 9 August 1946).
278. Muller, Heer, 547–9, 550.
279. TBJG, I/7, 228 (12 December 1939).
280. Halder KTB, i. 154 (10 January 1940), 157 (13 January 1940), 161 (18 January 1940), 165–7 (20 January 1940), 167–9 (21 January 1940); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Gelb. Der Kampf um den deutschen Operationsplan zur Westoffensive 1930, Wiesbaden, 1957, 93.
281. See Hilberg, 137ff.; Aly, 29ff.
282. TBJG, 1/7, 220–21 (5 December 1939).
CHAPTER 7: ZENITH OF POWER
1. TBJG, 1/7, 273 (16 January 1940).
2. Halder KTB, i.93 for the pessimistic report of Major-General Georg Thomas, head of the Defence Economy and Armaments Office at the OKW, on economic shortages and the inability to satisfy the needs of the armed forces for months to come; DRZW, ii.242; Hillgruber, Strategie, 54, referring to the basic plan, aimed at a long war, approved by the British cabinet on 9 September 1939.
3. DRZW, ii.235–6; Hillgruber, Strategie, 40.
4. Hillgruber, Strategie, 38–9. Nevertheless, the Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab (Luftwaffe Operations Staff) pressed in autumn 1939 for bombing-raids on Britain to be launched before the end of the year — targeting harbours to damage shipping and supplies — before British aerial defences could be built up (DRZW, ii.333, 336).
5. DRZW, ii.193.
6. DRZW, ii.239, 266; Hillgruber, Strategie, 34–40, 48, and (for the Z-Plan, which, on 11 July 1940, Hitler agreed to recommence) 148.
7. IMT, xv.385–6 (Jodl testimony); Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 4–5; Hillgruber, Strategie, 34, 53. The British Expeditionary Force, initially comprising a mere 152,000 men, began moving to France only on 4 September and was purely defensive in composition — without armoured division, inadequate in communications, equipment, and training, and with little air power (The Oxford Companion to the Second World War, ed. I. C. B. Dear and M. R. D. Foot, Oxford, 1995, 154–5).
8. DRZW, ii.236–7. See Staatsmanner, i.45, for Hitler’s account to Mussolini (on 18 March 1940) of how weak the German forces were on the western front at the outbreak of war, though he added that the Westwall would have provided an impenetrable barrier to an allied attack. Germany’s munitions were sufficient for a third of the available divisions for fourteen days of fighting, with reserves sufficient for a further fourteen days (Halder KTB, i.99 (8 October 1939)).
9. Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 18–21.
10. Hillgruber, Strategie, 41–5, 48.
11. Hillgruber, Strategie, 32, 45–6. See also Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Der Faktor Amerika in Hitlers Strategie 1938–1941’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Beilage zur Wochenzeitung ‘Das Parlament’, B19/66 (11 May 1966), 3–21, especially 8ff.
12. DGFP, D, VIII, 604–9 (especially 608), Doc.504; Hillgruber, Strategie, 30 n.13.
13. DGFP, D, VIII, 871–80 (especially 876), Doc.663; Hillgruber, Strategie, 30 n.13. See William Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbor. The Making of the Second World War, London, 1985, 113–14, for further comments along these lines, which Carr is prepared to see as an indication that Hitler’s views on Russia were undergoing a metamorphosis.
14. TBJG, 1/7, 269–70 (13 January 1940). A fortnight earlier, he had referred to Stalin as ‘a typical Asiatic Russian’. Bolshevism had eliminated the westernized leadership stratum capable of activating ‘this giant colossus’, he had said. Germany could be content that Moscow had its hands full, but would know how to deal with any attempt by Bolshevism to move westwards (TBJG, 1/7, 250 (29 December 1939)).
15. Jacobsen, 4–21 (Hitler’s ‘Denkschrift und Richtlinien uber die Fuhrung des Krieges im Westen’), here 7.
16. TBJG, 1/7, 270 (13 January 1940).
17. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 43–4, for the misreading of British motives, and, for the personalized elements of the conflict, John Lukacs, The Duel. Hitler vs. Churchill: 10 May–31 July 1940, Oxford, 1992; John Strawson, Churchill and Hitler, London, 1997, Ch.5.
18. Hillgruber, Strategie, 16.
19. DRZW, ii.193, 195–6.
20. Hillgruber, Strategie, 49–50.
21. DRZW, ii.190–92.
22. For the raid, see Churchill, i.506–8. Norwegian gunboats did not intervene. The Altmark was left grounded in the Josing Fjord as the Cossack, with the rescued prisoners on board, made good its escape. Norwegian protests at the entry into their territorial waters were brushed aside by the British Government, which could register a needed boost in morale.
23. Below, 221–2. On the planning of the campaign, see Walther Hubatsch, ‘Weserubung’. Die deutsche Besetzung von Danemark undNorwegen 1940, Gottingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 2nd edn, 1960, ch.2, 39ff.; and Michael Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935–1945, Bd.I: 1935–1941, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 176ff.; Lagevortrage des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939–1945, ed. Gerhard Wagner, Munich, 1972, 82, 85ff.
24. DRZW, ii.197–8; Weisungen, 54–7.
25. DRZW, ii.198; see Halder KTB, i.218 (3 March 1940).
26. Weisungen, 57; DRZW, ii.200.
27. Churchill had suggested the mining operation as early as the previous September. Problems about infringement of Scandinavian neutrality and divisions within the British government and between the British and the French had led to the postponement of any action before — without realizing the imminence of ’ Weser Exercise’ — the decision to mine Narvik was taken in early April. The British aim had been both to interrupt the iron-ore supplies to Germany, and also to provoke German retaliation thereby justifying British landings in Scandinavia (DRZW,
